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The Commemoration of Nelson and Trafalgar 
in St Paul’s Cathedral
Takeshi Nakamura*1)
Abstract
St Paul’s Cathedral, the mother church of the diocese of London and the architectural 
masterpiece by Sir Christopher Wren, became the most important site of royal and military 
state commemoration in the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars periods. This paper 
introduces a series of projects that commemorated Admiral Lord Nelson and the naval 
victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in this metropolitan cathedral in 1805-6 in order to 
improve our understandings about the cultural and political significance of the navy in 
Hanoverian Britain.
In modern Britain, state funeral has been a rare public occasion except for the cases of 
the royalty. It can be defined as a funeral superintended by the Earl Marshal and the 
College of Arms at the public expense. Though Nelson’s state funeral followed a manner 
of heraldic military funerals in the former period, there was a simultaneous attempt to 
signal a departure from this tradition because of both the intention of the Pitt ministry and 
the herald office and public opinion. It could be considered a naval ceremony: Admiral of 
the Fleet as the chief mourner, a bond of many naval officers and an iconoclastic 
attendance of veterans of HMS Victory and pensioners of Greenwich Hospital. Not only 
were these naval presence and symbolism appropriate for the interment of the distinguished 
naval hero, but they also affirmed British naval supremacy over Napoleon to the public.
Along with the discussion and preparation of funeral arrangements, the Pitt ministry 
considered inaugurating a new order of merit as a reward for naval and military officers. 
This order, as called the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’, had two prominent features: 
an unlimited number of knights and the creation of an official ‘Trafalgar Day’. For the 
latter, the choir of St Paul’s Cathedral was assumed as the chapel of this order and the 
investiture ceremony would be held there on 21 October in every year. In spite of an 
elaborate arrangement and a royal approval, however, the scheme to institute a new order 
of merit was suddenly abandoned.
In that period, British parliament had continuously voted to erect monuments for the 
departed heroes on an unprecedented scale. The entombment of Nelson was the sequence 
of the state funeral and the institution of an order of merit, and generated a range of 
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public debates as it was regarded as the focal point in this parliamentary effort. While 
John Flaxman’s monument, which consisted of patriotic narrative and classic allegory to 
fascinate emulation for later generations, only constituted a position amongst a ‘naval and 
military pantheon’, the magnificent tomb occupied the most important site in St Paul’s ― 
under the dome. 
In later years, the authority of St Paul’s exceptionally permitted the burials of admirals 
and Nelson’s kinsmen to enhance the sacred place of the national martyrdom. Furthermore, 
as shown in public funerals of Wellington and other heroes, the tradition of military 
commemoration affirms the significance of Nelson as the national hero in St Paul’s. 
Keywords: Commemoration, Monument, Navy, Horatio Nelson, St Paul’s Cathedral. 
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Horatio Viscount Nelson, the most renowned naval hero in Britain, visited St 
Paul’s Cathedral twice at crossroads in his life. The first time, Nelson participated in 
the Naval Thanksgiving held in this metropolitan cathedral in December 1797. The 
second time, he came back to St Paul’s to complete his last journey after the battle 
of Trafalgar: that is, the state funeral of Nelson in January 1806. In the years 
between 1797 and 1806, Nelson was rising from a naval hero to the naval hero, and 
naval patriotism was sublimated in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars.1) As a case study of cultural and political significance of the navy in 
Hanoverian Britain, this paper attempts to argue this most singular instance among 
naval commemoration in this period.
Stimulated by the Trafalgar bicentenary in 2005, historians examined not only the 
life of Nelson and his final battle with new insights but also the making of Nelson’s 
‘myth’ and ‘legend’ and its historical memory.2) From the latter’s point of view, the 
state funeral of Nelson is a suitable research subject. Though Timothy Jenks, 
Marianne Czisnik, Laurence Brockliss and others, for instance, have already explored 
Nelson’s funeral to consider the contested nature of patriotism and British/English 
national identity,3) they have scarcely studied it in the context of naval and military 
commemoration at that period. There is a more serious problem. St Paul’s 
Cathedral, the site of Nelson’s funeral and burial, is often regarded as the 
ontological condition in these studies.
In order to improve our understanding about the navy and its heroes in British 
political culture, this paper will not only investigate the organization of the state 
funeral of Nelson and its aspects of naval ceremony but also look at a series of 
 * The place of publication is London unless otherwise stated. 
1) Gerald Jordan and Nicholas Rogers, "Admirals as heroes: patriotism and liberty in Hanoverian 
England," Journal of British Studies, xxviii (1989), 201-24; Margarette Lincoln, Representing the 
Royal Navy: British sea power, 1750-1815 (Aldershot, 2002), esp. chapter 3; N.A.M. Rodger, "Queen 
Elizabeth and the myth of sea-power in English history," Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, 6th ser., xiv (2004): 153-74; Timothy Jenks, Naval engagements: patriotism, cultural politics, 
and the Royal Navy, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 2006).
2) David Cannadine, ed., Admiral Lord Nelson: context and legacy (Basingstoke, 2005); Cannadine, ed., 
Trafalgar in history: a battle and its afterlife (Basingstoke, 2006); Holger Hoock, ed., History, 
commemoration, and national preoccupation: Trafalgar 1805-2005 (Oxford, 2007).
3) Timothy Jenks, "Contesting the hero: the funeral of Admiral Lord Nelson," Journal of British 
Studies, xxxix (2000): 422-53; Marianne Czisnik, Horatio Nelson: a controversial hero (2005), 1-14; 
Laurence Brockliss, John Cardwell and Michael Moss, "Nelson’s grand national obsequies," English 
Historical Review, cxxi (2006): 162-82.
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projects to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar: the invention of an official 
‘Trafalgar Day’ and the erection of his monument and tomb. Simultaneously, this 
paper will suggest the significance of St Paul’s as the site of naval and military 
commemoration.
St Paul’s as a naval and military pantheon
After the news of victory and Nelson’s death arrived, the Pitt ministry began to 
make arrangements for his funeral. The funeral of this distinguished naval hero 
would have to be a magnificent and solemn one with all marks of military and 
national honours. In his letter to George III, Lord Hawkesbury, the Home Secretary 
who was entrusted with the arrangement of Nelson’s funeral by Pitt, explained why 
St Paul’s was a more appropriate burial place for Nelson than Westminster Abbey, 
the conventional burial place for the nation’s prominent figures:
As Westminster Abbey is at this time so very crowded with monuments, and as it was 
thought proper to lodge the Standards taken from your Majesty’s enemies in the different 
naval victories in the last war in St Paul’s, your Majesty will perhaps consider that Cathedral 
as the fittest place for this melancholy ceremony, as well as for the erection in future of such 
monuments as it may be determined to raise to the memory of those who may have rendered 
considerable naval and military services to their country.4)
As Hawkesbury indicated, there was a tradition of commemorating British 
victories in St Paul’s from the medieval period. In particular, he recollected the 
Naval Thanksgiving of 1797 as a recent and impressive instance. Immediately after 
the Battle of Camperdown in October 1797, the Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville 
communicated with Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to suggest a naval 
procession to St Paul’s for morale enhancement. After Spencer accepted Grenville’s 
proposal, Prime Minister Pitt also agreed to this idea, but he furthermore demanded 
to expand its scope by including naval victories at Camperdown as well as the 
‘Glorious First of June’ (1794) and St Vincent (1797).5) The Naval Thanksgiving thus 
illuminated the ministerial effort to exploit naval patriotism rather than mere royal 
4) Arthur Aspinall, ed., The later correspondence of George III, 1783-1810, 5 vols (Cambridge, 
1962-70), iv: 364-65: 3153, Hawkesbury to the King, 10 November 1805.
5) Julian Corbett, ed., The private papers of George, second Earl Spencer, 4 vols (1913-24), ii: 195-96: 
Grenville to Spencer, 13 October 1797; ii: 213-15: Pitt to Spencer, 22 October 1797.
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ritual.6) Although the Pitt ministry also planned another naval thanksgiving just after 
the battle of the Nile (1798), it could not help abandoning it because of the fear of 
the invasion from Revolutionary France.7)
In the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars periods, furthermore, the 
British parliament had continuously voted for the erection of national monuments 
amounting to 37, from 1793 to 1823 at a total cost of £119,175 (See, Table and 
Figure).8) While four monuments placed in Westminster Abbey were to commemorate 
naval captains and statesmen such as Pitt the Younger and Spencer Perceval, 
thirty-three monuments erected in St Paul’s were exclusively dedicated to 
high-ranking naval and military officers. Considering that parliament only approved 
the erection of four monuments before 1792 and seven after 1824, this official 
involvement in naval and military commemoration was unique and unprecedented in 
modern Britain, and comparable to the transformation of the Sainte-Geneviève 
Church into the Panthéon in Revolutionary Paris at the same period. St Paul’s was 
reinvented as a ‘British naval and military pantheon’, in which naval and military 
heroes were collectively commemorated.9)
6) Linda Colley argued this naval thanksgiving as a example of public royal ritual to imitate the 
Revolutionary France festival but she was mistaken to consider that the King was responsible ‘for 
the initial decision to hold a thanksgiving’. See, Linda Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837 
(New Haven, 1992), 215-16.
7) The Times, 2 November 1798, 2; William Eden, Baron Auckland, The journal and correspondence of 
William, Lord Auckland, 4 vols (1861-2), iv: 59: Pitt to Auckland, 4 October 1798.
8) "Return of monuments erected in Westminster Abbey and St Paul’s, at the public expense, from 
1750 to the present time," House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (hereafter, HCPP), 1837-8, 36 
(116), 471; "Report from the select committee on national monuments and works of art; with 
minutes of evidence, &c.," HCPP, 1841 Session 1, 6 (416), 437; "Return of sums voted by 
parliament since 1792, for the erection of monuments in honour of public services performed," 
HCPP, 1842, 26 (559), 505.
9) For naval and military monuments in St Paul’s, Alison Yarrington, The commemoration of the hero 
1800-1864: monuments to the British victors of the Napoleonic Wars (1988), chapter 1; Holger 
Hoock, "The British military pantheon in St Paul’s Cathedral: the state, cultural patriotism, and the 
politics of national monuments, c.1790-1820," in Panthoens: transformations of a monumental idea, 
eds. Richard Wrigley and Matthew Craske (Aldershot, 2004), 81-105; Eveline G. Bouwers, "Whose 
heroes? The House of Commons, its commemorative sculptures and the illusion of British Patriotism, 
1795-1814," European Review of History, xv (2008): 675-89. See also, Takeshi Nakamura, "Rulers of 
the sea: naval commemoration and British political culture, c.1780-1815" (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Osaka University, 2007), chapter 3. For a recent argument of ‘pantheons’ in 
nineteenth-century Europe and its cultural and political functions, see, Eveline G. Bouwers, Public 
pantheons in revolutionary Europe: comparing cultures of remembrance, c.1790-1840 (Basingstoke, 
2012).
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Name Rank in service Voted Cost (£) Sculptor
(1) 20 December 1798, contracted
1 Faulknor, Robert Captain RN 14April1795(30April1795) 4,200 Rossi, John Charles Felix
2 Dundas, Thomas Major-General 5 June 1795 3,150 Bacon,John,theYounger 
3 Burgess, Richard Rundell Captain RN 3 November 1797 5,250 Banks, Thomas
(2)  26 and 29 April 1803, contracted
4 Westcott, George Blagdon Captain RN 21 November 1798 4,200 Banks, Thomas
5 Howe, Richard, Earl Howe Admiral of the Fleet 3 October 1799 6,300 Flaxman,John 
6
Riou, Edward Captain RN
16 April 1800 4,200 Rossi, John Charles  FelixMosse,  James Robert Captain RN
7 Abercromby, Sir Ralph Lieutenant-General 18 May 1801 6,300 Westmacott, Sir Richard
(3)  29 October 1807, contracted
8 Nelson, Horatio, Viscount Nelson Vice-Admiral 28 January 1806 6,300 Flaxman, John
9 Cooke, John Captain RN 28 January 1806 1,575 Westmacott, Sir Richard
10 Duff,George Captain RN 28 January 1806 1,575 Bacon,John,theYounger 
11 Cornwallis, Charles, Marquis  Cornwallis General 3 February 1806 6,300 Rossi, John Charles Felix
(4)  7 December 1810, contracted
12 Moore, Sir John Lieutenant-General 25 January 1809 4,200 Bacon,John,theYounger 
13 Hardinge, George Nicholas Captain RN 18 May 1809 1,575 Manning,Samuel 
(5)  2 September 1811, contracted
14 Rodney, George Bridges, Baron  Rodney Admiral 17 June 1793 6,300 Rossi, John Charles Felix
15 Collingwood, Cuthbert, Baron  Collingwood Vice-Admiral 8 June 1810 4,200 Westmacott, Sir Richard
(6)  15 August 1812, contracted
16 Houghton, Daniel Major-General 7 June 1811 1,575 Chantrey,SirFrancisLegatt, 
17
Mackenzie, John Randoll Major-General 
24 June 1811 2,100 Bacon,John,theYounger 
Langworth,  Robert Brigardier-General
18
MacKinnon, Henry Major-General 10 February 1812
2,100 Bacon,John,theYounger 
Craufurd,  Robert Major-General 22 February 1812
(7)  3 and 8 August 1814, contracted
19 Le Marchant, John Gaspard Major-General 3 December 1812 1,575 Smith, James
20 Brock, Sir Isaac Major-General 13 July 1813 1,575 Westmacott, Sir Richard
21 Cadogan, Henry Colonel 13 July 1813 1,575 Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt
22 Bowes, Bernard Major-General 13 July 1813 1,575 Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt
23 Myers, Sir William Lieutenant-Colonel 13 July 1813 1,575 Kendrick, Josephus
(8)  19 December 1815, contracted
24 Ross, Robert Major-General 14 November 1814 1,575 Kendrick, Josephus
<Table> National Monuments in St Paul’s Cathedral voted by Parliament, 1793-1823
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(9)  30 August 1816, contracted
25
Pakenham, Sir Edward 
Michael Major-General 5 June 1815 2,100 Westmacott, Sir  Richard
Gibbs,  Sir Samuel Major-General 21 June 1815
26 Picton, Sir Thomas Lieutenant-General 29 June 1815 3,150 Gahagan, Sebastian
27 Ponsonby, Sir William Major-General 29 June 1815 3,150 Theed, William
(10)  6 December 1816, contracted
28 Gillespie, Sir Robert Rollo Major-General 21 June 1815 1,575 Chantrey, Sir Francis Legatt
29 Hay, Andrew Major-General 21 June 1815 1,575 Hopper,Humphrey 
(11)  5 August 1819, contracted
30
Gore, Arthur Major-General 
21 June 1815 2,100 Chantrey, Sir Francis  LegattSkerrett, JohnByne Major-General 
(12) 18 December 1823, contracted 　 　 　
31 Eliott, GeorgeAugustus, BaronHeathfield Lieutenant-General 17 June 1793 2,100 Rossi, John Charles Felix
32 Duncan, Adam, Viscount Duncan of  Camperdown Admiral 26 March 1823 2,100 Westmacott, Sir Richard
33 Jervis, John, Earl St.Vincent Admiral of the Fleet 26 March 1823 2,100 Baily, Edward Hodges
Sources: Journals of the House of Commons; House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1837-38, 36(116), 471; 1842, 
26(559), 505; The National Archives, The Treasury, Long Papers, T1/4029.19961, 26118.
We can observe an instance of correlation between the memory of navy and its 
heroes and St Paul’s even before Nelson’s funeral: the erection of the monument to 
Admiral Richard Lord Howe, the victor at the ‘Glorious First of June.’ Just after 
Howe’s death and burial in his family vault at Nottinghamshire in 1799, the 
parliament unanimously resolved to erect his monument at public expense. In this 
debate, Henry Dundas, the Secretary of State at War, voiced his preference to erect 
his monument in St Paul’s rather than Westminster Abbey by pointing to the enemy 
standard lodged as a war trophy and the thanksgiving service held for Howe’s 
victory: ‘the remembrance of his victory might accompany the remembrance of that 
solemnity with which the colours taken by him on the first of June were placed in 
that Cathedral’.10) Whilst the naval thanksgiving to celebrate his victory gave a 
strong sense to St Paul’s as a site for naval commemoration, its sacred memory 
simultaneously fascinated the erection of the monument to the departed admiral 
hero there.
10) The parliamentary register, or, history of the proceedings and debates of the Houses of Lords and 
Commons ... during the ... session of the eighteenth parliament of Great Britain, x, 94-5: Commons, 
3 October 1799.
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<Figure> St Paul’s Cathedral: Positions of National Monuments voted by 
Parliament, 1793-1823
•　Monuments erected over 3,150 pounds.
　Monuments erected below 3,150 pounds.
￭　Tablet monuments erected below 3,150 pounds.
  Source: Anon., Popular Description of St Paul’s Cathedral, including a Brief History of the Old 
and New Cathedral, with Explanations of the Monumental Designs, and other Interesting 
Particulars, 18th edn (1829), vi-vii, 14-42.
Nelson’s funeral as a naval ceremony
Nelson’s funeral was often described as a ‘state’ funeral without detailed 
consideration. The ‘state’ funeral has been a rare public occasion except for the 
case of royalty in modern Britain. According to John Wolffe, it was defined as a 
funeral superintended by the Earl Marshal and the College of Arms at the public 
expense.11) Contrary to this, funerals of the sovereign and the royal family became 
‘private’ occasions and were mainly organized by the Lord Chamberlain and his 
office.12) Apart from Nelson, the following personnel have received the honour of a 
11) John Wolffe, Great deaths: grieving, religion, and nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain 
(Oxford, 2000), 287; Wolffe, "National occasions at St Paul’s since 1800," in St Paul’s: the 
cathedral church of London 604-2004, eds. Derek Keene, Arthur Burns and Andrew Saint (New 
Haven, 2004), 381-91.
12) Paul S. Fritz, "From ‘public’ to ‘private’: the royal funerals in England, 1500-1830," in Mirrors of 
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state funeral since the Restoration: the Duke of Albemarle (1670), the Earl of 
Sandwich (1672), Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell (1707), the Duke of Marlborough 
(1722), the Earl of Chatham (William Pitt the Elder, 1778), William Pitt the Younger 
(1806) and William Ewart Gladstone (1898) in Westminster Abbey, and the Duke of 
Wellington (1852) and Sir Winston Churchill (1965) in St Paul’s.
The role of the Lord Chamberlain and his office was surely important in 
organizing the complete interment service to grieve the dying hero.13) As the daily 
newspapers such as the Morning Chronicle and the Sun indicated, however, the role 
of the Herald’s college was also essential in Nelson’s funeral. Contemporaries 
anticipated that ‘the whole Cavalcade’ would be ‘ordered and regulated by the 
College of Heralds’ and ‘there shall be a grand funeral procession, with all military 
and national honours, made out by the College of Arms’.14) This heraldic 
organization, of mediaeval origin, exercised control over the choreographed aspects 
of a state funeral: the heralds set up the heraldic protocol in compliance with the 
title and status of the deceased, and chiefly determined the hierarchical order of 
participants, the disposal of banners and standards in the procession, and 
ceremonial procedure. But such a protocol did not follow precedent or an 
entrenched style. It could respond to necessary alterations due to public opinion. 
The public were particularly concerned with the heraldic devices surrounding 
Nelson’s body and the procession at the funeral. The ministers and Sir Isaac Heard, 
the Garter King of Arms, who shared responsibility to consider the heraldic devices 
and order of procession, also paid special attention to these choreographed 
representations. The state funeral of Nelson led to a departure from ordinary 
heraldic military funeral.
In the order of the funeral procession, the position of chief mourner was 
principally noticed and discussed by newspapers and magazines as well as by 
ministers and the Herald’s office. Conventionally, the immediate heir of the 
deceased became the chief mourner to emphasize the lineal succession and to claim 
the heir’s legitimacy in inheriting the deceased’s title and status. This convention 
also gave emphasis to the hierarchical order of society.15) Yet it was out of the 
question that any member of Nelson’s family should become the chief mourner. The 
mortality: studies in the social history of death, ed. Joachim Whaley (1981), 61-79.
13) Brockliss, Cardwell and Moss, "Nelson’s grand national obsequies."
14) The Sun, 14 November 1805, p. 3; Morning Chronicle, 14 November 1805, 3.
15) Clare Gittings, Death, burial, and the individual in early modern England (Sydney, 1984), esp. 
chapter 8.
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organizers of Nelson’s funeral considered the Prince of Wales or Charles Middleton, 
Lord Barham and the First Lord of the Admiralty, as chief mourner.16) In December 
1805, they thought of Sir Peter Parker, Admiral of the Fleet and Nelson’s early 
mentor, as a candidate and subsequently settled on him.17)
The choice of Admiral Parker as the chief mourner apparently affirmed Nelson’s 
funeral as a naval pageant rather than a heraldic one. This decision illustrated that 
the Royal Navy and its officer corps would assert the succession of his genius and 
bravery. The aim of the organizers was to emphasize that the British navy was more 
prodigious than those of other European powers.18) We have to notice that this 
decision was made after Napoleon’s victories at Ulm and Austerlitz (October and 
December 1805). Furthermore, if Barham, a member of the Pitt ministry, filled the 
position of chief mourner, the public would regard it as a show of political 
partisanship. Surely Pitt and his fellow politicians wanted to appropriate the 
meaning of Nelson’s death for their political cause, for the popularity of the present 
ministry had been greatly undermined by the Melville Affair.19) Any kind of 
indication of political selection might have the opposite effect in such national 
occasion. In that light, Admiral Parker was a more suitable pick than Barham.
Following the choice of the most senior naval commander as chief mourner, it 
became clear that many naval officers would attend the funeral procession and the 
interment service. Admirals Lord Hood and Lord Radstock were assigned as 
supporters of the chief mourner and thirty-one admirals attended as pall-bearers, 
canopy-bearers, or assistant mourners; while a hundred and one captains and thirty 
three lieutenants, including Thomas Masterman Hardy and Rear-Admiral Sir Eriab 
Harvey who had fought with Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar, attended to bear the 
standards and banners.20) Such a naval presence at Nelson’s funeral made it greatly 
different from former heraldic military funerals of Albemarle, Sandwich, and 
16) The College of Arms (hereafter, CA), Funeral of Viscount Nelson MS, RRG LXIII A, fo. 106: 
Notes, dated 20 November 1805. I am indebted to Robert Yorke, the archivist of the College of 
Arms, for being able to read papers relating to Nelson’s funeral and the order of merit.
17) CA, Funeral of Viscount Nelson MS, RRG LXIII A, fo. 1: William Pollock to [Sir Isaac Heard], 
n.d. December 1805; fo. 108: William Marsden to Sir Isaac Heard, 20 December 1805; Morning 
Chronicle, 16 December 1805, 3; The Times, 23 December 1805, 3.
18) See also, Jenks, ‘Contesting the hero’, pp. 427-9.
19) E.g., Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, viii, 16 November 1805, col. 740. 
20) For the account of the funeral procession in the London Gazette, 14-8 January 1806, 53-60. 
However, we have to notice that such a funeral account was not the actual practice but the plan and 
program suggested by the organizers.
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Marlborough.
However, the most striking feature of Nelson’s funeral was that a cohort of 
Greenwich pensioners and veterans of the Victory participated in the funeral 
procession. At a traditional heraldic funeral, ‘poor’ people were summoned to attend 
and one was chosen for each year of the deceased’s age.21) The sailors included in 
the funeral service were substitutes for them. Though the attendance of the 
Greenwich pensioners was expected by the arrangement that the lying-in-state 
would be held in the Painted Hall at Greenwich, this decision was both symbolic 
and patriotic: those who had sacrificed their limbs in the service of their country 
were associated with Nelson’s figure ― he had also lost his eye and right arm in 
the naval service. The organizers of Nelson’s funeral also decided to include some 
ordinary sailors and marines of the Victory in the funeral procession. The crew of 
the Victory might have been rewarded for their loyalty to Nelson, or perhaps this 
decision responded to public opinion.22) 
Not only did admirals, naval officers and sailors participate in the funeral service 
but 10,000 men of military regiments under Lieutenant-General Sir David Dundas 
marshalled the funeral procession on the route guarded by volunteers. These soldiers 
were mainly from regiments ‘that fought and conquered in Egypt, and had 
participated with the departed Hero, the glory of delivering that part of the world 
from the tyrannic ambition of the French’.23) Amongst the troops, the 92nd and 
79th, two Scottish Highland regiments, participated in the procession and burial 
service.24) They were considered to have played a prominent part in that expedition 
to Egypt under the command of the Scottish General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who 
died in a battle near Alexandria.25) The presence of these armed forces evoked for 
the public both Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile and the late British victory 
over Napoleon in 1801. As well as many attendants of the naval profession, the 
21) Gittings, Death, burial, and the individual, 27-29.
22) Jenks, "Contesting the hero," 436; Colin White, "The immortal memory: the development of the 
Nelson legend from 1805 to the present," in The Nelson companion, ed. C. White (Stroud, 1995), 
7-8.
23) Adam Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson; including copious accounts of the 
three great victories obtained over the combined forces of France, Spain, &c. off the Nile, 
Copenhagen, & Trafalgar, … an authentic account of his death, … to which is added, the 
ceremonial of his funeral, … also select poetry (1806), 112.
24) Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson, 113, 125; The Times, 10 January 1806, 
3-4.
25) Cf. Piers Mackesy, British victory in Egypt 1801: the end of Napoleon’s conquest (1995).
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military forces in procession alleviated the fear of invasion and hence displayed 
British naval and military prowess over Napoleonic France:
The grand display of troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the finest soldiers the universe 
ever beheld, gratified the eyes of the British public, and satisfied their understandings that, 
with such defenders, ready to repair, at a moment’s warning, to any threatened point of 
attack, no enemy, or combination of enemies, could make any impression in the attempt to 
invade.26)
The public paid attention to the devices surrounding Nelson’s body as well as the 
funeral procession: the coffin and the funeral car. After the arrival of the Victory 
off the Nore, the remains of Nelson were removed from a leaguer of spirits to a 
plain coffin, made from timbers from the French flagship L’Orient at the Battle of 
the Nile, which was presented to Nelson by Captain Benjamin Hallowell. This coffin 
was enclosed in an ornamented and elaborate outer coffin designed by Ackermann 
brothers under the direction of the Herald’s office. There were many devices to 
indicate Nelson’s coat of arms, the orders of chivalry, his trophies, and other 
symbols. For instance, a crocodile and sphinx were depicted as attributes of the 
battle of the Nile; in the centre of the coffin, there were ‘Britannia and Neptune 
riding triumphant on the ocean, drawn by sea-horses, and led by Fame’ to represent 
Nelson’s immortality.27) This magnificent coffin was laid in the Painted Hall, 
Greenwich, and shown to the public from 5 to 7 January 1806.
In the funeral procession on 9 January from the Admiralty to St Paul’s, this coffin 
was laid on a funeral car designed by Ange Denis Macquin, a friend of Sir Isaac 
Heard. Such a funeral car was the prominent feature of a heraldic military funeral 
in England. Nelson’s funeral car was also specially designed to recall Nelson’s 
exploits and career: it was shaped in the form of Nelson’s flagship, the Victory, and 
its head was adorned with the figure of Fame; there were many decorations such as 
ostrich feathers, black velvet bordered with a magnificent gold fringe, and heraldic 
escutcheons as well as the outer coffin; its canopy was supported by four columns 
representing palm trees; on one side of canopy was inscribed Nelson’s motto, 
‘Palmam qui meruit ferat’ [Let he who has earned it bear the palm] and on the 
other, ‘Hoste devicto requiesit’ [The enemy having been defeated, he rested]. On the 
back and front of the canopy were the names ‘Nile’ and ‘Trafalgar’. This funeral car 
26) Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson, 113.
27) Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson, 102-104.
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served as a remembrance of Nelson and deeply impressed the spectators at the 
funeral procession.28)
We can observe that many prints to illustrate the magnificent coffin and funeral 
car with their captions were produced and distributed. For example, The Times on 
10 January 1806 devoted a large space to describe the scene of the funeral 
procession and the interment service as well as illustrations of the coffin and 
funeral car.29) Prints illustrating the coffin, funeral car, and funeral procession were 
very popular and served to share the memory of the departed national hero among 
Britons. After the funeral service, the funeral car was presented to Greenwich 
Hospital and displayed in the Painted Hall, becoming another destination for Nelson 
pilgrimage until its decay.30)
The invention of an official ‘Trafalgar day’
The state funeral was not the only ministerial effort to commemorate Nelson. 
Along with the discussion and preparation of the funeral arrangements, the Pitt 
ministry considered inaugurating a new order of merit as reward for distinguished 
naval and military officers. From early November, cabinet members such as Pitt, 
Hawkesbury, Mulgrave, Castlereagh and Barham, had frequently met to argue for the 
inauguration of a new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ at Downing Street and 
instructed Sir Isaac Heard to write a draft of statutes for this order.31) There was a 
remarkable point in the creation of this order: the invention of an official ‘Trafalgar 
Day’ with a solemn investiture ceremony in St Paul’s Cathedral.
There had been attempts to create a new order of merit as a reward for naval 
and military heroes before the Battle of Trafalgar. Immediately after the arrival of 
news of victory at St Vincent in 1797, Charles Small Pybus, a Lord of the Admiralty, 
proposed to Lord Spencer to create a new ‘Naval Order of Merit’.32) In his proposal, 
28) Collingwood, Anecdotes of the late Lord Viscount Nelson, 118-19.
29) The Times, 10 January 1806, 2-3.
30) The Times, 15 January 1806, 2.
31) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 1: Lord Barham to Heard, 9 November 1805; fo. 2: William 
Pitt to Heard, 10 November; fo. 3: Note on the Paper received from Mr Pitt, dated 11 November 
1805. Here I chiefly depend on the copy of statutes, proposed by Heard to Lord Spencer in June 
1806, included in the Liverpool Papers in British Library (hereafter, BL), Add MS 38378, fos. 19-47. 
See also, The National Archives (hereafter, TNA), Chatham Papers, 2nd ser., PRO 30/8/144/1, fos. 
7-8: Heard to Pitt, 21 November 1805.
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Pybus suggested that distinguished gallantry and conduct in the navy should be 
rewarded with this honour, which was divided into three graduated ranks, 
corresponding to the succession of flags in the fleet: red, white and blue. It is 
uncertain whether the Pitt ministry considered this proposal but the plan to create 
an order of merit was suddenly revived in December 1804. According to Joseph 
Farington, a landscape painter, George III intended to establish a ‘New Order of 
Honour of Naval Knights’. There is no doubt that Napoleon’s Legion of Honour, 
whose first investiture was held in July 1804 at the Invalides, triggered this 
intention.33)
The victory of Trafalgar and the death of Nelson stimulated the creation of a 
new order of merit to promote naval and military heroics on an unprecedented 
scale. According to drafts written by Heard, the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ 
would be headed by the Sovereign and two Grand Masters and divided into three 
ranks: Knights Chiefs, Knights Commanders, and Knights. These ranks, in unlimited 
number, would be bestowed for distinguished service and would correspond to ranks 
in the services. While the rank of knight was to be conferred on commissioned 
officers in both naval and military services, subordinate officers such as midshipmen, 
non-commissioned officers, and ordinary sailors and soldiers could receive gold and 
silver medals. In particular, master’s mates and midshipmen with the honour of a 
gold medal were entitled to the rank of knight just after their promotion to 
lieutenant in the navy.34)
In an early memorandum of the ministerial meeting, Pitt had already proposed 
that the investiture ceremony of this order of merit would be held in the choir of 
St Paul’s, and thus that the dean of this cathedral would also assume the deanship 
of the order in the solemn ordination ceremonies.35) Banners and plates inscribed 
with names, arms, titles, ranks and dates of achievements would be fixed in the 
choir. Despite the removal of the banners after the death of officers for the 
32) The following descriptions depend on Corbett, Private papers of George, second Earl Spencer, ii, pp. 
205-7: Mr Pybus’s Proposal for a Naval Order of Merit. Strength upon the Establishment of an 
Order of Naval Merit, dated 7 March 1797.
33) Kathryn Cave, Kenneth Garlick, and Angus Macintye, eds., The diary of Joseph Farington (hereafter, 
FD), 16 vols. (New Haven, 1979-84), vi: 2461, 1 December 1804.
34) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 5, et passim; BL, Add MS 38378, fos. 23-7, 45-7. 
35) CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 3; TNA, PRO 30/8/144/1, fos. 9-10: Observations concerning 
the Officer of the Order of Merit to be called “Victory”, by Heard, dated 16 December 1805; fos. 
15-6: Heard to Pitt, 16 December 1805. See also, CA, Order of Merit MS, RR59b, fo. 31: Copy of 
Letter: Heard to Pitt, 16 December 1805; BL, Add MS 38378, fos. 23, 36-40.
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reception of another knight, the plate was to remain there as ‘a lasting Memorial’. 
More significantly, the creation of the ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ was to 
constitute the official ‘Trafalgar Day’. According to the fourteenth clause in the 
statutes, the 21st of October in every year would be ‘the Anniversary of the glorious 
and ever memorable Victory near Cape Trafalgar’ and ‘all such Knights of the three 
Ranks, who may be attended, shall repair to the said Cathedral’.36) Like the 
investiture ceremony of the Order of the Bath in Westminster Abbey, the investiture 
of the new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ would be accompanied by solemn 
ceremony and a military procession. The inauguration of the ‘Naval and Military 
Order of Merit’ would provide another opportunity for naval and military 
commemoration to associate with the memory of Nelson at St Paul’s.
Although the draft of statutes, and designs for badges, collars, insignia and 
dresses were prepared in the winter of 1805-6, and the royal warrant published, the 
inauguration of the new ‘Naval and Military Order of Merit’ was suddenly 
abandoned. The most significant reason of this failure might have been the death of 
William Pitt in January 1806, who earnestly exploited naval patriotism for ministerial 
cause. In later years, William Wilberforce lamented that the plan for the new order 
remained to be premature after his friend’s death.37) The ‘Trafalgar Day’, the 
convention to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar every 21 October, failed to 
penetrate Britons until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Naval and military pantheon or Nelson’s mausoleum? 
Just after the death of Nelson, the British public did not only want a state funeral 
for the dying hero. They also desired the erection of public monuments to Nelson. 
Although we take it for granted that his contemporaries attempted to erect many 
monuments to Nelson, this momentum was an unprecedented phenomenon ― no 
naval or military heroes in the eighteenth century were honoured in such a manner 
except in a few instances. There were both local and national movements to erect 
monuments to Nelson.38) For instance, there was a project to raise a massive 
national monument funded by nation-wide public subscription, a precedent for the 
36) BL, Add MS 38378, fo. 38.
37) Parliamentary debates, 1st ser., xiv, cols. 611-2: Commons, 18 May 1809.
38) Yarrington, The commemoration of the hero.
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project of the Nelson Column at Trafalgar Square in later years.39)
In any case, the public were particularly fascinated by the scheme to erect a 
public monument to the memory of Nelson in St Paul’s, which could become the 
focal point of a British naval and military pantheon. Although the designs and forms 
of the monument were deliberated in newspapers and magazines, the consideration 
of many commentators chiefly focused on the site to place the monument in St 
Paul’s. Some insisted that Nelson’s monument should be placed beneath the centre 
of the dome. Robert Mylne, the architect and surveyor of St Paul’s, proposed to 
Lord Hawkesbury and the dean and chapter to erect his monument under the dome. 
This proposal was based on the historical ground that Sir Christopher Wren seemed 
to have desired his monument to be erected under the dome of that cathedral. If 
Mylne’s project were approved, ‘a large stone pillar will rise from the grave a 
considerable distance, a colossal figure of the deceased on the top of it’.40) His 
suggestion was an attempt to confer special meaning on the memory of Nelson in 
the space of St Paul’s. Numbers of people supported such plans and believed that 
Nelson’s monument should be erected in the most conspicuous site in St Paul’s.41)
The plans to raise a monument there were opposed on architectural, aesthetic 
and religious grounds.42) In particular, members of the Royal Academy of Arts were 
strongly opposed to having the monument erected in the centre of the crossing. 
When George III, through Lord Hawkesbury, informed the Royal Academy of his 
desire that ‘the members of the Academy would make designs for a monument to 
the Memory of Lord Nelson for His Majesty’s selection’, the members of the Royal 
Academy met to discuss the issue of Nelson’s monument in compliance with the 
intention of the King on 13 December 1805.43) At that meeting, John Flaxman, who 
was the sculptor selected to erect the Nelson’s monument in St Paul’s, opposed the 
prevailing idea that the monument should be erected beneath the crossing on 
religious grounds. According to Farington, Flaxman considered that it would become 
an obstruction to observing the choir and lead to ‘present as a first object in a 
place formed for the Worship of the Almighty the figure & the idea of Mortal Man 
as the principal object of attention’. The portrait painter John Hoppner supported 
39) The Times, 6 January 1806, 3.
40) The Times, 30 November 1805, 3; 7 December 1805, 2.
41) Gentleman’s Magazine, lxxv, December 1805, 1119-20. Cf. The Times, 26 December 1805, 3.
42) Ibid., 30 December 1805, 3; 6 January 1806, 3.
43) BL, Fraxman Papers, Add MS 39791, fos. 15-6: Richards to Flaxman, 19 December 1805 and a 
copy of letter from Hawkesbury to Richards, 11 December 1805; FD, vii: 2658, 11 December 1805.
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Flaxman’s statement and feared that it would not leave similar honours for a 
national hero in the future. He warned against a strong hero cult and the excessive 
scope of a naval and military pantheon.44) Though many Britons agreed that the 
exploits and merit of Nelson should be rewarded with the honour of a national 
monument in St Paul’s, there were different opinions concerning the exact site.
After the last honours and tributes had been paid to Nelson, and after a long and 
fierce argument relating to funeral honours for Pitt the Younger at the opening of 
parliament, a vote of thanks to the victors at the battle of Trafalgar and an address 
to erect monuments to the memory of Nelson were unanimously resolved on 28 
January 1806. In next year, the Treasury contracted with Flaxman for the commission 
to erect Nelson’s monument at the cost 6,000 guineas in October 1807.45) After a 
long delay due to his other commissions, Flaxman’s Nelson monument was finally 
unveiled in May 1818.46) As he desired, the site for this monument in St Paul’s was 
not at the centre under the dome but in the great piers between the dome and the 
choir, similar to Rossi’s monument to the Marquis Cornwallis.
This monument, in an immense pyramidal design, was a mixture of the 
contemporary and the allegorical: it consisted of a colossal statue of Nelson in naval 
uniform raised on the pedestal; a figure of Minerva instructing two young naval 
cadets and a crouching British lion on each side below Nelson’s statue; the front of 
the pedestal was carved with the names ‘Trafalgar’, ‘Nile’ and ‘Copenhagen’ and was 
engraved with three Sea Gods in relief, representing the Atlantic, the Mediterranean 
and the North Sea. It was also evident that Flaxman had idealized the figure of 
Nelson in his monument. Although Nelson’s right eye in that statue was as intact as 
in other portraits, statues and busts, his lost right arm was carefully concealed by a 
pelisse which Nelson had received from the Grand Signor.47) Contemporaries 
scarcely appreciated this monument but its narrative of allegory was obvious: heroic 
Nelson was the exemplar to fascinate younger generations in the navy.48)
On the other hand, the body of Nelson was buried in the crossing of the crypt 
under the dome, the most important site in that cathedral. This was due in part to 
44) FD, 2660-1, 14 December 1805.
45) Parliamentary debates, 1st ser., vi, cols. 97-107: Commons, 28 January 1806; TNA, The Treasury 
General Out-Letter Books, T27/60, fos. 152-3: Henry Wellesley to William Huskisson, 4 September 
1807.
46) Gentleman’s Magazine, lxxxviii, May 1818, 462; The Times, 14 May 1818, 3.
47) BL, Flaxman Papers, Add MS 39790, fos. 19-20: Flaxman to Mrs Flaxman, February 1806.
48) Cf. George Lewis Smyth, The monuments and genii of St Paul’s Cathedral and Westminster Abbey; 
comprising naval & military heroes, poets, statesmen, artists, authors, &c. &c. &c. (1826), 684-85.
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the proposal by Robert Mylne. Although Mylne, James Wyatt and even Italian sculptor 
Antonio Canova suggested the design of a tomb, the board of the Treasury instructed 
the diversion of a black marble sarcophagus, made for Cardinal Wolsey in the 
sixteenth century and long reserved in Windsor Castle, with the least alteration.49) A 
viscount’s coronet and a cushion were placed on the sarcophagus and the following 
words were inscribed in letters of gold metal on one side of the pedestal: 
‘HORATIO. VISC. NELSON’. The work for Nelson’s tomb proceeded concurrently 
with that for his monument, but seems to have been finished in early 1810.50) 
In the same year, St Paul’s received another admiral hero of Trafalgar. Admiral 
Lord Collingwood, the second command to Nelson and commander-in-chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet as his successor, died of disease on his voyage and was buried 
beside the tomb of Nelson in the crypt of St Paul’s. Although not organized as a 
state funeral, Collingwood’s funeral was performed along the same lines as Nelson’s: 
a lying-in-state in the Painted Hall, Greenwich Hospital, and a funeral procession 
with the attendance of Greenwich pensioners. There were many important naval 
figures such as Lord Mulgrave, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord St Vincent, the 
superior officer of Nelson and Collingwood, Sir Peter Parker and Lord Cochrane, a 
radical leader.51) In June 1831, Lord Northesk, the third in command at Trafalgar, 
was buried at the other side of Nelson’s tomb.52)
Even if the dean and chapters of St Paul’s tolerantly permitted the erection of 
naval and military monuments, they did not approve the burial of naval and military 
heroes until the 1850s. The funerals of Collingwood and Northesk were exceptionally 
admitted because of their connection with the memory of Nelson and Trafalgar. In 
addition, two of Nelson’s kinsmen, William Earl Nelson and his son Horatio Nelson, 
‘Lord Trafalgar’, were also buried near the tomb of Nelson in the crypt. Contrary to 
the monument, which did not attract sufficient public concern, his tomb not only 
occupied the most important place in St Paul’s; the burial of naval heroes and 
individuals was permitted to enhance the characteristics of this mausoleum of 
national martyrdom.
49) Morning Herald, 16 January 1806, 2; TNA, T27/61, fo. 47: George Harrison to James Wyatt, 9 
February 1808; The Treasury, Minute Books, T29/91, fo. 389: 13 August 1807; T29/93, fo. 266: 2 
February 1808; T29/122, fo. 526: 6 April 1813.
50) E.g., David Hughson [David Pugh], London: being an accurate history and description of the British 
metropolis and its neighbourhood to thirty miles extent, from an actual perambulation, 6 vols 
(1805-9), vi: 596.
51) Naval Chronicle, xxiii (1810): 383-84; The Times, 12 May 1810, 4.
52) The Times, 7 June 1831, 3; 9 June 1831, 5.
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The state funeral of Nelson was a watershed both in the history of state ceremonial 
in Britain and of St Paul’s Cathedral. Not only was it the first state funeral held at 
St Paul’s but it was regarded as an unprecedented occasion by contemporaries. For 
example, the Naval Chronicle insisted: ‘Thus terminated one of the most impressive 
and most splendid solemnities that ever took place in this country, or perhaps in 
Europe’.53) It could not estimate the number of people who visited the lying-in-state 
in Greenwich or who viewed the funeral procession. An eyewitness remarked on the 
public respect and grief for Nelson, beyond class and rank, observed in London: 
‘During the whole of this solemn ceremony, the greatest order prevailed throughout 
the metropolis; and as the Remains of the much-lamented Hero proceeded along, 
every possible testimony of sorrow and of respect was manifested by an immense 
concourse of spectators of all ranks’.54) 
This series of projects to commemorate Nelson and Trafalgar in 1805-6 the state 
funeral, the invention of official ‘Trafalgar Day’ and the erection of his monument 
and tomb can be considered to have reconstituted St Paul’s into a national shrine 
dedicated to the memory of the greatest naval hero rather than a naval and military 
pantheon. This memory was simultaneously perpetuated and privileged through this 
metropolitan cathedral. Although this meant the expansion of the potential and 
scope of naval and military state commemoration in Britain, there was a danger of 
strong hero-worship to Nelson.
Without any effort of continuance, the conjunction of St Paul’s with the 
pantheonization of the hero might be contingent on the period of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the ‘first total war’.55) As shown in public 
funerals of Wellington and other military heroes in later years, however, traditions 
of commemoration are thus revealed as living forces, which are shaped and 
reshaped in every generation; it further affirms the significance of Nelson as the 
national hero in St Paul’s, which was ‘our Pantheons, our Valhalla, our Chapel of 
the Invalides’.56)
53) Naval Chronicle, xv (1806): 233.
54) Gentleman’s Magazine, lxxvi (1806): 71. E.g., The Times, 7 January 1806, 3; 9 January 1806, 3; 10 
January 1806, 4; Archibald Duncan, A correct narrative of the funeral of Horatio Lord Viscount 
Nelson (1806), 47.
55) J.E. Cookson, The British armed nation, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997), 246; David Avrom Bell, The 
first total war: Napoleon’s Europe and the birth of modern warfare (2007).
56) E.g., The Times, 21 September 1852, 4.
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Socialism without Socialists:
The Status of Socialism in Public Debate in Britain in the 1890s*
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Abstract
This study is an attempt to approach the history of socialism in Britain in the late 
Victorian period from the perspective of discursive analysis. It analyses how the language 
of socialism was understood and defined by political commentators in major periodicals and 
newspapers in Britain in the 1890s. Existing historical research on socialism in Britain has 
not paid enough attention to the fact that the public debate, usually around Westminster, on 
‘Socialism’ was not led by socialists but by anti- or non-socialist political commentators. 
Most of the political commentators who used the term ‘Socialism’ at the time were not 
interested in the activities of British socialists, while censuring radical policies for its 
‘Socialist’ tendency. The discursive analysis of their intentions and their results will provide 
a new explanation for how the term ‘Socialism’ came to refer to the Liberal social reforms 
rather than the activities of real socialists in the late Victorian period.
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Introduction
This article pays attention to the public debate in which various interpretations of 
‘Socialism’ influenced each other, rather than to theoretical discussions by 
politicians or political thinkers on socialism or social reform. For this reason, 
periodicals, and sometimes newspapers, with various political orientations are the 
main sources for this article. There were a large number of periodicals in Victorian 
Britain, varying from the right to the left of the political spectrum. Although the 
history of these periodicals is important, it is not necessary to allocate much space 
to that subject in this article; the analysis of the socio-economic or political 
backgrounds of the reviewers, editors, and proprietors is not the primary objective 
of this article. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain why some periodicals are 
considered more important than others.
One of the most valuable sources for the history of Victorian periodicals is The 
Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900.1) This well-organised reference 
work provides not only the indexes to important periodicals but also a brief but 
detailed history of each one. In the Victorian age, periodicals were one of the most 
important means through which many intellectuals expressed and exchanged their 
opinions about various subjects. Indeed, they are ‘remarkable record[s] of 
contemporary thought in every field, with a full range of opinion on every major 
question ― a range exceeding what could be found, in many cases, in such books 
as were devoted to the topic being investigated.’ Not least because this article is 
interested in how various interpretations of ‘Socialism’ influenced each other, 
periodicals through which intellectuals exchanged their opinions are its most 
important sources.
According to The Wellesley Index, the most influential periodicals in the Victorian 
age were the Quarterly Review, the Edinburgh Review, and the Westminster Review. 
Their political orientations were tory, whig, and radical respectively. Because this 
article focuses on the differences between various definitions of ‘Socialism’ made by 
non- or anti-socialist commentators, the three most influential periodicals with 
distinctive political orientations are its main sources. However, such categorisation 
of political orientations of periodicals is by no means an absolute criterion by 
which this article analyses various definitions of ‘Socialism’. As it approaches the 
history of socialism on a discursive level, the political interests of authors, editors, 
1) W. E. Houghton, ed., The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900 (Toronto, 1966).
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and proprietors or their relationship with political parties are not regarded as the 
cause of changes in definitions of the term ‘Socialism’. For example, this article 
does not assume that the prime reason why articles in the Quarterly Review used 
the term ‘Socialism’ in order to criticise the Liberal social reforms was that the 
socio-economic or political interests of the author and the Quarterly Review were in 
line with the Conservative Party. This kind of explanation does not fully answer the 
question of why some other articles in conservative periodicals did not use the term 
‘Socialism’ when they criticised the Liberal social reforms, or why there were 
different definitions of the term ‘Socialism’ even in the same periodicals. In other 
words, periodical articles were not controlled by political parties. Nor was the term 
‘Socialism’. Thus in order to answer this question, one should not seek to establish 
a causal relationship between political activity and political discourse. From a 
linguistic perspective, as Stedman Jones emphasises, to analyse the socio-economic 
or political interests of the authors, editors, and proprietors is merely to repeat the 
question.2) Instead, we should perform a discursive analysis of the relationships 
between various definitions of ‘Socialism’. This is not least because the political 
orientations and intentions of those who used the term ‘Socialism’ were articulated 
only through discourse.
This article also looks at some other periodicals and newspapers dealing with the 
topic of ‘Socialism’. John Mason has observed that seven journals including the 
three above were most important in Britain from 1865 to 1914. The other four were 
the Contemporary Review, the Fortnightly Review, the Nineteenth Century (and 
After), and the National Review. However, with the exception of the National 
Review, these periodicals rarely used the term ‘Socialism’ when dealing with the 
political situation in Britain. They tended to restrict the usage of this term to 
socialism in foreign countries or socialism as a political theory which was not 
relevant to politics in Britain. This was also the case with the Westminster Review. 
Because this periodical used the term ‘Socialism’ more frequently than other 
non-conservative periodicals and because this was the oldest of them, this article 
mainly compares the Westminster Review with conservative periodicals while only 
occasionally drawing attention to other periodicals.
As for the National Review, although it frequently used the term ‘Socialism’ when 
dealing with the question of social reform in Britain, its influence on the public 
2) G. Stedman Jones, "The Determinist Fix: Some Obstacles to the Further Development of the 
Linguistic Approach to History in the 1990s," History Workshop Journal 42 (Autumn, 1996): 19-35.
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debate was not as great as that of the Quarterly Review or the Edinburgh Review. 
According to the Newspaper Press Directory, the Quarterly Review was advertised as 
‘Essays on General Literature, Politics, Reviews (Conservative)’; the Edinburgh Review 
as ‘Essays on Literature, Science, and Politics (Liberal)’; and the Westminster Review 
as ‘General Literature and Politics (Liberal)’, throughout the Victorian and Edwardian 
periods.3) On the contrary, the Contemporary Review was advertised as ‘Theological, 
Literary, and Social’; the Fortnightly Review as ‘Politics, Literature, Criticisms 
(Mthly.)’; the Nineteenth Century (and After) as ‘Original Articles on Topics of the 
Day, by Eminent Writers’. It follows that these periodicals were not considered as 
politically serious as the three older periodicals. The National Review was advertised 
as ‘Political (Conservative), Literary’ between 1884 and 1910, and as ‘Political and 
General’ between 1910 and 1914; it was not constantly regarded as a Conservative 
periodical. In addition, the pattern of the usage of the term ‘Socialism’ in this 
periodical was not very different from that in the Quarterly Review. This was also 
the case of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine (Maga), which was advertised as 
‘Political (Conservative) and general Literature’. For this reason, the National Review 
and of Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine deserves the attention of this article. 
Articles in the National Review, however, do not appear in this article, as they 
rarely used the language of socialism in the 1890s.
After Gladstone introduced the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886, a group of Liberals 
defected to form their own Liberal Unionist party in opposition to his policy and 
won the general election of the same year allied with the Conservatives. This group 
consisted of radical Unionists led by Joseph Chamberlain and moderate Unionists 
who followed the Marquess of Hartington, most of whom were from the landed 
class. Thereafter, the Liberals and their Irish Nationalist allies were occasionally 
called ‘Home Rulers’, while the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists were 
grouped as ‘Unionists’.4) The Liberal Party was now completely dependent upon 
support from the Irish Nationalists in order to come to power. Indeed, Gladstone  
won the general election of 1892 with their support and proposed a second Home 
Rule Bill, which was rejected by the Lords. He retired in 1894 and was succeeded 
by Lord Rosebery. After he lost the general election of the following year, the 
Liberal Party had to remain as the opposition party for a decade.
From the Unionist point of view, the Liberal Party was now a pure Radical party 
3) B. Bros, Newspaper Press Directory (London, 1849-).
4) They were merged officially in 1912.
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because it had driven out a large number of whigs while retaining many radicals 
despite the defection of Chamberlain.5) Under such circumstances, ideological 
differences between tory and whig periodicals were blurred even further and both of 
them began fervently to accuse the Liberal Party of sacrificing national interests for 
its electoral success. Alexander Michie, in Maga, regarded the Irish Home Rule Bill 
as ‘surrender to the Irish.’6) In terms of the interests of the landed class, the 
question of Ireland  was closely related to the nationalisation of land because both of 
them were based on the idea that ‘land is the common inheritance of all, and 
should be secured for the use of all.’7) Therefore, to conservative commentators, 
‘surrender to the Irish’ was a prelude to surrender to the radical demand for the 
nationalisation of land. Clement M. Bailhache claimed that ‘Land Nationalisation, 
then, is more than a reform; it is a revolution ― a complete reversal of the 
economic laws and ideas obtaining among all civilised nations.’8)
In the 1880s, some conservative commentators had already alleged that the 
radical demand for land reform was influenced by socialism. In the 1890s, they 
began to feel that such an influence, unchecked by the old whigs, might rapidly 
develop. They also feared that the leaders of the Liberal Party, who had already 
compromised with the Irish Nationalists, would easily commit similar errors when 
dealing with socialism. Some of the commentators believed that a number of 
unleashed socialists were secretly spreading through the political network of the 
Liberal Party. Based on this belief, they began to ascribe as many Liberal policies as 
possible to the growing influence of socialists.
However, conservative periodicals did not pay much attention to the activities of 
5) The defection of the whigs had already begun before the Home Rule Bill, which accelerated this 
process: M. Pugh, State and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain 1870-1997, The 
Arnold History of Britain (London, 1999), 29-30.
6) A. Michie, "The Gladstonian Myth," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 155 (July 1894): 581. 
Alexander Michie (1833-1902): writer on China; born at Earlsferry, Fifeshire, on 1 March 1833; only 
son of Alexander Michie, a weaver, by his wife Ann Laing; on his father's death his mother married 
again; Robert Thin, M. D. Edinburgh (d. at Shanghai in 1867), and George Thin, M.D. Edinburgh, 
of London, were Michie's stepbrothers; educated for commercial life at Kilconquhar school; left 
England to join Lindsay and Co., merchants, at Hong-Kong (1853); became a partner of his firm 
and its representative at Shanghai (1857); subsequently transferred his services successively to 
Chapman, King and Co., to Dyce, Nichol and Co., in which he obtained a partnership, and finally 
to the leading Chinese firm, Jardine, Matheson and Co; a prominent member of the Chamber of 
Commerce, Shanghai, and a chairman for some years.
7) C. M. Bailhache, "Land Nationalisation," Westminster Review 137 (May 1892): 513.
8) Bailhache, "Land Nationalisation," 513.
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British socialist organisations. They were more concerned about the probable 
connection between the Liberals and socialists than about who these socialists were. 
It was the Westminster Review that dealt with socialism as the main topic most 
frequently. The number of articles that included ‘Socialism’ or ‘Socialist’ in their 
titles increased from 6 in the 1880s to 9 in the 1890s. By contrast, it diminished 
significantly in conservative periodicals: only 1 in the Quarterly Review, and none in 
the Edinburgh Review.9) Therefore, the intensification of the conservative allegation 
that socialists were working together with the Liberal Party was not accompanied by 
an increase of interest in socialism per se.
Growing Fear of Fabian ‘Permeation’
While fear of socialism was building up in conservative periodicals, the actual 
influence of British socialist organisations diminished further. With the exception of 
the ILP, founded by Keir Hardie in 1893, most socialist organisations were not 
capable of sending their own members to parliament.10) This was mainly because 
they did not want to compromise with trade unionism, on the grounds that it did 
not aim at the collapse of capitalism but just tried to improve the living standards 
of the working class within the existing capitalist system. The SDF, led by Hyndman, 
was particularly antagonistic to trade unionists. Although William Morris generally 
supported trade unionism, many other members of the Socialist League, such as 
John Lincoln Mahon and Fred Jowett, preferred more revolutionary methods, which 
made Morris leave them in 1890 to begin his ‘Socialist Unity’ movement.11) Such 
9) H. H. Henson, "The New Christian Socialism," Quarterly Review 179 (July 1894): 1-26. These 
figures are calculated from the title indexes in The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 
1824-1900. Blackwood' Edinburgh Magazine and the Nineteenth Century presented two and three 
articles about ‘Socialism’ respectively: G. D. Campbell, "Christian Socialism," Nineteenth Century 36 
(November 1894): 690-707; W. H. Fremantle, "Individualists and Socialists," Nineteenth Century 41 
(February 1897): 311-24; Y. Guyot, "Socialism in France: Its Present and Future," Nineteenth Century 
34 (December 1893): 860-74; E. A. Irving, "Primitive Socialists [in Malaya]," Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine 168 (July 1900): 42-57; W. R. Lawson, "A Sham Socialist Budget," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine 155 (May 1894): 729-44.
10) Although four future members of the ILP, including Hardie, had been returned as independent labour 
members at the general election of 1892, none of its 28 candidates were elected in the 1895 
election.
11) K. Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism in Britain, c. 1881-1951 (Stroud, 1997), 19. John Lincoln 
Mahon: socialist, president of the ILP. Frederic William Jowett (1864-1944): the first Labour MP for 
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divisions made it more difficult for socialism to spread through the working class in 
Britain.
By contrast, the ILP took much more favourable attitudes towards trade unionism. 
Its main concern lay in the representation of the working class in parliament, not in 
the realisation of socialism, although its members frequently asserted that their 
ultimate goal was socialism.12) In this sense, the ILP was the least socialistic of all 
the British socialist organisations. It did not even use the term ‘Socialist’ in its 
name. Nevertheless, because its political activity was much more successful than that 
of other socialist organisations conservative reviewers tended to regard it as a more 
powerful socialist organisation than the SDF or the Socialist League, which were, by 
this process, alienated further from the conservative debate on socialism.
It was the Fabian Society that was most frequently connected to the Liberal Party 
in conservative periodicals among British socialists. According to Laybourn, the main 
feature of Fabian socialism was that it negated Marx’s labour theory of value and 
his emphasis upon class conflict while supporting Henry George’s emphasis upon 
rent, which involved the nationalisation of land and progressive taxation. In other 
words, the Fabians aimed to ‘play down the importance of class conflict and to 
stress the need to extend gradually the control of the state and municipal 
authorities in order to redress the economic imbalance.’13) In order to ‘gradually’ 
control the state, Sidney Webb stressed the need to permeate the radicals and 
Liberals; it was this strategy that alarmed conservative opinion.14) In consequence, 
some reviewers began to suspect that many socialists, directed by the ‘permeation’ 
strategy of the Fabians, were secretly and gradually taking control of the Liberal 
Party. Therefore, it seems that the doctrine of the Fabian Society was responsible 
for a large part of the conservative fear  of the spread of socialism in the Liberal 
Party. In this sense, the influence of the Fabian Society upon the development of 
socialism was significant.
However, although Laybourn observes that Fabian Essays in Socialism (1889) was 
selling many copies, the actual influence of the Fabian Society upon the Liberal 
Party is quite difficult to estimate. Even when it was suspected by some conservative 
reviewers that the Fabians were behind the Liberal policies, the target of the Fabian 
Bradford in 1906.
12) For more details, see D. James, T. Jowitt, and K. Laybourn, eds., The Centennial History of the 
Independent Labour Party: A Collection of Essays (Halifax, 1992).
13) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 22.
14) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 23.
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Society oscillated between the ILP, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party, before 
finally landing on the Labour Party during the First World War.15) In other words, 
they hardly succeeded in permeating any of the parliamentary parties before the 
First World War. Nor did any of these parties officially embrace the socialist 
doctrine of the Fabian Society. Indeed, Beatrice Webb seemed frustrated when she 
observed that it was not easy to persuade Liberals to accept socialism: ‘it is only 
Conservatives who can make revolutions nowadays, and they are, if anything, more 
susceptible to democratic pressure than the Liberals.’16) Therefore, even though the 
Fabian Society had been attempting to permeate the Liberal Party, the extent of its 
actual influence was rather restricted.
Here, an important point needs to be made about the relationship between 
conservatism and socialism. Although Beatrice Webb saw a possibility that the 
Conservative Party could take more positive attitudes towards radical social reforms 
than the Liberal Party, it does not change the fact that it was the Liberal social 
reforms which were described as ‘Socialistic’. In other words, even when the 
Conservatives took up socialistic ideas when drawing up their own social reform 
policies, they did not identify such reforms as ‘Socialism’. By the same token, the 
fact that conservative commentators criticised the Liberal social reforms for being 
‘Socialistic’ does not mean that the Conservatives opposed social reform, including 
some socialistic measures. Historical research on socialistic aspects of the 
Conservative social reforms belongs to another study.
Arthur Elliot in the Edinburgh Review speculated that the Liberal Party was 
influenced by Fabian socialism.17) Alarmed by the further radicalisation of the 
Liberal Party, Elliot suspected that socialists were growing under the shelter of the 
Liberals:
For the time being they recognise the weakness of outspoken Socialism, but the Socialists are 
a growing party, and one of these days they will feel strong enough to stand alone. When 
that day comes they foresee, though they do not shrink from, “the denunciations of Radical 
15) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 23.
16) Beatrice Webb, Diary, 26 July 1897: quoted in E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The 
Politics and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880-1914 (London, 1996), 145.
17) A. Elliot, "The Individual and the State," Edinburgh Review 174 (July 1891): 271-94. Arthur Ralph 
Douglas Elliot (1846-1923): politician; brother of fourth Earl of Minto; BA, Trinity College, 
Cambridge; called to bar (Inner Temple), 1870; Liberal Unionist MP, 1886-92; MP, Durham, 
1898-1906; financial secretary to Treasury, April to September 1903; edited the Edinburgh Review, 
1895-1912.
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wirepullers and the now so complaisant and courteous Radical press. The alliance will be at 
an end.” All this they are prepared to face rather than to swallow some possible Radical 
programme which is not truly Socialistic. The split is inevitable, and it will lead to the 
formation of a “definitely Socialist party ― i.e. a party pledged to the communalization of all 
the means of production and exchange, and which is prepared to subordinate every other 
consideration to that end.”18)
This kind of view was becoming more popular among conservative reviewers. They 
presumed that a large part of recent Liberal social reform was designed to pamper 
to socialist factions in the Liberal Party, as it had to count on every possible 
political force in order to constitute a majority in parliament. Elliot observed that 
there was an ‘unstable equilibrium of the party which is supposed to be led by Mr. 
Gladstone, and which advocates Repeal of the Union.’ That is, the coalition of the 
Liberals and the Irish Nationalists stood on a very weak basis after the defeat of the 
Irish Home Rule Bill. Because the Liberals had lost their political vitality, they would 
‘engage its opponents on any other ground than that of Home Rule.’ Therefore, the 
author contended, ‘to Socialistic pledges the Gladstonian candidate looks for success, 
regardless of time when their fulfilment will be called for, when these very pledges 
“will come home to roost.”’19) Thus he warned that the Liberal Party was fostering 
socialists unaware that they would soon be its most powerful enemy.
As proof for this allegation, the author provided the socialist doctrine of the 
Fabian Society, emphasising that parliament was divided between those who 
supported it and those who were opposed to it:
The writers of “Fabian Essays in Socialism” claim fairly enough that the trend of things 
towards an era of absolute Socialism is seen in the changed attitude of men towards State 
interference and control. They frankly remind us, however, that State control does not imply 
Socialism. “Socialism is the common holding of the means of production and exchange, and 
the holding of them for equal benefit of all.” It is upon this principle that men’s politics are 
in truth divided. In the present Parliament, for instance, were Home Rule left out, it is absurd 
to pretend that the “political parties consist of two bodies of men differentiated from each 
other by the holding of fundamentally different principles.” “The Whig” has by no means 
disappeared, “the daily democratic shouting of the Radical newspapers” to the contrary 
notwithstanding. It is the Tory who has gone from amongst us, and left the arena to be 
contested between men whose opinions are Whig and men whose opinions are Socialist.20)
18) Elliot, "The Individual and the State," 293.
19) Elliot, "The Individual and the State," 294.
20) Elliot, "The Individual and the State," 293.
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The Fabian Society was not the one and only socialist organisation at the time. 
There were also other socialist organisations whose strategies, if not their ultimate 
goals, were different from each other. The reason why the author chose the Fabian 
Society as the culprit for the political upheaval was that it overtly stressed the 
importance of permeation through parliament. While other socialist organisations 
had their own political representatives, the Fabians seemed to prefer to brainwash 
and manipulate existing politicians. As a result, conservative reviewers feared that 
the political activity of the Fabians was very hard to notice. These circumstances 
made them suspect anyone whose political stance looked similar to socialism.
Indeed, conservative reviewers scarcely asked exactly who in the Liberal Party 
were connected to the Fabian Society. Instead, they concentrated on the socialist 
tendency of the Liberals in general. All that they provided was the speculation that 
there must be socialists within the Liberal Party because its policy was apparently 
socialistic. For example, W.R. Lawson in Maga criticised Sir William Harcourt’s 
Budget proposals for being socialistic without providing any specific reasons.21) In 
particular, the author was provoked by the levy of graduated death duties:
It had been reserved for him to discover that even deficits have their uses. This one furnished 
him with an admirable opportunity for ventilating a few socialistic ideas on class taxation, 
which he had long been nursing for just such a chance to let loose. A Chancellor of the 
Exchequer with a big surplus in hand has no excuse for putting on more taxes. Even 
progressive economists do not advocate graduated taxes for their own sake. There must be 
some pretext for levying them, and it was only to be found in a bad year. Commercial 
depression and the recent naval scare produced a situation bad enough even for the saturnine 
soul of Sir William Harcourt. He smiled grimly on his declining revenue and his swelling 
estimates. They were preparing the way for a new era of democratic finance, of which he 
was to be the high priest.22)
Under the title of ‘A Sham Socialist Budget’, the author just assumed that readers of 
this review would automatically agree that the use of the term ‘Socialist’ was 
appropriate if only he could expose a class-biased (against the landed class) and 
21) Lawson, "A Sham Socialist Budget." Sir Wilfrid Lawson, second baronet (1829-1906): politician and 
temperance advocate. Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon Harcourt (1827-1904): some 
historians argue that he would have been Prime Minister but for Queen Victoria’s preference for 
Archibald Primrose, Earl of Rosebery. However, because the Queen did not ask Gladstone’s opinion 
about who would succeed him, this argument does not seem to be persuasive. Harcourt’s Budget of 
1894, which introduced the principle of graduated taxation, indicated the way forward in the 
financing of social reform.
22) Lawson, "A Sham Socialist Budget," 729.
Socialism without Socialists    33
democratic character of the Budget. Because graduated death duties would certainly 
be detrimental to the interests of the landed class and could be one of the 
stepping-stones towards the nationalisation of all the means of production, the 
author implicated that the Liberal Budget was tantamount to socialism. His intention 
was, therefore, not to prove that the Budget was socialist on a theoretical level but 
just to claim on quite a superficial level that it was as dangerous as socialism. The 
term ‘Socialist’ here was not used to signify any concrete body of thought but was 
used simply as a synonym of ‘sham’.
Most conservative reviewers did not pay as much attention to those who were 
clearly related to socialist organisations as to the alleged socialists in the Liberal 
Party. In most cases, there were no socialists but only the threat of socialism. 
Before the Home Rule Bill, conservative commentators had occasionally regarded 
Chamberlain as the culprit of the spread of socialism in the Liberal Party. Now that 
he had left, had their observation been correct, the Liberal Party should have been 
liberated from socialism. On the contrary, the conservative reviewers continued to 
claim that the Liberal Party had come even closer to being a Socialist party. 
Therefore, no matter who was in the leadership of the Liberal Party, insofar as their 
policies were at odds with the interests of the landed class, they were regarded as 
socialists.
In some cases, indeed, they provided their own interpretations of socialism. In 
the Quarterly Review, for example, Mallock defined socialism more favourably to the 
conservative suspicion. He observed that ‘Socialism is the word that in contemporary 
politics comes next in power after Democracy.’23) He argued that although the 
public regarded socialism as a ‘newly discovered force,’ the truth was the opposite:
Not only is Socialism as old as the oldest civilization, but there is no civilization of which it 
has not formed a part. The principle of Socialism, the very meaning of the word admitted to 
be such alike by its apostles and its critics, is the support by all of institutions for the use of 
all; and without some such institutions no civilized community can exist. There is no more 
complete example of a Socialistic institution than a street. Socialism, in fact, is as essential to 
civilization as individualism; and the only question that can be debated by any rational man is 
not which of them shall supersede and expel the other, but in what proportions the two can 
be best applied under a given set of circumstances.24)
This was one of the rare occasions when conservative reviewers dealt directly with 
23) W. H. Mallock, "Conservatism and Democracy," Quarterly Review 176 (January 1893): 282.
24) Mallock, "Conservatism and Democracy," 253.
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socialism, analysing its history and principles. However, this explanation was not 
based on actual facts such as who had created the concept of socialism and who 
was spreading it. Instead, Mallock diminished the significance of socialism by 
defining it very broadly. His definition of socialism was much closer to that of 
collectivism in that it was positioned against individualism, not against capitalism. 
He implied that because every aspect of society was related to socialism as well as 
to individualism, a ‘rational man’ would not adhere to only one of them, but would 
always try to keep the balance between them. Then he suggested that only 
Conservatives were capable of sustaining the balance: ‘when Conservatives are 
threatened with Socialism by fanatics who call themselves Socialists, their proper 
reply will be, And we are Socialists also; and when they are taunted with Socialism 
by those who call themselves Individualists, their proper reply will be, And you are 
Socialists also.’25) Mallock was the one who had written the first conservative article 
in which socialism was connected to radicalism in 1883.26) Now it looked as if he 
was the most authoritative person that could define what socialism was, overriding 
the authority of socialist organisations. By this process, the conservative debate on 
socialism was detached further from the activities of socialist organisations.
Because socialism was treated in conservative periodicals less with theoretical 
interest than with current political interest, few explained what exactly socialism 
meant. It was only when they dealt with socialism in foreign countries that they 
showed even a little theoretical interest. For example, the Nineteenth Century 
featured Y. Guyot’s ‘Socialism in France; Its Present and Future’ and Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine featured E.A. Irving’s ‘Primitive socialists in Malaya’.27) Although 
these cases were very rare and had little to do with the political situation in Britain, 
they do suggest that interest in socialism in general was beginning to develop.
Poor Status of British Socialist Leaders
In contrast to the frequent invocation of Fabian socialism, the overall influence of 
British socialist organisations upon conservative debate on socialism was becoming 
even more insignificant than in the 1880s. Many historians regard Hyndman as the 
25) Mallock, "Conservatism and Democracy," 283.
26) W. H. Mallock, "Socialism and England," Quarterly Review 156 (October 1883): 353-93.
27) Guyot, "Socialism in France: Its Present and Future"; Irving, "Primitive Socialists [in Malaya]."
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culprit for the divisions between British socialists.28) Henry Collins observes that 
Hyndman’s antagonism towards trade unionism was the main reason for the 
alienation of the SDF from the labour movement.29) Stanley Pierson also points out 
that Hyndman’s national socialism was not compatible with other forms of British 
socialism, most of which were much closer to utilitarianism.30) On the contrary, 
Martin Crick argues that the influence of Hyndman in the SDF was not as dominant 
as other historians suggest.31) However, Laybourn observes that all these approaches 
are agreed that ‘Hyndman’s character was still fundamental to many of the problems 
of the SDF.’32) More importantly, however, most of these researches, including 
Laybourn’s, imply that if Hyndman had taken more amicable attitudes towards other 
socialists and the trade unionists, the SDF and even British socialism as a whole 
might have developed better. All these observations, however, are confined to the 
small circle of socialists. In the eyes of those outside this boundary, the activities of 
Hyndman and the SDF were simply of no interest. In addition, as shown above, 
since his Marxist tendency seemed less directly targeted on the landed class than 
Fabian socialism, his activities scarcely drew the attention of conservative reviewers.
For example, The Times mentioned Hyndman only three times in the 1890s while 
it dealt with socialism at least 123 times in the same period, most of which were 
about socialism on the continent.33) Moreover, two of the three cases were not 
28) The most important historical research on Hyndman is as follows: M. Bevir, "H. M. Hyndman: A 
Rereading and a Reassessment," History of Political Thought 12 (1991): 125-45; M. Bevir, "The 
British Social Democratic Federation 1880-1885: From O'Brienism to Marxism," International Review 
of Social History 37 (1992): 207-29; M. Bevir, "Republicanism, Socialism, and Democracy in Britain: 
The Origins of the Radical Left," Journal of Social History 34 (2000): 351-68; G. Brown, 
"Correspondence from H. M. Hyndman to Mrs. Cobden-Sanderson, 1900-1921," Bulletin of the 
Society for the Study of Labour History (1971), 11-16; N. Etherington, "Hyndman, the Social 
Democratic Federation, and Imperialism," Historical Studies 16 (1974): 89-103; C. Holmes, "H. M. 
Hyndman and R. D. Blumenfeld: Correspondence in 1913," Bulletin of the Society for the Study of 
Labour History (1972), 27-29; T. Lloyd, "Morris v. Hyndman: Commonweal and Justice," Victorian 
Periodicals Newsletter 9 (1976): 119-28; W. Wolfe, "A Century of Books on the History of 
Socialism in Britain," British Studies Monitor 10 (1980): 46-65, (3) 18-46; J. D. Young, "H. M. 
Hyndman and Daniel De Leon: The Two Souls of Socialism," Labor History 28 (1987): 534-56.
29) H. Collins, "The Marxism of the SDF," in Essays in Labour History, eds. A. Briggs and J. Saville, 
vol. 2 (London, 1971), 67.
30) S. Pierson, Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism (London, 1973), 273.
31) M. Crick, The History of the Social Democratic Federation (Keele, 1994), 296.
32) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 3-13.
33) Calculation based on The Wellesley Index. H. M. Hyndman, "Beginning of State Socialism," The 
Times, 18 November 1891, 6, col. f; Hyndman, "BOOKS: Economics of Socialism," The Times, 27 
February 1896, 6, col. a; Hyndman, "The Liberal Party and Socialism," The Times, 14 September 
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articles about him but letters sent by him. In 1896, for instance, Hyndman sent a 
letter to The Times, provoked by the conservative criticism of the Irish Home Rule 
Bill for involving excessive state interference. He retorted that ‘what is being done 
in Ireland  by direct State intervention for the benefit, as Ministers contend, of the 
people of that country can scarcely be wholly harmful to the people of Great 
Britain.’34) Some other contributors also supported state interference. The Marquess 
of Huntly, for instance, regarded ‘State Socialism’ as a practical idea, contrasting it 
with unpractical ‘Revolutionary Socialism’.35) In 1897, The Times gave Hyndman 
another opportunity to talk about socialism:
The growth of Socialism in the constituencies has rendered it quite impossible for either 
Liberals or Radicals to hold office again unless the Socialists chose. ... It seems to me, 
therefore, that unless the Liberals and Radicals wish to remain in a position of permanent 
impotence they had better begin to study and assimilate what we conceive to be the truths of 
Social Democracy.36)
Whether Hyndman was actually threatening the Liberal Party or not, it seems 
obvious that this kind of article would have made the readers of The Times believe 
that socialists were growing enough to threaten the Liberal Party. Indeed, though 
The Times rarely dealt seriously with the activities of Hyndman himself or his SDF, 
it did imply several times that he was threatening the Liberal Party. In other words, 
even when The Times infrequently mentioned Hyndman its interest lay in his 
dangerous intentions rather than in his real achievements, which were rather 
insignificant. In this sense, the attitudes of The Times towards socialism were 
becoming increasingly similar to those of the conservative periodicals.
William Morris is also frequently mentioned as an important figure in the 
development of British socialism.37) Laybourn claims that ‘William Morris was, like 
1897, 9, col. b.
34) Hyndman, "Beginning of State Socialism."
35) Huntly, "Socialism," The Times, 7 March 1891, 6, col. f. Charles Gordon Huntly: born 
Orton-Longueville, 5 March 1847; Eldest son of 10th Marquis; Captain of Hon. Corps of 
Gentlemen-at-Arms, 1881; Lord Rector of Aberdeen University, 1890, 93, and 96; County Councillor 
for Huntingdonshire and Aberdeenshire.
36) Hyndman, "The Liberal Party and Socialism."
37) The most important historical research on Morris is as follows: R. P. Arnot, William Morris: A 
Vindication (London, 1934); M. Bevir, "William Morris: The Modern Self, Art, and Politics," History 
of European Ideas 24 (1998): 175-94; F. Boos, "William Morris’s Socialist Diary, Edited, Annotated, 
and with Introduction and Bibliographical Notes," History Workshop Journal 13 (1982): 1-75; F. 
Boos and W. Boos, "The Utopian Communism of William Morris," History of Political Thought 7 
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Hyndman, a vital figure in the emergence of socialism in Britain in the late 
nineteenth century.’38) Ever since E. P. Thompson first drew attention to Morris’s 
socialistic aspirations, many historians have tried to find out more about his 
theories and activities for the realisation of utopian socialism.39) However, it 
appears that his contemporaries were not so interested in his political career.
Indeed, the status of William Morris as a socialist was even worse than that of 
Hyndman in the public debate. For instance, the split of the Social Democratic 
Federation and the following foundation of the Socialist League by William Morris 
hardly drew any attention from conservative commentators. In general, he was 
scarcely mentioned when periodicals were dealing with the question of socialism. It 
was only when he died in 1897 that periodicals wrote about him. But even in this 
case, he was not regarded as a genuine socialist.
In the Edinburgh Review, for instance, H.H. Statham described him as ‘poet and 
craftsman’.40) ‘The author of “The Earthly Paradise” ― the production with which his 
name is most widely and popularly associated ― has left behind him a reputation of 
very unusual quality.’41) He regarded Morris as a poet, not as a political activist. He 
never mentioned political aspects of Morris’s life in this article. The Quarterly 
Review also presented an obituary of William Morris. Robert Steele described him as 
‘poet and artist’, not dealing with the political activities of Morris.42)
The Westminster Review also described Morris mainly as a poet.43) Although it 
mentioned his socialist activity, it was described as a personal devotion. His Socialist 
League was never mentioned. The author described Morris as a utopian and 
(1986): 489-510; C. Harvey and J. Press, "William Morris: Art and Idealism," History Today 46 
(1996): 15-21; R. Kinna, "William Morris: Art, Work, and Leisure," Journal of the History of Ideas 
61 (2000): 493-512; K. Kumar, "News from Nowhere: The Renewal of Utopia," History of Political 
Thought 14 (1993): 133-43; T. Lloyd, "The Politics of William Morris’s News from Nowhere," 
Albion 9 (1977): 273-87; E. P. Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (London, 
1976); C. Wrigley, "William Morris, Art and the Rise of the British Labour Movement," Historian 
67 (2000): 4-10.
38) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 13.
39) Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary.
40) H. H. Statham, "William Morris, Poet and Craftsman," Edinburgh Review 185 (January 1897): 63-83. 
Henry Heathcote Statham (1839-1924): writer on art, architecture and music.
41) Statham, "William Morris, Poet and Craftsman," 63.
42) W. R. L. Robert Steele, "William Morris, Poet and Artist," Quarterly Review 190 (October 1899): 
487-512. Robert Steele (1860-1944): man of letters.
43) D. F. Hannigan, "William Morris, Poet and Revolutionist," Westminster Review 147 (February 1897): 
117-19. Denis Francis Hannigan (1855-1938/39): Irish barrister, miscellaneous writer; King’s Inn 
Library Records, Dublin; disappeared from Thom in 1939.
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humanitarian:
William Morris, in the latter portion of his career at least, was an avowed Socialist; but his 
was not the cast-iron Socialism of the author of Looking Backward. His ideal was an epoch 
of peace and sweet enjoyment as a cure for the restless and feverish excitement which, at the 
present time, make true happiness impossible and, in many instances, produce misery, 
discontent, and an inevitable tendency towards self-destruction. This is the keynote of his 
marvellous “Utopian romance” entitled News from Nowhere.44)
When he compared Morris’s Chants for Socialists with his other poems, he asked, 
‘who can deny the noble humanitarianism that inspires these simple chants?’45) It 
shows that Morris was remembered more as a humanitarian than as a socialist. 
Consequently, the fact that Morris drew attention from periodicals does not mean 
that his socialism also took the spotlight. Nevertheless, the Westminster Review did 
mention his career as a socialist, whereas conservative periodicals strictly confined 
their topics to his talent as an artist. This fact suggests that, while conservative 
reviewers were interested in socialism mainly as a disturbing force in the Liberal 
Party, radical reviewers regarded socialism as less connected to party politics.
Why Radicals Turned against Socialism
Indeed, unlike conservative periodicals, the Westminster Review scarcely 
connected socialism to the Liberal Party. This was mainly because the Westminster 
Review was supporting radical demands. Although radicals were sympathetic to some 
of the socialist ideas, they did not embrace socialism as a whole. In the 1880s the 
Westminster Review had taken an ambiguous attitude towards socialism, but in the 
1890s, it seemed to be alarmed by the possibility that the realisation of radical 
demands might be thwarted if they were described as an equivalent to impractical 
and revolutionary socialism. Thus the Westminster Review also began to take a 
sceptical attitude towards socialism.
Unlike conservative periodicals, however, the Westminster Review focused on 
theoretical defects of socialism. For example, J. Endean criticised socialism because 
it would deteriorate, rather than improve, social conditions in Britain.46) He 
44) Hannigan, "William Morris, Poet and Revolutionist," 117.
45) Hannigan, "William Morris, Poet and Revolutionist," 119.
46) J. R. Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," Westminster Review 139 (May 
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analysed society into seven classes, arguing that naturally and inevitably the state of 
society was unequal: the submerged classes, the labouring classes, the artisan 
classes, the lower middle classes, the middle classes, the wealthy classes, and the 
aristocratic classes.47) He approved of this class system on the grounds that all these 
classes were governed well by laws that could not ‘prevent the humblest from rising 
to the highest honours in the social scale.’48) He worried, however, that this balance 
was in danger of collapse:
But society is somewhat nervous as to its future. Within itself it sees forces at work anxious 
to re-organise it from foundations upwards; there is a spirit of discontent spreading among the 
masses inimical to the public weal. Statesmen, poets, politicians, demagogues, socialists are 
peering into the future, vainly endeavouring to forecast with precision the social arrangements 
by which peoples, nations, empires shall be governed, or shall be free from government, as 
this term is now understood.49)
Although the author was as sceptical about socialism as conservative reviewers, what 
he was opposed to was socialism in general, not a particular form of socialism 
allegedly spreading in the Liberal Party. In other words, while conservative 
periodicals used the term ‘Socialism’ as an adjective for describing the radical 
tendency of the Liberal Party, radical periodicals confined it to overtly socialist 
ideas, most of which were found on the continent.
Indeed, it was not the activities of Fabian Society, let alone those of the SDF or 
the ILP, but foreign socialist cases that Endean counted on for theoretical analysis 
of socialism. He observed that in order to understand the meaning of socialism ‘it is 
scarcely possible to appeal to any higher authority than Dr. Albert Schäffle, a past 
Minister of Finance in Austria.’50) Then he introduced Schäffle’s explanations of 
socialism over five pages, during which he ignored the authority of British socialists 
on the question. After summing up several implications of socialism from Schäffle’s 
point of view, Endean concluded that the dream of an equal society would not be 
realised:
Nothing is offered by Socialism as a panacea for present social ills but the lifting up of the 
1893): 508-25. James Russell Endean: born in 1826.
47) Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 510.
48) Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 512.
49) Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 512.
50) Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 516.
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lowest classes to the level of the artisan, and the bringing down of every class above that 
level to the same plane, and as the evils it would create are manifestly far greater, vastly 
more onerous, and profoundly more mischievous and demoralising than any at present existing, 
it follows that every attempt to establish its principle is opposed to the best interests of the 
individual, of society, and of the State; that Socialism is visionary, unpractical, destructive, 
and repulsive to every civilised community, and therefore its condemnation as a system for 
the betterment of humanity cannot too strongly be pronounced.51)
Apparently, he agreed with conservative commentators that socialism was harmful to 
society. Nonetheless, he did not suggest that it was the Liberal Party which spread 
socialism in Britain. Nor did he mention socialist organisations in Britain. He was 
just concerned about socialism in general.
Another article in the Westminster Review also paid more attention to the 
continent.52) It dealt with Y. Guyot’s La Tyrannie Socialiste because ‘the book is a 
most valuable contribution towards the solution of a very burning question of the 
day.’ The anonymous reviewer stated, ‘M. Yves Guyot makes a valiant effort to stem 
the wave of State Socialism which is threatening to engulph [sic] all European 
nations alike. The state of things which is revealed in France by this book is, if we 
are to accept M. Guyot’s statements, far graver than in England.’53) It was the 
extension of the role of the state that had provoked the Conservatives to brand 
radicalism as socialism. Here, a radical reviewer also emphasised the danger of 
‘State Socialism’. Interestingly, at the time when conservative periodicals were 
accusing the radicals of being socialistic, radical reviewers were also criticising 
socialism.
Walter Lloyd, in ‘The collapse of Socialism’, also dealt with La Tyrannie Socialiste.54) 
He started his review by quoting Guyot’s figures to show the increase of the number 
of socialists in three countries. ‘Taking Germany first, the Socialist votes obtained at 
an election for the Reichstag in 1871 were about 100,000; in 1893 they were 
1,800,000. In France in 1889, the united Socialist vote was 90,000; in 1893, 500,000 
or 600,000. In England the trade unions in conference have passed resolutions in 
favour of Collectivism; and other countries show similar results.’ In this quotation, it 
is important to notice that he did not point to socialists but trade unions, and not 
51) Endean, "Will Socialism be a Remedy for Present Social Ills?," 525.
52) "The Tyranny of Socialism," Westminster Review 140 (October 1893): 404-406.
53) "The Tyranny of Socialism," 404.
54) W. Lloyd, "The Collapse of Socialism," Westminster Review 143 (July 1895): 597-602. Walter Lloyd 
(1844/45-1907): Unitarian preacher, clerk at Somerset House.
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‘Socialism’ but ‘Collectivism’ when he talked about England whereas he used 
‘Socialists’ in the case of Germany and France. This reveals that radical reviewers 
were very cautious about using the term ‘Socialism’ in domestic political affairs. The 
author made this point even clearer by stating that, despite the increase of such 
figures, socialism was already on the decline, not least because there was no 
consistent and universally accepted body of doctrines about which all socialists were 
agreed, and which might be regarded as representing the views of socialists 
everywhere.55)
Therefore, although both radical and conservative reviewers were sceptical about 
socialism, there was an important difference between them: radical reviewers tended 
to minimise the influence of socialism in Britain while their conservative rivals 
tended to exaggerate it. This was because their political interests were different 
from each other. The radicals wanted to show that their political programme was 
different from foreign, impractical, and revolutionary socialism, denying the 
conservative allegations that it was closely connected to socialism.
Not all the articles about socialism in the Westminster Review took sceptical 
attitudes towards socialism. Significantly, however, most of these exceptions were 
written by those who did not represent the official opinions of the Westminster 
Review. For instance, ‘Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View’, signed by A.F.B., 
took a rather positive attitude towards socialism.56) The author distinguished 
moderate socialism from more revolutionary socialism and advocated the former. 
The definition of moderate socialism was quite broad:
We scarcely realise how far in these last few years we have gone on the path of Socialism.
Mr. Hanbury, in January 1897, in answer to a deputation which waited on him, said: 
“The [Conservative] Government ought to be a model employer of labour.” Is not this the 
Socialists’ aim? And yet what exclamations it would have evoked a few years ago! Free 
elementary education is a great advance; free secondary education has yet to follow. If it is 
true and it seems so that the stipendiary magistrates of the London Police Court and 
elsewhere are infinitely better than of the old unpaid magistrates and J.P.s of the country, the 
latter will soon cease to exist. Justice will be administered by public servants everywhere, as 
the highest is already, and in the train of this reform would probably come a great 
simplification of law.57)
55) Lloyd, "The Collapse of Socialism," 597.
56) A.F.B., "Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View," Westminster Review 152 (August 1899): 
144-51.
57) A.F.B., "Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View," 147-48.
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Although this article was similar to conservative articles in that it regarded a wide 
range of reforms as socialism, it did not associate socialism exclusively with the 
Liberal Party. The definition of socialism was even broader than that of conservative 
periodicals. It looks as if the author contended that criticising Liberal policies for 
being socialist was meaningless because the moderate sense of socialism could be 
applied to any reform politics of any parties. Nevertheless this article surely risked 
the Westminster Review appearing to agree with socialism. Perhaps that was why it 
had given this article the title of ‘Socialism from an Outsider’s Point of View’.
No Socialism in Britain: the Daily Telegraph
Like the Westminster Review, most newspapers did not describe Liberal policies as 
socialist, although several articles in The Times continued to follow the Conservative 
discourse that ‘State Socialism’ was spreading among the Liberals. In general, 
newspapers still paid more attention to socialism in foreign countries. For instance, 
The Times used the term ‘Socialism’ in its headings 123 times and the term 
‘Socialist’ 99 times from 1891 to 1900, most of which were about foreign countries: 
at least 80 and 77 cases respectively.58)
The Daily Telegraph also usually confined the term ‘Socialism’ to the activities of 
socialists on the continent.59) When it sporadically dealt with socialism in Britain, its 
scope was confined to authentic socialist organisations. They rarely described the 
Liberal Party as influenced by them. However, it sometimes reported on the 
contention of British socialists that socialism was spreading in Britain:
A manifesto has been issued by the Independent Labour Party “To the Socialists of all 
Lands,” in which they state that the cause of Socialism in the B ritish  Is le s  is progressing 
rapidly. The continued misery of the great mass of the people in the face of ever-increasing 
abundance, and the apparent helplessness of so-called statesmen to relieve it, are inclining 
many to join in the attempt “to break down the dominant power of the wealthy few and use 
the machinery of the State, which in England is very perfect, to build up an industrial 
commonwealth based upon the principles of Socialism.”60)
58) Calculation based on The Wellesley Index.
59) Compared with The Times, however, even socialism on the continent was not frequently reported. In 
most cases, it was on socialism in Germany as in "German Anti-Socialism," Daily Telegraph, 9 May 
1895, 5, col. g, and "Social Democracy in Germany," Daily Telegraph, 11 October 1897, 8, col. d.
60) "The Independent Labour Party," Daily Telegraph, 21 May 1895, 3, col. f.
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The correspondent, however, did not blow up the contention of the ILP to the 
domination of the Liberal Party as Conservative commentators occasionally did. On 
the contrary, he implied that socialism in Britain was in fact not developing as 
smoothly as that in other countries, by reporting on the ILP’s envy of the successful 
activities of ‘Russian Nihilist’, ‘Spanish Revolutionists’, and some other socialist 
equivalents of France and Belgium. The correspondent thus made it clear that the 
spread of socialism in Britain was just the propaganda of the ILP, rather than a 
widely recognisable phenomenon.
Because the Daily Telegraph maintained a relatively neutral attitude to the 
question of socialism, the activities of British socialists were reported more 
accurately than in The Times. While The Times emphasised the contention of 
Hyndman that the Liberal Party was losing to socialists, the Daily Telegraph was 
more interested in the official activities of the SDF. In most cases, the link between 
British socialists and their comrades on the continent drew more attention than the 
relationship between the socialists and the Liberals:
Anarchists and Trafalgar-square
Mr. David Nicholl, secretary of the Walsall Amnesty Association, has asked and obtained 
from the Chief Commissioner of Police authority to convene a meeting in Trafalgar-square for 
3.30 on Sunday afternoon next. The object of the meeting is declared to be to advocate the 
release of the Walsall and Spanish “political prisoners,” usually spoken of as the Walsall and 
Spanish Anarchists. Members of the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour 
Party are expected to be among the speakers; but, so far as can be ascertained, there is no 
intention to invite the deported Spaniards to take an active part in the demonstration.61)
In February 1886, the Daily Telegraph and The Times alike had reported on a 
violent demonstration of British socialists, and their subsequent prosecution.62) After 
that incident, many people would naturally expect a violent scene when public 
meetings were held by socialists. This was why the Daily Telegraph drew attention 
to the schedule of this socialist meeting.
Three days later, however, the correspondent described the scene as dull but 
well-ordered, which was exceptional compared with the usually violent image of 
61) "Anarchists and Trafalgar-square," Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1897, p. 6, col. f.
62) T. Hughes, "State Socialism in England," The Times, 17 February 1886, 7, col. c.; "The Riots at the 
West-end," Daily Telegraph, 18 February 1886, 2, col. d-h.
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socialists:
A resolution ... was submitted to a well-dressed and essentially good-humoured crowd, which 
had manifestly gathered round the Nelson monument in the hope of deriving some amusement 
from the speeches. They were wofully [sic] disappointed. It may also be said that they were 
exceedingly patient. Such, indeed, were their powers of endurance that they allowed one 
speaker, who in appearance emulated the true Adelphi Anarchist, to hold forth in the language 
of his kind for close on an hour without uttering so much as one protest. For the rest, it is 
only fair to add that the other speakers, who included one female orator, were discreet of 
utterance and mild in their vocabulary. The inevitable hat was passed round, and for a brief 
moment ― in which the countenances of the prominent Socialists were wreathed in smiles ― 
a shower of coppers on to the plinth.
After a display of eloquence extending two hours the resolution was declared carried, and 
the onlookers quietly dispersed.63)
Compared with conservative publications, the attitude of this article towards British 
socialists was quite positive, noticing the improvement of their manners. In addition, 
the Daily Telegraph hardly commented on the relationship between socialist 
activities like this occasion and the radicalisation of the Liberal Party. Instead, it 
confined itself to what actually happened, confining the influence of socialist 
demands among the socialists themselves.
Not only the Liberal Party, but also the question of labour was detached from 
socialism in the Daily Telegraph. In general, it did not describe the development of 
labour politics in terms of socialism. Perhaps it did not want to, or more likely, did 
not need to drive the Liberal Party into a crisis over the question of its identity by 
describing labour politicians, most of whom were collaborating with the Liberal 
Party, as socialists. For example, when a large number of the working classes called 
for the minimum wage, which was one of the most frequent targets of conservative 
commentators, the Daily Telegraph remained aloof from the question of socialism:
The Minimum Wage
A meeting about 3,000 workman employed in the Royal Arsenal was held in the Drill 
Hall of the Royal West Kent Volunteers, Woolwich, last night, for the purpose of urging the 
Government to adopt a scale of 21s for a week of forty-eight hours for labourers in 
government employment. Mr. Arthur Harris, secretary of the Labour Protection League, was 
chairman of the meeting.64)
63) "Socialist Meeting and Anarchists," Daily Telegraph, 20 September 1897, 7, col. g.
64) "The Minimum Wage," Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1897, 4, col. c.
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There was not a scintilla of hint that this meeting was connected to socialists or 
that it was secretly supported by Liberal leaders. In most cases, the paper’s report 
on labour unrest did not involve the language of socialism.65)
The Daily Telegraph also refrained from using the language of socialism when 
dealing with the question of state interference. R.W. Hanbury, as a financial 
secretary of the treasury in the Conservative government at the time, interfered with 
several labour issues so actively that, two years later, his activities came to be 
considered quite similar to socialistic demands in the Westminster Review:66)
The Government and Trade Unionism
Mr. R. W. Hanbury, replying, at the Treasury, to a deputation of trade unionists, said he 
was determined that the House of Commons resolution should be carried out very strictly, and 
if a Government contractor failed in any respect to carry out the resolution he lost his work. 
If there was any suspicion of work for Treasury contracts being underpaid, they would act 
vigorously and at once and the contractor would be dealt with. The decided policy of the 
country was free trade, but he thought it ought to be known what things came from abroad 
and what did not, and the information was being gathered as to what goods came from 
abroad, though they were supplied by English firms. It had been for some time recognised by 
the Treasury, said M. Hanbury, that when wage-earners had to give evidence they should 
receive some payment, and there was a Board of Trade and Home Office scale to allow up 
to 10s a day, and he thought that was not unfair.67)
Because this case was related to the question of state interference and the principle 
of free trade as well as the question of labour, Conservative commentators might 
have invoked the language of socialism in order to exaggerate the spread of 
socialism even among some Conservative politicians. Or, as the supporter of 
socialism did in the Westminster Review, socialist commentators might have used 
this occasion as a proof that socialist demands were practical and acceptable 
enough to be implemented even by the Conservative government. However, the 
Daily Telegraph correspondent did not use the term ‘Socialism’ to describe the 
situation, not only because the question of state interference in this report did not 
directly involve the question of land but also because the paper was basically not 
interested in relating the question of state interference or that of labour to 
65) "Coroner and Trade Unionists," Daily Telegraph, 1 January 1897, 4, col. d.
66) See the article above by A.F.B. in the Westminster Review.
67) "The Government and Trade Unionism," Daily Telegraph, 20 January 1897, 5, col. b.
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socialism. The correspondent reported on this event in quite unbiased terms. 
Therefore, the actual status of socialism and socialists in Britain in this period was 
probably most accurately reflected in the Daily Telegraph. 
Conclusion
In the 1890s, most periodicals, regardless of their political orientations, took 
sceptical attitudes towards ‘Socialism’. The fact that more conservative reviewers 
began to use the language of socialism to criticise the Liberal Party discouraged 
radical reviewers from supporting socialism. As a result, it appears that writers in 
the Westminster Review began to divert attention from the question of British 
socialism to that on the continent. For they were careful not to make Liberal 
policies appear to be impractical, violent, foreign or even absurd by associating 
them with socialism. By this process, the role of British socialist organisations in the 
public debate on the development of socialism diminished even further.
Although ‘Socialism’ was becoming a popular political term by which conservative 
commentators attacked the Liberal Party, there were many other cases when they 
chose not to use it. When Gladstone retired in 1894, Alexander Michie wrote an 
article about his political career in Maga: ‘Mr. Gladstone’s position during the last 
quarter of a century has been that of the destroying angel of British politics.’68) The 
main purpose of this article was to criticise Gladstone for his radical policies:
Whether Mr. Gladstone imposed on his adherents with malice aforethought, or was carried 
away by his devotion to his latest adopted purpose, may well be left a mystery; but recent 
experiments in Radical legislation, rash in so old a man, seemed to have broken down the 
prestige of transcendent morality which has so largely supplied him with political capital; for 
in the haste suggested by age it was not possible for him to maintain respect for the 
decencies of form which belong to high policy.69)
Of Gladstone’s radical policies, the Irish Home Rule Bill was most severely criticised. 
‘Even if he had convinced himself of the national necessity of surrender to the Irish, 
it would have been in harmony with political tradition for him to have left the 
actual surrender to the hands of others not so deeply pledged as himself to the 
68) Michie, "The Gladstonian Myth," 573.
69) Michie, "The Gladstonian Myth," 580-81.
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opposite course.’70) However severe the criticism was, he did not suggest that 
Gladstone had been connected to socialists, whether in theoretical or personal terms. 
There are many other examples in which conservative commentators did not use 
the language of socialism when they dealt with the further radicalisation of the 
Liberal Party after 1886: R. E. Prothero used the term ‘demagogues’ when he 
attacked the Liberal Party in the Quarterly Review; F.H.S. Escott, in the same 
periodical, saw the radicals as ‘cosmopolitans’.71) Even Arthur Elliot in the 
Edinburgh Review, one of the most frequent users of ‘Socialism’, did not use the 
term ‘Socialism’ in other occasions such as in ‘The English Radicals’.72) Therefore, 
the term ‘Socialism’ was just one of many expressions available for describing the 
radicalisation of the Liberal Party. However, not least because ‘Socialism’ was newer 
than others, it produced more possible definitions and implications.
Perhaps socialism itself had been developing in Britain since the early 1880s 
because several socialist organisations were endeavouring to spread their ideas. 
Indeed, not only some Liberals but also some Conservatives seemed to be sympathetic 
to the socialist demands of the Fabian Society. Some of them even had personal 
relationship with the Fabians.73) Other socialist organisations such as the SDF were 
also active. It began to grow rapidly in the provinces from the late 1890s.74) The 
ILP was also sufficiently developed as to field 28 candidates in the general election 
of 1895, although none of them were elected. Even so, British socialists were still 
seriously divided: the fact that William Morris started a ‘Socialist Unity’ movement in 
the 1890s reveals that socialists themselves were also aware that the divisions 
between them were holding back the development of socialism in Britain. As a 
result, they failed to provide an authoritative definition of socialism in unison.
Nevertheless, the language of socialism was gradually becoming familiar, not least 
because many political commentators had been writing about socialism on the 
continent. Like in the 1880s, socialism on the continent still had the image of 
revolution, nihilism, anarchism, and other extreme political ideas, most of which 
70) Michie, "The Gladstonian Myth," 581.
71) R. E. Prothero, "Demagogues in British Politics," Quarterly Review 178 (January 1894): 553-69. 
Rowland Edmund Prothero, Baron Ernle (1851-1937): administer, author, and minister of agriculture; 
brother of Sir George Prothero (1848-1922, historian). F. H. S. Escott, "Cosmopolitans in the House 
of Commons," Quarterly Review 185 (January 1897): 149-72. Thomas Hay Sweet Escott (1844-1924): 
journalist, editor of the Fortnightly Review.
72) A. Elliot, "The English Radicals," Edinburgh Review 191 (January 1900): 207-25.
73) G. R. Searle, The Liberal Party, British History in Perspective (Hampshire, 2001), 57-58.
74) Laybourn, The Rise of Socialism, 29.
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were considered impractical. Under such circumstances, the authority to define 
socialism was moving from British socialist organisations over to conservative 
political commentators. This process was facilitated by the absence of socialist 
parties in Westminster: none of the exiting parties supported socialism, nor was 
there an independent Socialist party. Although the ILP took the most favourable 
attitude towards socialism, it was the Liberal Party that conservative commentators 
regarded as the culprit of spread of socialism. At the same time, some socialist 
organisations pledged themselves to permeate the existing parties. Under such 
circumstances, socialists looked both ubiquitous and absent at the same time, 
making it easier for those who had more tangible and influential political 
organisations to define what socialism was, who were socialists, who supported 
them, and what they intended to do.
The Conservatives were no doubt the most influential party during the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, not least because they remained in power in 
most of the period in both Houses. Alarmed by increasingly radical demands of the 
Liberal Party, they felt that existing expressions were not enough to reveal the 
extreme danger of such demands and that it was necessary to apply the most 
shocking but not clearly defined expression to them: ‘Socialism’. Perhaps some 
Conservatives consciously intended to create such a strategy, but it is more likely 
that most of them were just following, accepting, and reproducing this quite 
plausible allegation. For language controls the way people understand phenomena, 
rather than just being a tool for describing existing phenomena. By this process, the 
development of socialism in Britain was not only exaggerated but also 
misunderstood to be intimately related to non-socialist groups such as the Liberal 
Party.
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A Colonial Implementation of Metropolitan Policy: 
The Debate on African Coffee Growing in Kenya Colony in the 1930s
Chan Do Jung*1)
Abstract
The idea of allowing Africans to grow coffee on a smallholder basis led to heated 
debate between Whitehall and the Kenya Colony in the early 1930s. As the economic 
sustainability of the colony and the settler community was at stake in the midst of the 
Great Depression, this new scheme was a desperate measure by the colonial administration 
to resuscitate the colony’s dwindling economy in order to comply with the Colonial Office 
directive, which was to make the colony economically self-sufficient. The administrative 
measures resulting from the debate, however, limited the scope and scale of the scheme. 
By reviewing this bureaucratic process, this study examines how the idea of African coffee 
growing was implemented as a small-scale experiment carried out in the African reserves 
remote from the White Highlands.
Keywords: Colonial policy, Rural development, Kenya, coffee, Smallholder cashcrop production.
* I thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am indebted to my 
supervisor professor Megan Vaughan at King’s College, Cambridge and my advisors Professor John 
Lonsdale at Trinity College, Cambridge for their valuable suggestions on this subject. I am also 
grateful to Trinity College, Cambridge for providing financial support for my fieldwork in Kenya 
through grants. Any remaining errors are my own. 
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Perhaps no agricultural development scheme promoted by the colonial state in 
Kenya become a more politically and economically contentious issue in both 
Whitehall and Nairobi than coffee growing by African smallholders. The question of 
whether African coffee production should be allowed was raised in extensive 
correspondence between officials in Colonial Office in London and the colonial 
administration in Kenya for several years and involved two Secretaries of State for 
the Colonies, Lord Passfield (formerly Sydney Webb, 1929-31) and Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister (1931-35), and two governors of Kenya Colony, Lt. Col. Sir Edward W. 
M. Grigg (1925-30) and Sir Joseph Byrne (1931-36). 
Numerous scholars have paid attention to the debate, because it was a key 
element of their discussions on the role of the colonial state in implementing 
agricultural innovation and rural development that caused the social and economic 
change in the African countryside during the colonial period. Largely focusing on 
the consequence of the debate that led the colonial administration to start only a 
limited scale of coffee trials in the African reserves remote from European settlers’ 
coffee estates, these scholars presented it to show how strong and influential settler 
interests were in the politics of the colony and how Africans were deprived of 
opportunities for economic development in the process.1) Building on these earlier 
contributions, this study focuses on understanding the debate within a broader 
perspective of colonial development and bureaucracy. By examining the details of 
the hotly debated issues of African coffee growing, this article will review the 
bureaucratic process of how the idea of African coffee growing was formulated and 
then became a small scale experiment due to the colonial administration’s 
reluctance to promote African economic activities in direct competition for markets 
with those by the Europeans.
Although primarily emerging as an economic option from the recessionary 
conditions in the late 1920s, the idea of African coffee growing was perhaps 
inspired from the political environment sympathetic to African interests in the 
1) See for example, E. Clayton, Agrarian Development in Peasant Economies: Some Lessons from 
Kenya (Oxford, 1964); Roger M. A. Van Zwannenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 
1919-1939 (Nairobi, 1975); Caroline Barnes, "An Experiment with African Coffee Growing in Kenya: 
the Gusii, 1933-1950" (Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1976); Robert M. Maxon, Conflict 
and Accommodation in Western Kenya: The Gusii and the British, 1907-1963 (London and Toronto, 
1989); and I. D. Talbott, Agricultural innovation in colonial Africa: Kenya and the great depression 
(Lewiston, 1990).
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metropolitan government from the early 1920s. To a certain extent, both the 
contemporary Conservative and Labour governments during this period, notably 
Duke of Devonshire (Conservative) and Lord Passfield (formerly Sydney Webb, 
Labour), shared the increasing humanitarian concerns for Africans as their colonial 
secretaries and intended to promote the ‘African paramountcy’ in Kenya.2)  
However, as shown in Gregory’s study on Sydney Webb and the Labour 
government’s policy for East Africa, the implementation of such policy initiative was 
frustrated by a combination of entangled conflicts and mixed interests within the 
imperial bureaucracy. In this regard, the subject of African coffee growing in Kenya 
can broaden our understanding on the operating mechanism of the colonial 
administration; it will serve as a case demonstrating that the complex social forces 
were not only influencing the process of discussing imperial policies, but also 
defining the scope and scale of a seemingly straightforward rural economic 
development scheme for the indigenous farmers in an African colony. 
In order to carry out this endeavour, this article begins with a review on the 
examination on economic and political relationship between metropolis and the 
Kenya Colony. In the first place, it examines the state of the settler economy, 
which had been the focus of government policies promoting agricultural production 
for export. The focus will be to explain the extent to which the colonial 
government contributed to the establishment of the European coffee industry up 
until the 1930s. This article then reviews the underlying problems in European 
coffee production and the colonial administration’s reasoning for African coffee 
growing, which eventually led the colonial government to decide for promoting 
African coffee growing despite settler opposition. 
Metropolitan Policy for Colonial Development 
and the Economic Structure of the Colony
Metropolitan policy for colonial development was a product of intermittent 
intervention rather than of systemic approach. The social and geographical diversity 
of the vast empire made it nearly impossible for the British imperial government to 
2) For further details on the humanitarian concerns for Africans shared by the colonial secretaries of the 
Conservative government and the Labour government, see Robert G. Gregory, Labour’s Experiment 
with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).
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impose any uniform policy. In practice, the Colonial Office adopted a vague set of 
principles and expected the local administrators to use a wide range of discretion 
when putting those principles into action, which was manifested as the doctrine of 
‘trust man on the spot.’3) However, this does not mean that the metropolitan 
intervention was not possible. As shown by Berman, the most effective instrument 
for colonial control proved to be the fiscal and budgetary oversight, which was 
mainly exercised to make the colonial administration economically sustainable.4) In 
line with the policy of fiscal self-sufficiency, one of the colonial officials’ duties was 
to keep the costs of colonial administration “as inexpensively as possible.”5) Such 
motivation led the colonial state to be interested in economic development and 
therefore promote various activities such as natural resources extraction or 
commodity production, which provided a tax base to meet the costs of running the 
local apparatus in the colony. 
As there were no other viable resources (such as mineral resources) for economic 
growth and self-sufficiency than agriculture, commodity production was important in 
Kenya. Commonly known as Dual Policy, the colonial administration in Kenya 
developed a structural economic division between European settlers and Africans 
from the immediate post-WWI years and firmly established it by the mid-1920s. It 
was European settlers who were involved in commercial and export agriculture such 
as high-value cash crop production from the early 1900s. Within this structure, 
coffee was the most valuable export commodity, consistently contributing more than 
one-third of total value of agricultural exports of the country during the 1920s and 
the early 1930s. Although production for export agriculture was limited, Africans 
were also actively engaged in the domestic market and maize had increasingly 
become the chief cash crop for Africans by the early 1910s.6)
Scholars like Brett and Sorrenson have argued that European settlers in Kenya 
were unable to establish viable economic foundation without colonial government 
support in terms of favourable land tenure, control of labour supply, and exclusive 
access to certain kinds of economic commodities such as coffee.7) John Overton 
3) Cosmo Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, 1909-1945 (London, 1947), 55.
4) Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, the Dialectic of Domination (London, 1990), 
77-78.
5) T. H. R. Cashmore, "Studies in District Administration in the East Africa Protectorate 1895-1918" 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1965), 5.
6) John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the 
Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914," Journal of African History 20-4 (1979): 501; See also Kenyan 
Land Commission, Evidence and Memoranda, vol. 1: 979.
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also pointed out that the settler economy was founded on “a structure developed 
upon artificial and abnormal economic circumstances.”8) Such a system was 
sustained by the generally high prices of the colony’s exports which masked the 
inefficiencies in settler production.9) Although there was a group of politically 
well-connected and influential individuals who were highly capitalised, more efficient 
and economically sound enough to manage favourable terms even in financially 
troubled times,10) the majority of European settlers in Kenya were relatively 
small-scale farmers who were constantly short of funds and had limited options.11) 
Moreover, for most European settlers from the early 1900s, farming in the highlands 
was a considerable challenge simply because they were not farmers before they 
came to Kenya.12) 
Coffee growing began in Kenya with little governmental support in promoting 
coffee production. In the late 1890s and early 1900s most trials for coffee planting 
took place in Kenya at a number of mission stations operated by the French Roman 
Catholic missionaries who developed plantations as a source of income to carry on 
their work.13) A group of European settlers in the neighbourhood was able to get 
the seedlings from this mission for their own experiments. There seemed to be no 
way to acquire the necessary knowledge for coffee growing other than through trial 
and error. However, coffee could be a practical option even for settler farmers with 
relatively small plots of land. Firstly, coffee was a suitable cash crop for the 
highlands of Kenya, since the ecological setting of the settled areas provides 
favourable climatic conditions at an altitude of between 4,500 and 6,500 ft., and an 
annual rainfall of 35 and 80 inches, well distributed throughout the crop year with 
7) E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: the politics of economic change, 
1919-1939 (London, 1973), 212. For more about the inherent weakness of settler economy, see M. 
P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi, 1968).
8) John Overton, "War and Economic Development: Settlers in Kenya, 1914-1918," Journal of African 
History 27-1 (1986): 101.
9) David Anderson and David Throup, "The Agrarian Economy of Central Province, Kenya, 1918 to 
1939," in The Economics of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression, ed. Ian Brown (London, 
1989), 12.
10) Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963 (London, 
1974), 165. 
11) Paul van Zwanenberg, "Kenya’s Primitive Colonial Capitalism: The Economic Weakness of Kenya’s 
Settlers up to 1940," Canadian Journal of African Studies 9-2 (1975): 278-79
12) Roger van Zwanenberg, The Agricultural History of Kenya (Nairobi, 1972), 32-47.
13) For the early experiment of commercial coffee production held in Kenya in the beginning of the 
20th Century, see J. A. Kieran, "The Origin of Commercial Arabica Coffee Production in East 
Africa," African Historical Studies 2-1 (1969): 51-67.
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short dry seasons.14) Secondly, unlike sisal (which needs to be planted on a very 
large scale to justify the costs and secure a decent return on investment), coffee did 
not require substantial capital investment for processing equipment. Lastly, coffee 
could be grown on a much smaller scale than that of sisal, and the processing 
machinery for coffee cost much less than that for sisal production. 
The colonial administration was apparently in doubt as to its economic prospects 
in the first place and thus not in favour of the expansion of coffee growing.15) 
Three reasons may be found from a contemporary official’s observation on the state 
and prospect of the industry. Firstly, labour scarcity and uncertainty in labour 
supply in the future would not allow coffee acreage to increase to a desirable level. 
Although coffee could provide a relatively high income, the commercial success of 
coffee hinged too much on the acquisition of a sufficiently cheap labour especially 
at harvest seasons. Thus, the concentration of labour demands in such a very short 
period of the agricultural cycle could further intensify if coffee production were to 
be expanded, which would inevitably push labour costs up. Secondly, technical 
knowledge of coffee growing was still not adequate. Although some guidelines for 
the required conditions in the region were provided (mostly through trial and error), 
the optimal soil and climatic conditions for coffee growing were not fully 
understood at this early stage. Coffee was also highly vulnerable to pests and 
diseases. Thirdly, the government was concerned with the lack of international or 
regional marketing channels available for the crop. As the same report pointed out, 
only a few marketing arrangements were established as no regular business had 
been opened with South Africa and thus only a few plantations had sent any 
considerable consignments to Europe.16)
In addition to the unfavourable economic conditions for coffee growing, European 
coffee planters did not have any organizational support protecting their interests. 
Although there was the Kenya Coffee Planters’ Union founded in 1917, which 
replaced a loosely formed interest group of some of the larger planters called The 
Coffee Planters’ Association established as early as 1908, coffee planters in Kenya 
14) L. H. Brown, "the Development of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya," extract from an article published 
in East African Agricultural Journal 24-1 (Jan. 1959) in Overseas Development Record Project, 
Rhodes House Library (hereafter ODRP RHL): MSS Afr s. 1717(18).
15) Claud R. Watson, "Notes on Coffee Industry in B. E. A. year 1909-10," included in Kikuyu District 
Annual Report 1909/10, Microfilm Collection of Kenya National Archives held at Seeley Historical 
Library, University of Cambridge (hereafter MC) KNA: AR/7.
16) Watson, "Notes on Coffee Industry in B. E. A. year 1909-10."
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were not a politically influential group during the 1910s.17) Even by 1921, only 110 
out of some 600 planters were members of the Union.18) The administrative 
resources necessary for coffee disease control were also inadequate. For example, 
although the Coffee Leaf Disease Ordinance of 1904 was passed in order to prohibit 
the importation of plants and seeds from designated countries, it was not until in 
1908 that the first government entomologist was posted to Kenya. The first 
mycologist was posted much later in 1913. The system of coffee grading was not 
introduced until the early 1920s.19) 
Expansion of European Coffee Production under Protective 
Environment in the 1920s
In the following decades, however, European coffee production, along with other 
crops such as maize, wheat, and sisal, grew significantly. By the end of the 1920s, 
the number of European coffee planters reached 931, comprising more than 40% of 
total number of European farm owners in Kenya <Table 1>. A number of studies 
have argued that this significant expansion in settler coffee production in the 1920s 
was largely due to a combination of favourable conditions created and supported by 
the colonial administration. The conventional explanation for this relatively rapid 
development in European agriculture in the 1920s focused on a series of favourable 
policies and legal frameworks provided by the colonial government during the 1920s 
which granted the settlers considerable advantages in land acquisition, labour supply, 
exclusive access to economic opportunities and agricultural research and advisory 
services.20)
The main driver of this significant expansion seemed to be land ownership 
established in the settled area. The alienation of land from Africans by the colonial 
government created an exclusive land market for the settlers in Kenya, allowing 
settlers to establish land ownership and enabling them to secure their properties for 
17) Alan Rufus Waters, “Change and Evolution in the Structure of the Kenya Coffee Industry”, African 
Affairs, 71(283), (April, 1972), 165.
18) M.F. Hill, Planters’ Progress, the story of coffee in Kenya (Nairobi, 1956), 67.
19) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Department of Agriculture Annual Report (hereafter DAAR) 
1919/20, 3.
20) See R.M.A. van Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and M.G. Redley, “The Politics of a Predicament: 
the white community in Kenya, 1918-1932, PhD Thesis (University of Cambridge, 1976). 
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1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Number of Growers n/a n/a n/a 671 696 714 749 829 871 931
% Growth from the previous year - - - - 3.73 2.59 4.90 10.68 5.07 6.89
% of Total European Occupiers of Farm Lands - - - 40 41 39 39 42 42.8 44.4
Total Acreage of Coffee (‘000) 33.81 43.36 52.25 60.05 65.14 69.95 74.56 84.07 90.21 96.69
% Increase from previous year - 28.23 20.50 14.94 8.47 7.38 6.59 12.76 7.29 7.19
 Source: DAAR and Agricultural Census of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1921-1930.
<Table 1> Development of European Coffee Growing, 1921-1930
long-term improvement. Additionally, this exclusive land market and security of 
ownership made it possible for European settlers to finance the capital required for 
the investment through loans provided by the lending agencies, such as the British 
banks and private moneylenders. As farm development for coffee planting required 
significant capital input for at least five to six years in advance and for 
maintenance costs until bearing of coffee trees that could actually generate profit, 
the availability of relatively long-term credit was essential for coffee planting. 
Mortgages were to be the main vehicle of these long-term loans provided by 
commercial banks on the basis of the value of land.21)
The railway also helped the European planters a great deal in establishing export 
agriculture in the 1920s. Easy access to railway services provided settler planters a 
direct advantage over African peasants, in terms of cost and time in transporting 
the produce for export market. Moreover, the favourable railway rate set by the 
colonial state also served as a subsidy to the settler export agriculture, as the 
railway services charged low rates for outward traffic of agricultural produce for 
export. For inbound consumer goods, the railway charged higher rates for African 
population in the colony.22) One of the highest tax rates was imposed on cotton 
clothes, an important product consumed by the Africans. In fact, second-hand 
cotton clothing imported for sale was charged with a 30% tax per item, the same 
rate as for luxury goods such as jewellery, perfume, cosmetics and gold/silver plated 
wares.23)
The colonial administration also established a legal framework favourable to 
European employers who sought cheap labour for regular work. A number of 
21) Paul van Zwanenberg, "Kenya’s Primitive Colonial Capitalism," 282.
22) M. F. Hill, Permanent Way, the Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway (Nairobi, 1961), 419-42.
23) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Blue Book for the year ended 31st December 1928, 7.
A Colonial Implementation of Metropolitan Policy    61
measures were implemented to mobilize Africans to work. The collection of poll tax, 
which began in 1910 at first in ‘labour producing areas’, was a deliberate measure 
devised by the colonial officials to force Africans into the cash economy, as it was 
expected to drive younger Africans living in the reserves to earn cash income to 
pay this tax.24) The impact of poll tax was reinforced by the increases in tax rates 
in 1915 and another raise in 1920, while the movement pass and registration system 
known as Kipande were introduced under the Registration of Natives Ordinance of 
1915 as a new measure to increase the labour supply.25) The enforcement of the 
Resident Natives Labourers’ Ordinance of 1918 legalized squatter labour, which was 
then the most effective form of cheap labour utilized by European settlers, 
especially during the harvesting seasons. 
Despite these various measures aimed at transforming the African population into 
a cheap and readily available labour force, it seemed that settlers continued to 
experience labour shortage. A. Trench, the Senior Coffee Officer for the whole 
colony from the mid-1920s, expressed concerns about labour shortages in his annual 
reports. Urging the need for adopting labour saving devices, Trench noted in 1924 
that a considerable amount of coffee was dropped on the ground due to lack of 
pickers and thus not processed.26) In the next year, labour shortage was blamed 
again for the drop in coffee exports and quality, which led to a decrease in value.27) 
Conventional explanations for the development of settler agriculture in the 1920s 
also note that exclusive access to agricultural research and advisory services were 
provided by the colonial administration for the settlers, which gave settlers 
significant technological advantages in terms of productivity and disease and pests 
control. The staff at the Department of Agriculture (hereafter DoA) were primarily 
focused on providing agricultural advisory services in European areas, not to 
mention that the critical findings from the agricultural research were published in 
periodicals written in English. However, whether the quality and scope of the 
services provided was adequate could be questionable, given that there was only one 
member of the agricultural staff dedicated to this cash crop available for some time 
24) Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 41-42.
25) As suggested by John Henley, Kipande system and its reinforcement had been an advantage enabled 
the European farmers to keep wages low, because their costs of labour control were shifted to the 
government. John S. Henley, "Employment Relationships and Economic Development-The Kenyan 
Experience," Journal of Modern African Studies 11-4 (Dec. 1973): 560.
26) DAAR 1924, 126.
27) DAAR 1925, 15.
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until the 1930s. As Trench admitted in his 1922 report, even though the Disease of 
Plants Prevention Ordinance allowing powers to agricultural officials to enforce 
planters to treat and destroy any infected plants or seed was passed in 1921, the 
rules could not be efficiently enforced “owing to additional work, correspondence, 
increase of acreage throughout the coffee districts in the Colony and a further 
increase in the number of new plantations.”28) It was reported for the first time in 
1924 that notices under the conditions of Disease of Plants Prevention Rules were 
given to seventeen plantations in which signs of neglected coffee were found.29) 
However, there was no further record on enforcement actions such as prosecutions, 
followed by fines, before 1928.30) It was not until 1930 that eight cases under the 
Rules were prosecuted and convictions obtained.31) This was perhaps because trials 
for pruning and crop husbandry were still ongoing and there was no general 
consensus of opinions among experts on coffee cultivation among experts.32) 
Despite the expansion, protective environment for European agricultural 
production for export in the 1920s led many settlers to be highly dependent on 
cheap African casual labour, whilst other elements of farming enterprise available 
for further development such as land, credit, or technology were increasingly 
limited. Land prices were rising because of the open market speculation33) and land 
concentration, and financing consequently became more burdensome. Also, there 
was no significant technological development mitigating reliance on cheap African 
labour.
28) DAAR 1922, 123
29) DAAR 1924, 124.
30) Those who failed to notify DoA of the existence of a pest were to be prosecuted and fined Sh. 100, 
those did not carry out the instruction to destroy some neglected coffee bushes were to be fined Sh. 
200, and those who moved coffee plants from a quarantine area to a clean area violating the 
Movement of Coffee Plant Regulations were to be fined Sh. 50. DAAR 1928, 256.
31) DAAR 1930, 20.
32) Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health, Report by Mr. F. A. Stockdale, C.B.E., 
Agricultural Adviser to the Secretary of the State for the Colonies, on his visit to South and East 
Africa, Seychelles, the Sudan, Egypt, and Cyprus, 1930-1931 (London: HMSO, 1931), 47-49.
33) Farms in the Rift Valley which sold for six pence per acre in 1908 were resold for 10 shillings per 
acre in 1912. In 1914 the same land changed hands on the market at £1 per acre. See Richard D. 
Wolff, The economics of colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930, Yale series in economic history 
(New Haven, 1974), 59-60.
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The Great Depression and Worsening Structural Problems 
in Settler Economy
The rapid expansion of European coffee growing was short-lived <Table 2>. The 
crash in the world coffee market price was triggered by a large release of Brazilian 
stock from 1930 when Brazil’s Valorisation Scheme, a stabilization fund for coffee 
prices operated by the Brazilian government, ran short and was forced to release its 
coffee stock more freely.34) Consequently, the prices of coffee fetched on the 
London market, which had soared to over Sh. 120 per cwt during the mid 1920s, 
had sharply declined to Sh. 60 per cwt in the mid 1930s <Figure 1>. The impact 
was disastrous for the settler coffee farmers in Kenya. In 1930, coffee prices 
dropped from about £120 to £70 a ton. In the meantime, it cost producers about 
£71-75 to get each ton of coffee to the London Market (interest charges not 
included).35)
In the same period, numerous cases of disease and pests infection (such as 
Coffee Berry Disease and Coffee Mealy Bug) and adverse climatic conditions brought 
considerable damages. Although the research and extension division for coffee at 
DoA made attempts in various directions, the control measures did not improve the 
situation. Many of those measures proved to be either too expensive or poisonous 
for field use, and unsuitable for wider scale application.36) 
The price fall most gravely affected the most was the coffee planters’ credit 
worthiness and inflicted a serious long-term damage to the planters. For settler 
farmers, this constituted a major crisis in their financial security, because land and 
business ownership were closely tied to credit provided from banks or private 
moneylenders. The Coffee Board of Kenya’s survey carried out in 1933 shows the 
scale of settler debt. More than 37% of coffee planters responding to the survey 
replied that they were in financial difficulties and in desperate need of further 
credit for seasonal finance, even though they had already mortgaged their estates. 
The total debt for the coffee industry in Kenya in terms of mortgages, bank 
overdrafts and other loans financed through land was £1,212,110, with annual 
interest charge of £82,043.37) As coffee takes three years to bear fruits and six years 
34) DAAR 1930, 18.
35) Elspeth Huxley, White Man’s Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya (London, 1953), 
305.
36) DAAR 1932, 124.
37) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, "Memorandum from the Coffee Board of Agricultural 
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
Number of Growers 871 931 926 940 942 929
% increase from previous year 5.07 6.89 -0.54 1.51 0.21 -1.38
% of total European Occupiers of Farm Lands 42.8 44.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Total Acreage of Coffee (‘000) 90.21 96.69 98.87 100.39 102.24 102.90
% Increase from previous year 7.29 7.19 2.26 1.53 1.84 0.65
Source: DAAR 1929-1934 and Agricultural Census of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1929-1938.
<Table 2> European Coffee Growing and the Depression, 1929-1934
<Figure 1> Prices of coffee in London and general wholesale prices*
    Source: V. Liversage, "Kenya Coffee, A Graphical Analysis of Post War Prices," The East Africa Agricultural 
Journal 2-3 (November 1936): 221. 
    * Seasonal variation removed from the graph.
for full crop production, settlers’ financial situation got even worse. Also, coffee's 
degree of flexibility in responding to fluctuations in prices was not high, which was 
a commonly shared feature of many annual crops. Although the rate of expansion 
in coffee acreages significantly slowed from 1930, the settler coffee farmers’ 
suffering had just begun because large areas of coffee plantation only reached their 
full bearing stage after the price collapse. 
The state of the settler coffee industry during this period is well outlined in the 
Indebtedness," 25 November 1935, ODRP RHL: Mss. Afr. s. 596; Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 
Interim Report of the Agricultural Indebtedness Committee (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1936), 9-10.
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contemporary report on the agricultural indebtedness:
for a prolonged period farming operations have been conducted at a loss, left many without 
any working capital with which to meet labour costs, etc., to plant another crop or to 
maintain existing areas.38) 
As a temporary measure to alleviate the financial hardship under the price drop 
and the overstock of coffee, planters resorted to seasonal advances against their 
crops. The situation was made worse by merchant houses, the wholesaling agencies 
for coffee, who had decided “to curtail and in some cases to discontinue seasonal 
and anticipatory advances on which planters had relied in past years.”39) 
The government’s remedy to this crisis was to supply additional financial 
resources by setting up the Land and Agricultural Bank in 1930, which was designed 
to grant long-term loans repayable over 10 to 30 years.40) At the same time, 
additional attempts to subsidise European agriculture were made, particularly for 
maize and wheat. In 1930, the grading and inspection services for the produce 
operated by the administration decided to refund 80% of charges imposed the 
previous season and to remit 80% of fees for port storage facilities charged by the 
Kenya railways and harbours. In addition, the government was able to negotiate 
with ocean freight carriers to secure a deal reducing the charges for transporting 
Kenya produce to the world market.41) 
Despite the above measures, the economic situation showed no sign of recovery. 
Failure to find a successful method of stabilizing European agriculture through 
various forms of subsidy led the colonial government to turn to new options. 
Colonial Bureaucracy and Attention to African Agriculture 
Reading the correspondence between the officials of the colonial administration 
in Kenya in the 1920s and 1930s regarding the development of African agriculture, 
one can distinguish two different attitudes toward the issue. The senior adminis-
trators in Nairobi were explicitly sympathetic to European agriculture.42) Not all of 
38) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Interim Report of the Agricultural Indebtedness Committee, 15.
39) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Interim Report of the Agricultural Indebtedness Committee, 15.
40) For its detailed operation, see R.M.A. Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 20-26.
41) DAAR 1930, 56.
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them, however, were against African agricultural development in principle. They 
considered encouraging African agricultural production in general as a viable 
solution to the Colony’s development complementing European export crop produc-
tion. It had become increasingly obvious in the course of the 1920s and 1930s that 
African agricultural development might stabilize the dwindling European farmers’ 
position, as surplus African food crop production (largely comprised of maize and 
beans) had found a market for workers in settler farms and private/public sector 
businesses.43) African agriculture could be developed, but the improvement in African 
areas should be limited to an extent that Africans would still go out from the 
reserves and seek work in the European industries. In this regard, coffee growing by 
Africans was certainly not in their interest. Africans would be reluctant to work for 
European employers if they were allowed to grow coffee. As the crop cycle for 
African coffee growing would be almost identical with that of Europeans’, the settler 
farmers, who were already in trouble, would find it more difficult to find labour 
especially at harvest time. Labour cost would likely be increased in consequence, 
which already made up over 40% of total production cost.44) 
Another group of administrators, on the contrary, were keen on introducing 
agricultural innovation like coffee production to African smallholders. Contrary to 
common belief, there was no regulation banning Africans from coffee growing in 
Kenya. However, up until the early 1930s, African involvement in coffee production 
was effectively restricted by “government discouragement”, which was rather a form 
of intimidation.45) These officials were working in the provincial administration in 
the African reserves, particularly those remote from the European areas, where they 
42) This group comprised of high-ranking officials in Nairobi, including Lieutenant Colonel Sir Edward 
W. M. Grigg, then governor of Kenya Colony who have been in favour of settler concerns and in 
opposition to the plan to allow coffee growing by Africans. He was later in 1931 replaced by Byrne, 
who was more sympathetic to African coffee growing.
43) European coffee and tea plantations were the largest purchasers of African grown maize at that time. 
G.N. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya (New Haven, 1970), 58.
44) In a 200 acre coffee estate, it was estimated that cost of labour (19 Sh. 99 Cts., or 42.5%) was the 
largest expense in total cost of maintenance and treatment (46 Sh. 95 Cts.), followed by Guano (as 
fertilizer, 16 Sh 27 Cts., or 34.6%), and pest control material (e.g. cutworm shields, 8 Sh 15 Cts, or 
17.3%). See Table II, J. F. Perkins, "The Effect of Certain Factors on the Production Cost of Coffee 
and on Estate Profits," The East African Agricultural Journal 3-5 (March 1938): 367.
45) Asked about the issue of African coffee growing before the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on 
East Africa in 1931, Lt. Col. Sir Edward W. M. Grigg, then governor of Kenya, testified that 
Africans were “allowed”, but “definitely discouraged from growing coffee.” HMG, Joint Select 
Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 2. Minutes of 
Evidence (1931), 112.
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experienced acute economic difficulties caused by the Depression which in turn 
were associated with wider social problems. They felt that simply encouraging more 
food crop production for sale, which had been a focus of government’s dual policy, 
would not solve the problem: not because there was not enough surplus agricultural 
produce for sale, but because there were no markets available for those surpluses. 
From the early 1930s, however, local colonial administrators began to report that 
it was necessary to redirect the focus of the policy on commercial sale of surplus 
food crops by African producers in the reserves. Africans living in the reserves far 
from the European areas, such as Meru District, had “increased their production to 
the point where they are unable to get rid of their surplus in a normal year and 
further increase in production will not be of benefit to the district unless new 
markets can be found.”46) E. B. Horne, the Provincial Commissioner for Kikuyu 
Province in 1930, sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary to request a coffee trial in 
Meru district. While he was trying to explain to his superior why African coffee 
growing ought to be allowed in Meru, Horne described the situation in his district, 
where economic opportunities for earning cash income were severely limited due to 
the distance from any market:
Any surplus native crops that are grown can find no cash market. The distance from the 
Railway and transport, render it impossible. ... These people have no money and it is merely 
battering of skins and goats in exchange for maize or maize flour. This does not relieve the 
difficulty experienced by the Meru in obtaining money for hut tax or any work in their own 
reserve.47)
As early as the late 1920, the subject of coffee growing by Africans in Kenya had 
been discussed between colonial officials as a part of wider government discussions 
on improving “the general condition of the natives by encouraging them to make 
the most efficient use of their own resources for purposes of production.”48) At the 
same time, discouragement of African coffee growing was constantly questioned in 
numerous officially commissioned reports,49) and it eventually became one of the 
46) Meru District Annual Report (hereafter MDAR), 1931, 8.
47) E. B. Horne, Provincial Commissioner, Kikuyu to Colonial Secretary, "Coffee Growing by Natives of 
Meru," 14 February 1930, KNA: DC/MRU/5/3/2.
48) See Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, Cmd. 3573 (London: HMSO, 1930). 
49) For example, Report of the East Africa Commission by Ormsby-Gore Commission in 1925 and 
Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa by 
the Hilton Young Commission in 1929.
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most hotly debated topics in London and Nairobi at that time. The issue was also 
raised in a series of discussions at the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee held in 
London from 1930 to 1931 as part of a wider debate assessing the economic 
situation in Kenya (as well as Tanganyika and Uganda) in which colonial adminis-
trators, representatives of settler interest, as well as an African delegation were 
called as witnesses.50) 
It is notable that Whitehall was in favour of African coffee production in Kenya. 
Frank Stockdale, the Colonial Office’s agricultural adviser in the 1930s, advised the 
Kenya government that the besetting problem of the country’s economy was 
producing too little quantity of coffee for export, and the answer was to add 
African production to settler production as in Tanganyika Territory.51) If production 
were to increase, then Kenya could get a better deal from shippers or buyers, as T. 
S. Jervis, a DoA official of Tanganyika Territory, later suggested in 1937. Jervis 
explained in 1937 that the same grade coffee sold on the London market at a much 
higher price than on the Nairobi market, and bulk shipments of the coffee from 
Kenya to London could bring planters much higher margins even after deducting 
transport costs. Jervis then argued “a bulked coffee, whatever the quality may be, 
will always attract buyers because of its ready utilization by the trade.”52) 
As pressure mounted for African coffee growing, settler anxiety was well 
expressed in the public domain including daily newspapers and letters to 
government officials.53) One of the clearest examples is found in Resolution No. 11 
made in the 1932 Coffee Conference, an international event for those with a vested 
interest in coffee. Their resolution, while it demanded the indefinite postponement 
of the scheme, regarded the currently considered plan of African coffee growing as 
“a step utterly unwise”.54) The European planters attending the conference gave a 
50) Chief Koinange Mbiu, James Mutua, and Ezekiel Apindi had come to London to present the case of 
African coffee growing before the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East 
Africa, which was established to examine evidence in 1931. In their list of requests, they asked that 
Africans “should not be prohibited from planting economic plants such as coffee”. HMG, Joint Select 
Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 2. Minutes of 
Evidence (1931), 401.
51) John M. Lonsdale, “The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya”, in 
David Killingray and Richard Rathbone eds., Africa and the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 
1986), 97-142.
52) T. J. Jervis, "The Marketing of Coffee," East African Agricultural Journal of Kenya, Tanganyika, 
Uganda, and Zanzibar 2-6 (May 1937): 461-62.
53) For the settler complaints over the government’s plan to introduce African coffee growing, see TNA 
CO 533/431/13 Native coffee growing: protests 1933 Feb.-1934 July.
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number of reasons: the government proposed to increase supply to an already 
overstocked world market; Africans would experience difficulties competing with 
well-organized plantation interests; once coffee was allowed to Africans, it could be 
difficult to prove whether the coffee berries in question were from European farms 
and therefore theft of coffee would increase; and the marketing of coffee produced 
by Africans might injure the good reputation held by Kenya coffee; and if coffee 
was allowed to be grown in one area, there would be an outcry from other parts of 
the reserves and it would be difficult for the government to define areas where 
coffee could and could not be grown.55)
Although such claims were widely believed by European settlers, it seems that the 
colonial officials were not convinced. 56) For example, in 1934, there was a meeting 
between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the European elected members 
of Legislative Council in Nairobi. In response to an argument about world surplus of 
coffee raised by Lord Francis Scott (who was representing settler interests in Kenya 
as the successor of Lord Delamere), the Secretary of State claimed that the surplus 
of coffee depressing the world price was the effect of the large quantity of Brazilian 
and other foreign coffee and “the coffee experts in London say that it is absolute 
rubbish to say that the addition of some native coffee growing in Kenya is going to 
make the faintest iota of difference to the world market.” Again on Lord Scott’s 
argument that coffee growing would not pay Africans well, the Secretary of State 
responded: “I think the native is a fairly shrewd person at finding out what pays 
him”.57) Settlers presented coffee theft as another major concern,58) but the 
contemporary colonial officials did not feel the argument was “tenable.”59) 
54) Report of Proceedings of Coffee Planters’ Days and Coffee Conference Held at the Memorial Hall, 
Nairobi, June 29 ~ July 2, 1932, Government Printer, 26.
55) Report of Proceedings of Coffee Planters’ Days, 26-28.
56) Many scholars who closely examined settlers’ arguments against African coffee production regarded 
the increase in labour cost due to low-cost African competition as setters’ central fear against the 
scheme. See Caroline Barnes, "An Experiment with African Coffee Growing in Kenya" and I. D. 
Talbott, Agricultural innovation in colonial Africa.  
57) "Extract from Record of an Interview between the S of S and the European Elected Members of 
Leg Council on 14 February, 1934," TNA: CO533/447/1.
58) The concern of the settler coffee planters was vividly shown in Department of Agriculture, Report of 
proceedings of Coffee Conference held in Nairobi, June, 1927. Settlers complained the difficulties in 
administering the registration for coffee dealership and plantations, and argued that both of which 
could provide illegitimate channels of coffee trade and could be taken advantage of by the African 
coffee thieves. See Department of Agriculture, Report of proceedings of Coffee Conference held in 
Nairobi, June, 1927 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1927).
59) "Note of a Meeting held in Mr. Stockdale’s room on Tuesday the 6th, June, 1933, between Mr. 
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That the danger of coffee disease and pests would increase if African coffee 
growing were allowed was another commonly used argument against the introduction 
of African coffee production. The assumption here was that Europeans alone were 
capable of controlling such diseases and managing the risk with advanced farming 
technology. As shown earlier, however, it is doubtful that the government’s support 
for disease control in coffee farms was adequate enough to provide proper 
protection to the European planters during the 1920s. Little had improved in the 
1930s, given that the measures provided by the agricultural department to control 
diseases and pests largely remained the same. Up until the 1930s, therefore, settler 
coffee planters did not seem to have been as advanced as they thought. A series of 
appalling outbreaks of coffee disease and pests causing heavy losses, for instance 
Coffee Berry Disease in 1922 and Coffee Mealy Bug in 1923, also indicated that the 
question of disease and pests was “by no means confined to native plantations.”60) 
On the contrary, coffee production carried out by African peasants in the 
neighbouring Uganda and Tanganyika was widely regarded as a success, and the 
colonial administration in Kenya was well aware of this development. 
However, the colonial government in Nairobi was still reluctant to take the 
solution for the Kenyan economy presented by Frank Stockdale. This was primarily 
because of the colonial administration’s obsession with control. In 1931, in a letter 
to Cunliffe-Lister, Lord Passfield’s successor as the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Byrne, the Governor of Kenya Colony who succeeded Governor Grigg, 
reported that two natives of the Fort Hall District had recently deposited with the 
District Commissioner Shs. 30/- each as registration fees for coffee plantations. The 
District Commissioner was of the opinion that if registration were permitted there 
would be a large number of similar demands. Byrne’s recommendation was not to 
permit any application: 
Haphazard planting by individual natives would be most dangerous and would not be in the 
interests of the native planters, particularly in the neighbourhood of European coffee 
plantations. Disaster to the latter would mean disaster to the native population which depends 
on them largely for its income.61) 
Holm, Mr. Stockdale, and Mr. Freeston (Mr. Hibbert being also present) to discuss the Kenya Native 
Coffee Rules forming the subject of the Governor’s Confidential No. 4 despatch of the 13th January, 
1933," TNA: CO/533/431/12. 
60) Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, "Extract from Official Report of 8th November, 1933 on Colonial Products 
(Native Cultivation)," TNA: CO533/431/12.
61) Byren to Cuniffe-Lister, Confidential Letter, 25 November 1931, TNA: CO 533/408/9.
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Colonial officials’ concern for the African reserves adjacent to the European 
coffee farms based on the interdependence of two communities indicates that there 
was clearly a limit to the government’s attempt to encourage commercial agricultural 
production in the African reserves. This led the colonial government to contradict 
itself in promoting its own policies regarding African coffee growing. Although there 
was no real ground to discourage African coffee growing, the colonial administration 
did not allow African coffee growing in the areas neighbouring European coffee 
plantations. 
Effort to Improve the Economic Conditions in African Reserves
While the debate on African coffee growing was continued at the upper echelon 
of the colonial bureaucracy, Africans in the reserves were experiencing a severe 
economic downturn in the 1930s. The depressed economy in the country made it 
more and more difficult for Africans to earn cash, which was becoming increasingly 
important in their livelihoods. The main reason for Africans’ cash demand was to 
pay taxes, the main source of revenue for the colonial government’s operation.62) 
By the 1930s, it already became difficult for Africans to pay taxes: Meru District 
Commissioner reported in 1930, “the collection of Shs. 12/- Hut & Poll tax from the 
Meru is only accomplished by draining the district of practically every available 
shilling in it.”63) The importance of cash was further strengthened at the same 
period, as growing number of Africans needed it for goods and payment of 
education fees.
Because of the economic hardship in the 1930s, local administrators found it 
difficult to collect taxes in the African areas. For example, the administrators 
recommended a reduced tax rate from Shs. 12/- to Shs. 6/- in Meru in order to 
ease the situation, but Nairobi turned it down in the first place on the grounds that 
the reduced tax revenue would hinder the progress of the District.64) The tax rate 
for the district was eventually reduced to Shs. 8/- in 1933, but as H. E. Lambert, 
the then District Commissioner, remarked in his annual report, “the people of many 
62) John D. Overton, "Spatial Differentiation in the Colonial Economy of Kenya: Africans, Settlers and 
the State, 1900-1920" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983), 38-45.
63) MDAR, 1930, 6.
64) MDAR, 1930, 6.
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areas found it difficult to pay even the reduced tax.”65) Within Central Province, 
economic hardship was more burdensome to African households in the more remote 
places, such as Meru, Embu, Machakos and Kitui, in which opportunities for earning 
cash income were more limited than those in the African districts adjacent to settler 
areas like Fort Hall, Kiambu, and Nyeri.66) 
It became increasingly clear to the administration that the hardship in African 
reserves would get worse unless something was done, and the introduction of high 
value cash crops to the reserves was put forward under these circumstances. In fact, 
coffee was not the only cash crop promoted by the colonial administration purely 
for export in the African reserves. The government was aware of the need to 
increase agricultural production especially in the economically depressed African 
areas, and consequently a series of rural development plans was tried by the 
administration in the 1920s and 1930s. The government was to provide guidelines to 
the colonial officials in the African reserves to prepare specific zone development 
plans for individual areas based on climatic conditions. The primary objective of 
these plans was to promote mixed farming, a combination of food crop production 
and livestock husbandry under supervisory and extension services provided by DoA. 
For example, maize for sale or domestic consumption could be combined with the 
sale of dairy products for additional cash income, and livestock would provide the 
manure that could be used for fertilizer at the same time. Coffee was one of many 
possible crops to be tried in the areas with suitable conditions.67)
In line with the effort, different crops were tried in different areas. For example, 
cotton growing was promoted in arid, low altitude areas of the African reserves, 
firstly in coastal and western areas in the 1920s, and then in central Kenya during 
the 1930s. The government’s inspection note in 1936, however, indicated that cotton 
growing did not take off from the trial stage.68) Repeated experiments for cotton 
growing continued to be unsuccessful up until the end of the 1920s, largely due to 
its low prices even when compared to that of food crops like maize, which required 
much less effort to produce and provided better security against price change.69) 
65) MDAR, 1933, 12.
66) Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1933, 114.
67) For further details of zone development plans see I. D. Talbott, "Agricultural Innovation and Policy 
Changes in Kenya," 62-81 and 100-104 (mixed farming).
68) Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Inspection Note on the Kenya Cotton Crop in November and 
December, 1935 (Nairobi, 1936), 20-23.
69) For more detail in cotton trials in Kenya, see R.M.A. Zwanenberg, "The Develoment of Peasant 
Commodity Production in Kenya, 1920-40," The Economic History Review, New Series, 27-3 (August, 
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Cotton was also unpopular among farmers because the labour demands for cotton at 
the peak time coincided with the labour input required for food crops. Furthermore, 
the control measures employed to prevent diseased and pest-infected cotton from 
spreading to other locations often made promotion of cotton growing more difficult. 
In 1934 alone, there were five government notices in the Kenya Official Gazette 
ordering local agricultural officers to control the failed cotton schemes in various 
African districts. In order to prevent diseases and pests, the officers had to order 
Africans to uproot and burn all the old cotton plants. In some places like South and 
Central Kavirondo Districts even the purchase of cotton was banned.70) Sharp price 
drops and unpopular disease control measures made the cotton growing trial 
unpopular amongst African farmers in central Kenya by the end of the 1930s.71) In 
1940, the District Commissioner in Meru recommended abandoning the African 
cotton production programme because the Africans in his district “loathe the very 
name of cotton”.72)
Trials of wattle bark in central Kenya were also implemented in the African 
districts near settler areas as a small-scale campaign in the 1920s. The campaign 
was a success: although the development of wattle bark production had shown 
limited progress until the early 1930s, it soon expanded rapidly in the late 1930s, 
thanks to its various uses that increased its exchange values not to mention its 
minimal labour requirement. African producers in three districts, including Fort Hall, 
Kiambu, and Nyeri, were eagerly growing wattle trees, not only because they could 
sell the tannin extract from the its bark on the export market, but also because 
they could sell the wood as building material and as logs for charcoal.73) 
Although the colonial government would not let Africans in the reserves closer to 
settler farms grow coffee, the administrators in areas away from European farms 
were still committed to promoting African coffee growing. By 1933, steps had finally 
been taken to initiate African coffee growing in those areas. Land had been selected 
both in central (Embu and Meru districts) and western (Kisii, Nyanza Province) 
Kenya to start the nurseries. Actual coffee farming by African farmers started in 
1974): 445-48.
70) Government Notice No. 57 (Jan. 13th, 1934), No. 128 (Feb. 6th, 1934), No. 129 (Feb. 7th, 1934), 
No. 167 (Mar. 2nd, 1934), and No. 608 (Sep. 10th, 1934) found in The Kenya Official Gazette.
71) DAAR, 1938, 77.
72) MDAR 1940, 36. KNA: DC/MERU/2/3/3.
73) See M. P. Cowen "Capital and House Production: the case of wattle in Kenya’s Central Province, 
1903-1964" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1978).
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1935 when the seedlings were large enough to transplant to the already demarcated 
and prepared plots.74) These locations provided the colonial administration with a 
number of advantages for the experiment of African coffee growing. Above all, 
those areas had a favourable environment in terms of soil, rainfall, and climatic 
conditions for coffee cultivation. Thanks to the distance from the European coffee 
farms, settler concerns over disease and pests, as well as theft of berries, could be 
effectively ignored. In these locations, “distance and transport charges preclude the 
economic production of the less profitable staple crops, and at the same time their 
very isolation should prevent friction between the native growers of coffee and the 
larger, established European farmers.”75) In other words, promoting African coffee 
growing in these areas was an attractive option for the colonial government, as it 
could provide economic opportunities in the depressed African reserves, where there 
was no alternative source of income other than the sale of surplus food crops, 
without affecting labour supply to European farms at the same time.
Conclusion
The focus of this article has been to show how colonial interests in economic 
development in Kenya influenced the colonial administration’s decision on African 
coffee production and consequently determined the scope of the scheme. The 
colonial administration had continuing interests in stimulating the development of 
the colony’s trade balances. This led the administration to make various efforts to 
encourage commodity production by European settlers in the 1920s. In the process, 
however, white settlers’ over-dependency on the supply of cheap African labour 
worsened the structural problem of the settler economy, which found itself in the 
deep financial distress by the 1930s when the Great Depression severely disturbed 
global trades. 
From the late 1920s, the idea of African coffee production was considered in the 
bureaucratic circle of Whitehall and Nairobi as a part of discussion on improving 
African welfare by economic development. It was clear that both the metropolitan 
government and the colonial administration in Kenya regarded African coffee 
74) EDAR, 1935, MC KNA: EBU/13 AR 440 Reel No. 14.
75) Ukamba Province Annual Report (with Kikuyu Province Annual Report) 1933, 47. KNA: 
PC/CP/4/1/2.
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growing as a viable solution for the economic development of the colony from early 
on. The metropolitan government was generally in favour of the idea as the 
increased production of coffee would lower the transport cost and therefore bring 
higher profit margins. The colonial administrators in Kenya were also in favour 
because high value cash crop like coffee would provide sources of income and 
employment for the African areas with limited opportunities. Although settlers were 
strongly against the new scheme and presented various arguments as to why coffee 
growing should not be allowed, the colonial government was not convinced. The 
colonial administrators in Kenya were well aware of the fact that coffee production 
carried out by indigenous Africans in neighbouring countries, namely Uganda and 
Tanganyika, was a success, whilst the settler agriculture was heavily indebted and 
was suffering from high cost base and poor profitability. 
Such reasoning based on economic considerations, however, did not encourage 
the colonial administration to implement the idea of African coffee growing as a 
full-scale commercial operation in the African reserves in the 1930s. The colonial 
administrators in Nairobi were reluctant to promote African coffee production, 
primarily because it could bring severe economic damage to the already depressed 
settler community whose presence was relatively stronger than that of those in 
Uganda or Tanganyika. Moreover, as shown in Byrne’s recommendation, the colonial 
administration wanted to have a full control over the implementation process in 
order to avoid the danger of ‘haphazard planting’ by African farmers, which 
obviously required more time and financial resources. 
Consequently, the initiative for African coffee growing was only implemented as a 
carefully controlled rural development programme providing an opportunity for cash 
crop production in the economically depressed African reserves remote from the 
White Highlands. It was only much later in the 1950s that the government finally 
allowed the African farmers in the areas near the settled areas to grow coffee. In 
this regard, as far as the economic development was concerned, the colonial Kenya 
in the 1930s was in a condition where “development of the European and 
development of natives are inimical to each other.”76)
76) It was L.S.B. Leakey who made this observation. "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Joint Select 
Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on East Africa," Confidential and 
Private, 19 March 1931, TNA: CO533/412/3.
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Teaching British Life Style: 
The Role of Women’s Groups in Resettling Foreign Workers 
during the Attlee Years
Hiromi Mizokami*1)
Abstract
Immediately after the Second World War, Britain suffered serious labour shortage. The 
Attlee’s Labour Government, regarding this manpower shortage as an impediment to 
overcoming the post-war economic crisis, and also in order to solve the contemporary 
problem of displaced persons, decided to admit to the UK more than 200,000 foreign 
workers of Baltic and Eastern European origin. As most of these foreign workers could not 
be forced to return to their counties that were under the influence of the USSR, the 
government was directly involved not only in recruiting but also resettling them in Britain. 
However, this official resettlement of foreigners required cooperation from local people, 
who did not necessarily welcome these displaced Europeans. The Labour government asked 
for help from various volunteer groups, particularly, women’s groups, such as the Women’s 
Voluntary Service (the WVS) and Women’s Institutes (WI). These women’s organisations, 
especially the WVS, cooperated closely with the Attlee government. They supported the 
government’s resettlement policy by acting as intermediates among officials, local people 
and foreign workers. They played a significant role in making up for the lack of social 
service for foreigners, paying special attention to dependants and assisting them in fitting 
into life in Britain. Their activities included escorting new arrivals to the holding camps, 
distributing clothes and foods, arranging for interpreters, and even teaching English. 
Although there are some studies on the official resettlement policy for European 
immigrants in the Attlee years, these support activities conducted by women’s organisations 
have not attracted much attention to date. What a role these women played still remains to 
be researched. By using materials from the WRVS Archives in Abingdon, the Women’s 
Library and the National Archives, this article focuses on the activities by the WVS, WI 
and its national federation, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI), 
considering how women of the host community behaved or, were expected to behave in 
receiving ‘others’ during the Attlee years.
As this article describes, the government heavily depended on the voluntary work of 
local women on site. However, women’s groups did not always comply with the official 
*  Kyoto University
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policy. Some of their activities were outside the purview of, and sometimes, even at odds 
with the official policy. Especially, the WVS, or at least its executives, took pride in what 
‘ordinary’ women could do. They felt that women could play a significant role in 
‘teaching’ foreign workers the British way of life, because they knew most what British 
lifestyle was as housewives. Thus, they insisted that British women should live in the 
camps and hostels for foreign workers. While the government tended to overlook the 
family life of foreign workers for the sake of securing manpower and saving limited 
resources, women’s groups valued family life and acted to maintain and reconstruct the 
family independently from government policy. 
Keywords: foreign labour, women, voluntary organisation, Labour government, welfare, Second World 
War.
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Immediately after the Second World War, Britain suffered a serious labour 
shortage. The Attlee’s Labour government actively utilized foreign labour- Italian and 
German POWs and other Western Europeans etc. However, it became difficult for 
the government to obtain enough workers from these sources. Meanwhile, the UK 
was also saddled with maintaining both a large number of displaced persons (DPs) 
and thousands of Polish people in exile. Though, at first, government’s officials 
were unwilling to admit these people to the UK, they gradually began to see them 
as a potential labour source.1) As a result, the Labour government allowed these 
people to resettle in the UK. From 1946 to 1950, Britain admitted about 200,000 of 
European immigrants, comprising of 120,000 Poles and 80,000 displaced persons. 
The former group consisted of ex-servicemen of the Polish army under British 
command who had owed allegiance to the Polish government-in-exile in London 
and their families, and who now refused to return to Poland under the post-war 
conditions. The latter group comprised ‘European Volunteer Workers (EVWs)’, who 
were recruited from DP camps in continental Europe. In 1953, the Home Office 
reported to the House of Commons that ‘since the war we have admitted no fewer 
than 250,000 aliens to come and live here on a permanent basis. Most of those 
aliens were refugees or displaced persons’.2) As we can see from the table 1 and 2, 
Polish ex-servicemen, their dependants and EVWs were predominant among these 
250,000. 
Such a large scale of official resettlement of foreign workers epitomises the 
situation of the time where the government’s role had expanded enormously in the 
course of the war. Under the direction of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service (MLNS) not only arranged for the recruitment of these foreign 
workers, but also was involved in their resettlement process. The fact that most of 
these foreign workers had been displaced as a result of the war made the 
resettlement problem significant. However, this official resettlement of foreigners 
required cooperation from local people. Not only was there a need to persuade 
local people to accept these (not necessarily welcomed) aliens, but, in order to fill 
1) This research was financially supported by grants from GCOE Program (Global Center of Excellence 
for Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia), Kyoto University, and 
International Training Program, the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, both of which are 
funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Diana Kay and Robert Miles, Refugees 
or Migrant Workers?; European Volunteer Workers in Britain, 1946-1951 (London 1992), 132-35.
2) Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 521,col. 561, 26 November 1953.
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European Volunteer Workers and Refugees allowed to settle on the compassionate grounds 100,857
Polish ex-servicemen and their Dependants 121,172
Ex-German POWs allowed to remain 15,000
Ex-Ukrainian POWs allowed to settle 　8,000
Ex-Italian POWs allowed to remain 1,000
Total 246,029
Based on the statement by the Home Secretary at the House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th 
series, 472, col. 87, 31 March 1950
Note: Apart from the number above, the Home Secretary revealed that about 101,000 foreigners were issued with 
employment permission during the same period. 
<Table 1> Numbers of foreigners allowed to enter to, and to settle in the UK 
from 1945 to 1949
Pre-war refugees (80,000 less approximately 34,000 naturalized) 46,000
Polish Resettlement Corps 91,000
Dependants of Polish Resettlement Corps 33,000
European Volunteer Workers and ‘Balt Cygnet’ (including Ukrainian POW numbered about 8,000) 84,000
‘Distressed Relatives’ (excl. Dependants of Polish Resettlement Corps )  4,000
Refugees from Czechoslovakia  2,000
Total 260,000
Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London, 1953), 364
<Table 2> Categories of Refugees in Britain
in gaps in the social service for foreigners, the Labour government also depended 
heavily on volunteer groups; in particular, women’s organisations such as the 
Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) and the Women’s Institutes (WI). 
While Diana Kay and Robert Miles briefly mention such works by voluntary 
groups, these support activities conducted by women’s organisations for foreign 
workers have not attracted much attention to date.3) Although there are several 
studies of European immigrants in the Attlee years, they concentrate on the 
government’s policy or on immigrants’ communities.4) Meanwhile, in studies of 
3) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 132-35.
4) Joseph Behar, "‘Essential Workers’: British Foreign Labour Recruitment, 1945-51" (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Toronto, 1998); Behar, "Diplomacy and Essential Workers: Official British Recruitment 
of Foreign Labor in Italy, 1945-1951," Journal of Policy History 15-3 (2003): 324-44; Kathleen Paul, 
Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in Post-war Era (Ithaca, 1997); Johannes Dieter Steinert 
and Inge Weber-Newth, eds., European Immigrants in Britain 1939-1950 (München 2003); Elizabeth 
Stadulis, "The Resettlement of Displaced Persons in the United Kingdom," Population Studies 5-3 
(1952): 208-12; M. Bulbring, "Post-war Refugees in Great Britain," Population Studies 8-2 (1954): 
99-112; John Allan Tannahill, European Volunteer Workers in Britain (Manchester, 1958); Wendy 
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women’s history, the WVS and the WI have been disregarded because of their 
non-feminist characteristics. Only recently have some historians, James Hinton for 
the WVS and Maggie Andrews, Caitriona Beaumont and Linda Perriton for the WI, 
started to review the roles that these non-feminist, but ‘mainstream’ women’s groups 
played in women’s lives in post-suffrage era. While Hinton emphasises the continuity 
of class in regard to the WVS movement, Andrews and Beaumont appreciate the 
role of these mainstream organisations in improving women’s lives which were 
closely linked to home.5) But, the focus of these studies is mainly on British 
women’s attitudes towards their own affairs, not towards ‘others’, though Andrews 
mentions the considerably ‘liberal’ attitudes of the WI towards immigrants from the 
Commonwealth.6) 
This article will focus on how women of the host community behaved or, were 
expected to behave in receiving ‘others’ during the Attlee years, taking example of 
the activities by the WVS, the WI and its national federation, the National 
Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI) whose activities were prominent in the 
official resettlement process of European foreign workers. As Alison Light argues, 
after the First World War, English national identity had become feminised and 
Webster, "Defining Boundaries: European Volunteer Worker women in Britain and Narratives of 
Community," Women’s History Review 9-2 (2000): 257-76; Linda McDowell, "Narratives of Family, 
Community and Waged Work: Latvian European Volunteer Worker Women in Post-war Britain," 
Women’s History Review 13-1 (2004): 23-55.
     As for Poles, Jerzy Zubrzycki, Polish immigrants in Britain: a Study of Adjustment (Hague, 1956); 
Shelia Patterson, "The Polish Exile Community in Britain," The Polish Review 6-3 (1961): 69-97; 
Keith Sword with Norman Davis and Jan Ciechanowski, The Formation of the Polish Community in 
Great Britain 1939-1950 (London, 1989); Keith Sword, Identity in Flux: the Polish Community in 
Britain (London, 1996); Perter D Stachura, ed., The Poles in Britain 1940-2000: From Betrayal to 
Assimilation (London 2004); Thomas Lane, Victims of Stalin and Hitler: The Exodus of Poles and 
Balts to Britain (Basingstoke, 2004); Kathy Burrell, Moving Lives: Narratives of Nation and 
Migration among Europeans in Post-War Britain (Aldershot, 2006).
5) James Hinton, "Voluntarism and Welfare/ Warfare State: Women’s Voluntary Service in the 1940s," 
Twentieth Century British History 9-2 (1998): 274-305; Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the 
Second World War: Continuities of Class (Oxford, 2002); Linda Perriton "The Education of Women 
for Citizenship: the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and the British Federation of Business 
and Professional Women 1939-1959," Gender and Education 21-1 (2009): 81-95; Maggie Andrews, 
The Acceptable Face of Feminism: the Women’s Institutes as a Social Movement (London, 1997); 
Andrews, "‘For home and country’: feminism and Englishness in the Women’s Institutes movement, 
1930-1960,” in The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960, eds. 
Richard Weight and Abigail Beach (London, 1998), 116-35; Caitriona Beaumont, "Citizens not 
feminists: the boundary negotiated between citizenship and feminism by mainstream women’s 
organisations in England, 1928-39," Women’s History Review 9-2 (2000): 411-29. 
6) Andrews, The Acceptable Face of Feminism, p. 163.
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domesticated.7) The Second World War accelerated the integration of women into 
the nation, as indicated in the characterisation of this war as a ‘people’s war’.8) 
The Post-war welfare state strengthened the link between women and nationhood by 
placing ‘home’ at the centre of the nation. Women’s relationship with nationhood 
remained heavily gendered, with women’s role in ‘home’ as mothers and housewives 
emphasised. According to Wendy Webster, ‘home’ played a significant part in 
constructing post-war British national identity, distinguishing ‘us’ from immigrants 
‘others’. While white British women were expected to devote their time to their 
family, immigrant women, both European and Caribbean, were regarded only as 
‘workers’ by government officials, and their family lives were disregarded.9)  
However, when viewed from Women’s groups’ perspective, the general picture 
seems a little different or complicated, as what they tried to do for European 
foreign workers during the Attlee years was sometimes at odds with official policy. 
By using materials from the WRVS Archives in Abingdon, the Women’s Library, and 
the National Archives, this article will describe the support activities of women’s 
groups for the resettlement of Poles and EVWs during the Attlee years. Though 
other volunteer groups also joined in the support activities, the Labour government, 
as far as we can see from official documents, seems to have depended heavily on 
the WVS and, to a lesser extent, on the WI, which may suggest a gender bias in 
official minds.
The labour government and women 
On 29th January 1948, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
addressed ‘women journalists’ at a press conference:
I am convinced that it is vital, if we were to come through the tremendous struggle in which 
we are now engaged, for women of this country to give their full backing to the national 
effort. It is they who carry the heaviest burdens and it is they who are the greatest factor in 
maintaining our national morale... I emphasise again the key point to our morale as a nation 
is in the home and it is the mother and the housewife who run the home and sustain the 
7) Alison Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars (London, 
1991).
8) Paul Ward, Britishness since 1870 (London, 2004), 38.
9) Wendy Webster, Imagining home: Gender, ‘Race’ and National Identity, 1945-64 (London, 1998), 
"Introduction" and 141-47.
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morale.10)
This statement indicates how much importance the Labour government placed on 
women, as housewives, in implementing its economic policy. The main purpose of 
Cripps’ statement was to ask editors of women’s magazines for their cooperation in 
appealing to women to continue to minimise their consumption in order to sustain 
the British economy, which was on the brink of collapse. At the same time, Cripps 
did not forget to mention foreign workers:
I should like to mention the problem of the European Volunteer Workers. They are a most 
useful if small addition to our labour force. They badly need friendliness and to be 
encouraged to speak English ... They are lonely people in a strange land but have come to 
help us and we must do our best to help them to fit into our social life.11) 
Welcoming and supporting foreign workers was regarded as being as helpful a 
contribution to the nation as was saving on household consumption and working in 
the textile industry. Especially after the economic crisis of 1947, the Labour 
government actively recruited foreign labour. The Economic Survey for 1947 
reflected a keen understanding of the critical economic situation, insisting that they 
should do their best to save and earn dollars.12) For this purpose, the Economic 
Survey emphasised the vital importance of securing sufficient labour in ‘essential’ 
undermanned industries, such as coal, agriculture and textiles, by producing the 
‘manpower budget’ ― the numbers of workers that would be required to achieve 
the production target in each industry. The point was not in the number of 
workers, but in the distribution of labour. According to the Economic Survey, ‘if the 
process of closing the gap is left to chance, some vital requirements are sure to be 
squeezed by the less essential ... if women who are needed in the textile mills go to 
work in shops, the whole population will go short of clothing and curtains and 
sheets’.13) It was because of this distribution gap that the Economic Survey 
recommended that the UK utilise foreign labour. Polish servicemen and DPs were 
pointed out as the main sources of the foreign labour in the survey.14) Because of 
their alien status, they were supposed to be put into a particular industry under the 
10) TNA, LAB12/513, Statement by Cripps, 29 January 1948.
11) TNA, LAB12/513, Statement by Cripps, 29 January 1948.
12) The Economic Survey for 1947, Cmd. 7046 (London, 1947), 16-31.
13) The Economic Survey for 1947, 7.
14) The Economic Survey for 1947, 28.
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Aliens Order. Thus, while increasing pressure on Poles to work in undermanned 
industries, the government lifted the immigration restriction on DPs and launched a 
new official recruitment scheme called ‘Westward Ho’.15) Under the ‘Westward Ho’ 
scheme, DPs who were prepared to take any job offered to them were recruited as 
European Volunteer Workers. In the screening process, young single people were 
given priority. Because of the housing shortage in Britain, applicants with 
dependants were allowed in on condition that they agreed to leave their relatives on 
the Continent for the time being.16) There were so many unfilled positions for 
young, single women that the government later extended recruitment to German, 
Austrian and Italian women.
However, the domestic attitudes towards foreigners were not necessarily 
welcoming. In addition to resistance from trades unions, there were so many 
misunderstandings about these foreigners that the Ministry of Labour had to set up 
a committee for the education of public opinion in October 1947.17) The Ministry 
seriously took the need ‘to dispel such views as that they are potential Fascists-or 
alternatively the Jews of Europe- and to explain to employers and workpeople alike 
that their labour means increased production for export and home consumption and 
is therefore a direct contribution to the country’s economic well-being’.18) As Kay 
and Miles point out, the government deliberately avoided such words as ‘foreign’ or 
‘displaced persons’ in referring to these foreign workers, and instead used 
‘European’.19)
Thus, the Attlee government paid considerable attention to domestic reaction 
towards these officially admitted foreigners, and to persuading the public to accept 
them. In the process, the government involved the WVS and WI in its resettlement 
policy. The Ministry of Labour directly asked the National Federation of Women’s 
Institutes (NFWI) to call their members’ attention to these foreign workers.20) 
Representatives from both the WVS and the WI were invited to the official 
committees set up to educate public opinion alongside those from government 
departments on a regular basis.21) As shown later, representatives from government 
15) TNA, PREM8/1014, CM (47)10th, 30 January 1947.
16) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?.
17) TNA, LAB12/513, Minute of Meeting held at the MLNS, 1 October 1947.
18) TNA, PREM8, From L. H. Hornsby to F. Tarrant, Regional Office in Manchester, 10 February 1948
19) Kay & Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 125.
20) TNA, LAB12/513, From Miss. Jenkins (MLNS) to Mrs. Freeman (NFWI), 15 March 1948.
21) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting held at MLNS, Publicity for the Education of Popular 
Opinion on Foreign Labour, undated.
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departments also attended the meetings of the WVS. 
 Of the two women’s groups, the government was much more dependent on the 
WVS. Indeed, ‘the WVS was consistently singled out by government welfare officers 
as an outstanding body’.22) The reason for this would be because there was a 
special relationship between the government and the WVS. While both of these 
women’s groups had been created in connection with the war, the WI, formed in 
1915, had become financially independent of the government by the middle of the 
1920s.23) By contrast, the WVS was formed in 1938 at the behest of the then Home 
Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, for the purpose of recruiting women to assist in the 
Air Raid Precautions. Hoar himself asked Lady Stella Reading, who had had worked 
for various public bodies, charities and women’s organizations, to form the WVS. 
Thus it might to be said that the WVS was a quasi-official organization. However, 
under the leadership of Lady Reading, the WVS aggressively acted on its own 
initiative. During the war, with the membership of about one million, the WVS 
played a key role in helping civilians in coordination with local authorities.24) 
With the end of the war, the future of the WVS began to be questioned, and it 
was on the brink of dissolution. While the Labour government decided to extend the 
life of the WVS for at least two years in 1945,25) the Attlee years were nonetheless 
the hardest time for the organisation. As Hinton argues, it was the strategy of Lady 
Reading to cooperate actively with ‘Labour’s austerity’ that enabled the WVS to 
survive.26) The WVS showed its value to the Labour government by creating ‘a new 
role for itself: developing the Home Helps scheme, looking after the settlement of 
displaced persons from Europe, and taking command of the work of women’s 
organisations as a whole in response to the fuel crisis of 1947.27) 
 Interestingly, Lady Reading presented the significance of the WVS to the 
government as consisting in the amateurism of ‘ordinary women’. Although Hinton 
stresses hierarchical characteristic of the WVS, Lady Reading saw the WVS in a 
different way. For her, the WVS represented a ‘democratic’ change of voluntary 
work, as we can see from one of her talks on the WVS:
22) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 133.
23) Andrews, The Acceptable Face of Feminism, 49.
24) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 158.
25) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 215.
26) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 215.
27) Hinton, "Voluntarism and Welfare/ Warfare State," 279.
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Voluntary service of yesterday was based on charitable patronage, which, with the vast 
generosity of the contributor, paid its own way and did every kind of specialized job for the 
nation, for the community, and for the individual. But, since the last war, there are no longer 
the same funds to draw upon... We, as a nation, have to make every man, woman and child 
realize the necessity for accepting responsibility... The Service to which I belong is a Service 
of very ordinary women, doing very ordinary things in a very ordinary way, on a National 
Scale.28)
After the war, other voluntary groups criticised the continued official financial 
assistance to the WVS. The WI was among those critics. The NFWI repeatedly 
requested that the Labour government make a decide about the future of the WVS; 
disintegrate it or treat it in the same way as it does other voluntary organisations 
by refraining from supporting it financially.29) Despite these criticisms, the Labour 
government took a supportive attitude towards the WVS, recognising the benefits 
they would gain from an organisation that could mobilise women at the 
government’s request whenever needed. Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, 
expressed his blessing for works that the WVS had done and would do in assisting 
social service. In his letter to Lady Reading, he said: 
I am glad to have had an opportunity of discussing with you the extent to which my 
Department may hope to enjoy, in the development of the housing and health services for 
which we are responsible, the help of the WVS from which we have profited so 
conspicuously in our war-time administration. I have no doubt at all that there are many ways 
in which the WVS can, if they will, continue to be of great service to the Ministry.30)
The Home Office tended to avoid discussion with other voluntary and women’s 
groups about the future of the WVS, and resisted calls to cut financial assistance to 
it.31) Thus the Labour government and the WVS were co-dependent. 
By contrast, the WI helped foreign workers out of different motives and from a 
different position. As Kay and Miles point out, the WI regarded the existence of 
Poles and EVWs in the UK as ‘magnificent opportunities’ to carry out their pledge 
28) Virginia Thesiger, ed., It’s the Job that Counts 1939-1953: A Selection from the Speeches and 
Writings of the Dowager Marchioness of Reading Chairman of Women’s Voluntary Service for Civil 
Defence (1954), 108-109.
29) TNA, HO45/24302, From General Secretary of the NFWI to the Home Secretary, ‘the Future of the 
WVS’.
30) TNA, MH30/277, From Bevan to Lady Reading, 8 April 1946. 
31) For example, TNA, HO356/2, From C.A. to Alexander Maxwell, 8 January 1947; CAB124/914, 
From Ede to Morrison, 9 January 1951.
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to work by every means in their power for the promotion of friendship among 
nations. Also they saw themselves as ‘traders of democracy’.32) The WI joined the 
committee organizing welfare arrangements for EVWs under the auspices of the 
National Council of Social Service as well as official meetings for voluntary societies 
held at the Ministry of Labour.33)
In many rural areas there was overlap of WVS and WI leadership,34) though, as 
mentioned, the attitude of the WI towards the WVS was not necessarily cooperative. 
In 1938 the WI had been invited to consult with the Home Office about the role of 
the newly formed WVS, and joined the WVS advisory council. Subsequently, the 
NFWI was formally associated with the WVS,35) although the NFWI sometimes stayed 
away from it.36) While the WVS attempted ‘to colonize and, to some degree, to 
control established world of women’s organizations’, it did not threaten the 
long-term hegemony of the WI in the villages.37) This explains why the WVS and 
even the WI were often invited to meetings of the Ministry of Labour; the WVS had 
to depend on the network of the WI in rural areas. The next section will focus on 
the role that these women’s groups played in the resettlement of foreign labour and 
describe how femininity was represented in the process.
The role of women in the resettlement of Poles and EVWs 
The WVS and WI played various roles in the resettlement of foreign workers. 
First, they helped the government in persuading people to accept Poles and EVWs, 
acting as intermediates between officials and local people. A note of the WVS asks 
its members ‘to know the position of EVWs and Poles in order to impart correct 
information to arm chair critics’.38) The WVS published a leaflet to advise members 
to become the ‘bridge’ between the foreign workers and local people: 
32) Kay and Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers?, 132; TNA, LAB12/513, Chairman’s Speech at 
NFWI, 28th Annual General Meetings.
33) Women’s Library (WL), 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 26 June 
1947.
34) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 146.
35) TNA, HO356/2, From C.A. to Alexander Maxwell, 8 January 1947.
36) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, Minutes of a meeting of Executive Committee, February 14 1946.
37) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 6, 146.
38) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, The WVS Talk IV, Note on the Welfare for Poles and EVWs, 
undated.
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Visit them at the same time establish a good contact with the landlady, you may be able to 
smooth initial difficulties which may arise between the two on account of misunderstanding. 
Make sure she understands the tragic position of these people and is not labouring under false 
notions about them. Remind her too that customs differ in each country and there are bound 
to be things which will appear strange to both parties. Let them both know where the WVS 
Office is in case of need.39) 
WVS members sometimes helped to resolve troubles between the employers, 
landladies and the EVWs by acting as interpreters (especially for German speakers) 
and clearing up misunderstandings.40) In order to encourage communication between 
local people and foreigners, the WVS also organized concerts and exhibition of 
crafts by EVWs etc., and sometimes took local residents to social evenings organised 
by foreign workers.41)
Education of opinion was necessary not only for local people, but also for the 
ordinary members of the women’s groups. Members sometimes shared in misunder-
standings of local people concerning Poles and EVWs, especially so in the case of 
the NFWI. After Home & Country, the magazine of NFWI, had called for members 
to show hospitality towards Polish ex-servicemen and their families, a number of 
criticisms were sent to the editor.42) For example, a letter from a member in Suffolk 
alleged as follows:
A paragraph in News of the Month, November issue, states that the men have all fought for 
Britain during the war. This is not in accordance with the known facts. 56,000 of these men 
were taken prisoners by our army and are thus known to have been fighting for Nazis. It is 
pretty certain that the reason many of them cannot return to their own country is because 
they are known to have helped the Nazis.43)
The Executive Committee of the NFWI took it seriously, and asked the editor ‘to 
publish a selection of this correspondence in Home & Country, together with the 
reply in which the leaflet published by [by] the British Joint Committee of Welcome 
for Polish Forces should be referred to’, and it was further agreed in the circular 
39) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, European Volunteer Workers, WVS leaflet, September 1947.
40) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer Workers, 
undated.
41) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, the Extract from a Report from Malvern Camp, May 1947.
42) Home and Country, November 1946, 169.
43) Home and Country, January 1947, 9.
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letter to let the counties know that the leaflet was available’.44) In January 1947, the 
correspondence from the editor was printed with the protesting letters from readers, 
explaining why some Poles had been in the Wehrmacht; they were forced to enrol 
under the Nazi occupation.45) The amount of rationed meat for foreign workers in 
heavy industries also became a contention within the WI.46) Responding to the 
rumour that foreign workers were receiving more food rations than British people 
did, the Ministry of Labour refuted this at the conference which representatives 
from the WVS and WI attended.47) 
Thus, for the government, involving women’s groups in the resettlement process 
itself was useful for education of public opinion. Moreover, it also enabled the 
Ministry to ensure indirectly that foreign workers would remain in undermanned 
industries, through the personal relationship that women established with each 
foreign worker in their support activities.48) Keeping an eye on the activities of the 
WVS, the Ministry of Labour even requested to the WVS that ‘officials should be 
given a chance of seeing the minutes (of the meeting of the WVS with 
representatives of the Ministry of Labour) in draft’.49)
Another area where the government expected women’s groups to cooperate was 
welfare for Poles and EVWs. Most foreign workers were refugees or DPs who had 
lost everything in the war and there were dependants among them. In addition to 
about 30,000 Polish dependants and refugees, there were about 3,000 dependants of 
EVWs, although single people were preferred in the recruitment process. Both Poles 
and EVWs, at least technically, were supposed to enjoy the same social service as 
British people did. Under the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, government departments 
were given special authority to implement necessary social services for Polish 
ex-servicemen and their families.50) Additionally, welfare officers of the Ministry of 
Labour were in charge of welfare for EVWs. Both Poles and EVWs were integrated 
into the web of social services, such as national assistance and the NHS, which 
were being developed during the Attlee years. Thus, as Joseph Behar points out, it 
could be said that, like the British working class, these foreigners ‘earned’ their 
44) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 28 November 1946
45) Home and Country, January 1947, 9.
46) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 27 November 1947
47) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of Conference, April 20 1948.
48) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County 
Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.
49) TNA, LAB26/235, From J.G. Stewart (MNLS) to Mrs. Warmington (the WVS), 1 April 1949.
50) 10&11 Geo.6, Ch.19, Polish Resettlement Act, 1947.
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citizenship in the post-war British welfare state through their hard work.51)
 However, this was not necessarily the case in reality. Local authorities that 
implemented social service often gave lower priority to foreigners, who were not 
regarded as local residents. The government showed an understanding of such an 
attitude on the part of local authorities and tended to refrain from urging them to 
fulfil their responsibilities, so as not to increase public antagonism towards foreign 
workers. According to the Home Secretary, one of the purposes of the Polish 
Resettlement Act was to enable the government, not local authorities, to take 
responsibility for welfare service for Poles for a while, by ‘taking steps whereby 
dealing with these people will be a national and not a local charge’.52) At a meeting 
held at the Ministry of Labour in order to discuss publicity for education of public 
opinion on foreign workers, an official revealed his view about the role of local 
authorities that ‘the possible influence of local authorities should be considered 
though they should not be asked to take an active part’.53) It seems that, in welfare 
matters, the attitude of the Ministry of Labour was the same. It was this gap in 
social service that volunteer groups, including women’s ones, were expected to fill. 
Among various voluntary groups, the WVS was supposed to play the main role. At 
the aforesaid meeting, a representative from the Ministry of Health said that 
‘perhaps the WVS and similar local organisations were the best people to help’.54) 
The WVS cooperated with the Ministry of Labour and took the main part in 
reception of EVWs, escorting them from the port to the holding camps and 
distributing clothes to them.55) WVS members, along with officials of the Ministry of 
Labour, stood ready to welcome and assist EVWs at the ports or stations on their 
way to the holding camps, serving tea and cakes to them. These activities were 
conducted under the direction from the Ministry of Labour. There were some 
complaints within the WVS of the way in which the Ministry of Labour treated its 
members, as Mrs. Warmington of the WVS protests to the Ministry:
I am afraid we are still having a certain number of complaints from our Regional Officers in 
the matter. It is not that we are in any way unwilling to do undertake escort work when it is 
required ... The main point is that we are asked to send members on these very long 
51) Behar, "Essential Workers."
52) Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 433, col. 1535, 20 February 1947.
53) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of a meeting held at MLNS, 5 December 1947.
54) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of a meeting held at MLNS, 5 December 1947.
55) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on the WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer 
Workers, undated.
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journeys and they find that arrangements have also been made for the EVWs travellers to be 
met at all the changes by Ministry of Labour officials which makes our members feel that 
their escort work is not really necessary.56) 
In escorting EVWs, the Ministry of Labour sometimes asked the WVS to dispatch 
interpreters, as a WVS member reported to headquarters. ‘The Ministry of Labour 
Welfare Officers in the Regions invariably ask the WVS for German speaking escorts 
to come with them to London or Hull and to help them bring back the parties of 
EVWs to their Region’.57) 
Yet not all escorting and distribution tasks were under the control of the Ministry 
of Labour. In particular, the WVS seems to have regarded works for dependants as 
‘their own sphere’, and to have acted independently within this ‘sphere’. In an 
escort operation conducted in 1947, members of the WVS mainly paid special 
attention to women with small children and were heavily engaged in taking care of 
them. What the WVS members worried about most was that dependants of EVWs 
had to wait too long to get on the train after their arrival at the port, during which 
time mothers with babies were kept standing. The WVS members made a firm 
protest to the Ministry of Labour officials:
All had to stand or wait ... There was nowhere at all for mothers to make their babies 
comfortable. Such luggage as they had was not the type for them to sit on and it was 
impossible to cope with changing nappies with the child in a pram, and in such a dimly lit 
place ... Even if the train is in the station when the boat docks, I still feel it is important to 
have seating accommodation for the mothers, and if possible a portion of the shed curtained 
off for their use.58) 
The WVS members got on trains with dependants and continued to take care of 
them there, bringing meals to mothers with small children, helping them change 
children’s nappies, and coping with children’s travel sickness. On the basis of these 
experiences, WVS members were able to give a lot of family-related advices to the 
Ministry of Labour; to provide mothers with nappies, Vaseline and baby powder, and 
to equip trains with buckets and brushes.59)
Though unrelated to escorting, a document from the WVS headquarters to its 
56) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs.Warmington to Miss. Boyes (MLNS), 19 January 1948.
57) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Miss. Russell to Miss. Halpin, 6 May 1947.
58) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on visit to Harwich to escort EVS dependants to London, 18 
November 1947.
59) Report on visit to Harwich to escort EVS dependants to London, 18 November 1947.
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regional offices explained the policy of the Ministry of Labour on pregnant and 
parturient women as follows: 
Generally speaking EVWs are expected, as far as possible, to make their own arrangements in 
cases of pregnancy with the assistance, financial and otherwise, of their husbands and with 
any help which can be given through the Maternity and Child Welfare Services, the WVS 
and other Voluntary bodies.60)
Indeed, the WVS helped mothers of EVWs ‘in many ways, such as attending local 
Clinics, and bringing up baby in the English way’.61)
The women’s domestic experience was seen as positive in helping foreigners fit 
into life in the UK by both the government officials and the women themselves, as 
is represented most clearly in the following words of Lady Reading:
We had many advantages in that we were a homogeneous nation and we must make every 
effort to assimilate the Poles and EVWs. The British way of life was not found in Hansard 
nor in the newspapers ― it was found in our homes and we needed individual initiative and 
courage in helping these people to settle.62) 
This meant not only that they should do their best to help Poles and EVWs fit 
into their new lives in Britain, but also that housewives who ran the home were the 
best persons to ‘teach’ the British way of life to foreigners, because it was best 
represented by home. This would be the reason why Lady Reading stressed to the 
Ministry of Labour the importance of placing British women welfare officers in each 
camp for foreigners, and asked for permission for WVS members to live in camps 
with foreign workers:
[O]n a long term basis what is really most needed is more opportunities for the EVWs to 
mix with British people and learn our language and our British way of life. One of the 
difficulties in achieving this is that many of the Holding Camps are in isolated areas... For 
this reason, and also because we understand that there is no British woman in most of the 
Holding Camps, I am writing to suggest to you that we should put a WVS woman welfare 
worker into each of the Holding Camps ... we feel a WVS worker could be of great use in 
teaching domestic English, in giving advice on various women’s problems, and in making 
local contacts and getting the EVWs invited into British homes.63) 
60) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County 
Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.
61) TNA, LAB26/235, From Mrs. Warmington to Miss. Boyes, 7 Oct. 1949 E.V.W.s in Atherton.
62) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting at the WVS headquarters, 20 April 1948.
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Such a proposal reminds us perhaps of the settlement movement concerning the 
working class in the nineteenth century. While the Ministry of Labour showed 
hesitation about this proposal, they made a promise to place female welfare officer 
from the Ministry in each camp.64) As for the WI, Lady Albemarle of the NFWI told 
the story of a WI member who utilized her experience in the home in teaching 
English to Polish women. ‘One Englishwoman used to arrive for her class with a 
shopping basket containing things the Polish woman might need to buy; another 
found an illustrated catalog useful. The more advanced class exchange cooking 
hints, and experience of home life and war. A member from a neighbouring W.I. is 
helping the women in the camp to start a garden’.65) 
This sense of ‘mission’ led members of both the WVS and WI to visit camps and 
hostels to hold English classes and recreational activities etc.. Particularly in English 
education, their contribution was great. The WVS headquarters issued phrases sheets 
in the mother tongues of foreign workers and distributed copies of texts in 
elementary English in order to facilitate its members in holding English classes.66) 
Some members who got in touch with foreign workers realized the seriousness of 
the language barrier, as the report from a WVS member illustrates:
This war-time American hospital echoed to the sound of many languages when I drove to sort 
out clothes for the EVWs-prior to their embarking on their new lives in England ... and oh! 
the struggles we had to establish complete understanding! So, I asked to be allowed to take 
some classes in elementary English, to help them a little on one of their main problems, the 
speaking of our language.67)
According to a document of the WVS, ‘[s]ometimes the WVS members themselves 
are the teachers, either organizing social evenings or inviting a few EVWs to their 
own homes’. It seems that some English education for foreigners in the Attlee years 
was undertaken not only by professional English teachers but also by ‘amateurs’68) 
in order to make up for the lack of official infrastructure for English education as a 
63) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Lady Reading to Buxton (MLNS), 7 August 1947.
64) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Whyte (MLNS) to Lady Reading, 25 August 1947.
65) TNA, LAB12/513, Chairman’s Speech at 28th Annual General Meeting. 
66) Chairman’s Speech at 28th Annual General Meeting; WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Repatriate, 
Poles, EVWs welfare Department (the WVS) to the Duchess of Atholl, 26 September 1947. 
67) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, undated reports signed by Anne Keble.
68) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Report on the WVS welfare activities for European Volunteer 
Workers, undated.
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second language. 
This lack of official infrastructure was also prominent in English education for 
Poles, for which the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain was 
formed. This committee, charged with not only school education for Polish children 
but also adult education in camps and hostels, sent English teachers and Educational 
Organisers who organised clubs and recreation activities. However, as a report from 
the chairman of the committee revealed, they had difficulty in getting professional 
teachers for English as a second language, being forced to depend on Polish 
teachers who happened to understand English or who had been trained as such by 
the committee. Thus, even for Poles whom the government treated specially, the 
WVS and WI played significant roles in their English education. The report of the 
Committee repeatedly praised the contribution of these two women’s groups to 
English education for Poles. WVS members visited Polish camps to talk in English to 
Polish children who were otherwise surrounded by only Polish-speakers.69)
Thus the government ministries welcomed these activities by women’s groups, and 
the regional offices of the Ministry of Labour acted as liaison agents for them by 
giving out the lists of camps and hostels and facilitating their contacts with 
managers of those accommodations.70) The WVS made special efforts to continue its 
support after EVWs left holding camps for their new employment and asked the 
Ministry of Labour to give them information about where EVWs were placed.71) 
However, allowing the WVS members to enter camps and hostels and assume the 
provision of assistance for foreign workers could prove a ‘double-edged sword’ for 
administrative authorities to allow the WVS members to enter camps and hostels 
and assume the provision of assistance for foreign workers. On the one hand, 
cooperation with the WVS enabled the authority to fill the gaps in official service, 
which decreased the inevitable friction involved in taking in foreign workers. By 
visiting camps and hostels, the WVS members found such defects as wet cradles, 
shortage of equipment for new-born babies and the lack of places where mothers 
could dry children’s clothes, in respect of which the WVS directly requested the 
Ministry of Labour for improvement.72) Poles and EVWs also conveyed their 
complaints to WVS members: lack of hot water, awful and monotonous meals in 
69) Report of Chairman of the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain with Audited 
Accounts, for the Year Ended 31st March, 1947-1954 (London, 1947-1954).
70) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad, 20 June 1947.
71) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Lady Reading to Buxton (MLNS), 27 June 1947.
72) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting at the WVS headquarters, 20 April 1948.
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hostels, discriminatory treatment based on ethnicity (in particular, against Yugoslavs), 
overpriced rents for poor quality rooms, and so on.73) On receiving such grievances, 
the WVS asked the Ministry of Labour to investigate. The Ministry responded to this 
request, trying to explain the situation and the extent of the efforts made by the 
Ministry. The Ministry of Labour officials also indicated some guidelines for giving 
advice to foreign workers about various problems, such as the reunion of families 
and changing employment.74) 
At the same time, these involvements sometimes became an ‘intervention’ in 
official policy towards foreign workers. For example, the WVS was worried about 
the poor quality of Polish camps and requested that the government departments 
concerned should conduct inspections. In answer to this request, the Ministry 
displayed its irritation with ‘interventions from ‘amateurs’ who did not understand 
the prevailing situation properly: a serious shortage of materials, which forced them 
to give priority to their own nationals. They even pointed out that Lady Reading 
requested inspection because she ‘feared scandals’ (that is, the public criticism 
against the WVS for the maltreatment of Poles). Despite these irritations, however, 
this request from the WVS eventually led to inter-ministerial inspection in Polish 
Camps.75) In another case, such behaviour by the WVS ended up in the serious 
friction with the authorities. The very poor quality of life in camps for foreign 
workers run by County Agricultural Committees was often pointed out.76) In two 
camps in East Suffolk, problems such as an extraordinarily high proportion of 
sickness among residents, suicide cases and inadequate English teaching were noted. 
In response to these problems, WVS members sought to elucidate the situation by 
getting in touch with EVW residents. But WVS members were prevented from 
entering camps by the camp authority, which led to the resignation of the EVW 
specialist for East Suffolk who made the protest that ‘the attitude of the Agricultural 
committee was so anti-WVS and they appeared to regard us as wishing to spy’.77) 
73) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, A letter from a hostel at Oldham to Miss. Martin, 7 October 1947; a 
letter from a Yugoslavian EVW, undated. 
74) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Office, County, County 
Borough Organizer, Center Organizer, 17 February 1948.
75) TNA, LAB26/193, To Whyte, 12 December 1947; From Whyte to Secretary, 16 December 1947; a 
note of the Cabinet Emergency Accommodation Committee, 3 September 1948.
76) TNA, LAB12/513, Minutes of meeting on the Welfare for Poles and European Volunteer Workers, 
20 April 1948; Minutes of meeting of regional welfare officers, MLNS, 29 January 1948.
77) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Regional Office to Miss. Halpin, the WVS headquarters, 7 
November 1949.
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Moreover, when it came to the family life of foreign workers, the WVS took a 
different stance from that of the government. Some activities of the WVS were 
totally independent of, and even contradicted, the official policy. The WVS 
undertook some special projects related to family life for foreign workers. One of 
these projects on which the WVS focused its energy was the project to help female 
DPs with a child in Germany and Austria. In May 1948, Mrs. Warmington at the 
WVS headquarters made the following proposal to Lady Reading:
There are many women (mostly widows) in DP camps anxious to come over here and work 
but who are debarred from the Westward Ho Scheme which only enrols single women 
without children. A great many households in Great Britain would willingly take such a 
women for domestic work and provide a home thereby for the child ... It is suggested 
therefore that the WVS should act as agent to collect names of individuals willing to come as 
domestic workers and to put them in touch with British people who undertake to employ and 
provide for them.78) 
Subsequently, the WVS approached the International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
and the Ministry of Labour for assistance in carrying out this plan. While the IRO 
responded favourably to this offer, the Ministry of Labour exhibited reluctance. 
According to the report by Mrs. Warmington:
He (an official of the Ministry of Labour) feels very strongly that if the WVS are prepared 
to help the DP position, our first enthusiasm should be to try and absorb the Poles in 
domestic work before bringing in more DPs. He also told me they had had a certain amount 
of trouble by bringing in women with children for priority households, as invariably, after a 
short time, the household tired of the child.79) 
Warmington persuaded an official of the Ministry of Labour, explaining that they 
would vet the household in question and follow up on the case, and also possibly 
help to alleviate some of the inevitable difficulties between the householder and the 
employee.80)
As far as I can see from documents from the WRVS Archives, the WVS was 
confident of securing households which would accept female DPs with a child. In 
this connection, we should remember the middle-class characteristics of the WVS 
and the contemporary situation surrounding the domestic service. In the Attlee 
78) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 24 May 1948.
79) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 10 July 1948.
80) From Mrs. Warmington to Lady Reading, 10 July 1948.
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years, it became difficult to find domestic workers for many households. Securing 
enough domestic workers became one of the most important manpower policies 
after the war. As is well known, in 1945, Violet Markham and Florence Hancock 
produced a report at the instigation of Ernest Bevin concerning post-war 
organization of domestic service, in order to promote the recruitment of domestic 
workers.81) In April 1946, the Home Office resumed the admittance of female 
foreign workers for domestic service under the work permit system, and, at least 
until 1948, the issuance of employment permits revolved around domestic service.82) 
In distributing the limited number of foreign domestic workers, the Attlee 
government gave priority to hospitals, sanatoria and other similar institutions. Even 
the repeated request from the NFWI for the securing of domestic help for farmers’ 
wives could not receive satisfying response from the government.83) Thus, for 
middle- and upper class households, it became almost impossible to hire enough 
servants at all in post-war Britain. As Hinton shows, the middle-class characteristic 
of the WVS is exemplified by the fact that it lobbied for exemption of the servants 
of WVS members from mobilization for war.84) 
Taking into account all of these facts, the WVS had good reason to believe that 
they would be able to find ‘adequate’ numbers of households among its members. 
This belief is vividly shown in the following direction from the WVS headquarters to 
regional offices for a pilot program of admitting a dozen female DPs with a child:
There are many women in the DP Camps in Europe to-day who, having a child, are debarred 
from volunteering as EVWs ... it has been agreed that the WVS shall make an experiment by 
trying to place a dozen of such women, each having one child, in English households. It will 
be easier to get the women included in the scheme if we can suggest households which have 
some claim to priority, i.e. farmer’s or doctor’s or where there are children etc., but if you 
know of a case, even of a hard pressed Centre Organiser, falling outside the priority class but 
where the need is great, will you please send forward the name and full particulars and we 
will do our best to press for the household to be included as if it were in a priority class. 
The experiment implies a responsibility is on us, as the Ministry of Labour are loath to bring 
over any further DPs who might prove a commitment if the householders employing them 
81) Violet Markham and Florence Hancock, Report on post-war organization of private domestic 
employment (London, 1945).
82) Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, 421, cols. 2111-2114, 11 April 1946. According to the 
Ministry of Labour Gazette, in February 1948, the number of issuance of employment permit was 
22,965, of which 18,952 were for domestic service. 
83) See the file of WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/21 Box19, A Meeting of the Executive Committee, 11th November 
1947; International Sub-Committee, 7th September 1948.
84) Hinton, Women, Social Leadership, and the Second World War, 30.
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decide too late that they cannot support a child in the house. Through the WVS channels, 
however, we feel that the right kind of households can be found who will appreciate the 
situation and adapt themselves to meet it ... We would like each Region to furnish 3 genuine 
offers, for though this over-subscribes our initial venture it will enable us to discuss further 
plans with the Ministry of Labour.85)
As we can see from this quotation, in order to move the project ahead, 
executives of the WVS tried to seek households that would admit female DPs and 
their children from within its members. We can see the extraordinary enthusiasm of 
the WVS headquarters for making a contribution to alleviating the problem of DP 
women with children.
However, even some from within the WVS expressed doubts against its feasibility. 
A regional administrator in Leeds pronounced her strong misgivings based on her 
experience of trying to place English unmarried mothers as domestic workers in 
private homes; ‘it appears that even when the people are English, hence no 
language difficulty, we cannot place them’.86) Unfortunately, from documents which 
I have at present, I cannot say whether this project was put into practice thereafter, 
or what its result was.87) There are strong doubts about whether the tactics 
dependent on ‘goodwill’ of its members actually enabled the WVS to overcome the 
difficulties in placing women with children into English households, and to what 
extent the WVS was able to take responsibility for DP women and their children. 
Moreover, there remained a note of an interview with the IRO on this WVS project. 
In this note, a WVS member said that it would be necessary to ‘[I]f possible get him 
(an official of the Ministry of Labour) to agree for the Ministry of Labour to agree 
to undertake the ultimate assimilation of these experimental cases but if this is not 
possible one must gamble on their ultimate assimilation and the IRO must be 
prepared to take them back’.88) Nevertheless, it remains the fact that this project 
was at odds with the policy of the Ministry of Labour, and this fact illustrates 
clearly that the activities of the WVS went far beyond those of ‘semi-official’ 
organizations. 
85) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From the WVS headquarters to Regional Administrators, 3 September 
1948.
86) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From a Regional Administrator in Leeds to Miss Halpin (the WVS), 7 
September 1948.
87) Unfortunately, the WRVS archive in Abingdon is at present closed. For more information, please see 
http://www.wrvs.org.uk/about-us/our-history/wrvs-archive-and-heritage-collection/enquiry-service.
88) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, Note of interview with International Refugee Organization held on 8th 
August 1948.
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Another project by the WVS independent of official policy was a plan for building 
family camps for the families of EVWs who were forced to live separately. In Kent, 
there were two Hostels for male EVWs from Baltic countries, and some wives of 
these men were in DP hostels at Hull and Corsham. Many of the wives and children 
were still in camps in Germany, waiting to come over to Britain. Throughout their 
support activities, members of the WVS saw some cases where ‘several of the men 
are getting too friendly with women living in the village near the Agricultural 
Hostels’. In order to ‘re-establish family’ as a necessary step for ‘assimilating’ these 
foreigners into British society, the WVS planned to build a ‘village’ where families 
speaking the same language were forming some kind of ‘colony’, and looked for 
disused camps to use for this purpose. According to the WVS plan, camps would be 
build in places that were so close to local schools, shopping centres and other 
facilities as to enable them to mix with local people, and ‘until the villagers settle 
down and realize their responsibilities towards each other and their English 
neighbours, a Warden- if possible married and with children-should be in residence’ 
to act as an exemplar of ‘good citizen’ for foreigners. The warden was expected to 
‘discover that it is by his example that he can do most to educate these people in 
the proper use of freedom’, by, for example, making his own garden beautiful and 
planting vegetables in it.89) Behind these efforts, there was a clear understanding 
that the reestablishment of family lives was closely connected to the ‘assimilation’ of 
these foreign workers into British society. 
Interestingly, helping foreign workers sometimes contributed to ‘protectection’ of 
the local family life by keeping an eye on their personal relationship. A WVS 
member who helped a German girl reported to headquarters; ‘We allow the girls to 
bring their boyfriends (to the club the WVS formed for Germen girls), and thus are 
able to keep a bit of a check on the sort of man they are meeting, and the fact 
that he is trotted round to the W.V.S. to be vetted has discouraged many a man 
who knows we are acquainted with him and his family, very often his wife I am 
sorry to say’.90)
Although both the WVS and the WI showed respect for the foreign workers’ own 
culture and language, the ‘home’ or ‘family’ that the WVS expected Poles and EVWs 
to reconstruct as a step for ‘assimilation’ into British society was middle-class and 
89) WVS Archives, 73/M464/40, European Volunteer Workers in East Kent: Proposal for families camps 
for EVWs, undated.
90) TNA, LAB26/235, Extract from Gainsborough WVS Narrative Report, March 1950, Welfare-German 
Girls.
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English in character, represented by ‘tea’ and ‘gardening’. Furthermore, there was a 
perceived ‘racial ’hierarchy among European foreign workers, with Balts, most of 
whom were from the middle class, at the top. A letter from a farmer’s wife who 
had employed a Lithuanian EVW couple wrote to Home and Country expressing 
such preference for Balts, saying ‘I would advise trying only people who have real 
faming background, and are from Baltic countries where most of the people are fair 
haired, sturdy and healthy’.91) On the other hand Ukrainian EVWs were seen by the 
WVS as so ‘ungainly’ that ‘classes have been held to learn deportment, make up, 
etc.’.92) In respect of Ukrainian EVW girls who were working in a hospital, an 
official of the Ministry of Labour also asked the WVS for careful treatment:
[T]hey are the peasant type and are rather lonely and bewildered... She (an official from the 
Ministry of Labour) wondered if the WVS could contact the Matron and see if she would let 
the girls go out to tea with the WVS sometimes ... She stressed that the girls should only go 
to rather Homely working class WVS as otherwise they might feel rather like fish out of 
water.93)
‘Homely’ is valued in this case, too.
Conclusion
Although the UK had already taken a number of immigrants and been a 
multi-ethnic country in reality by the Second World War, as Lady Stella’s words 
suggests, in the 1940s it was sometimes represented as if it were a ‘homogenous’ 
nation that had had little experience of immigration. Lady Albemarle of the NFWI 
said in connection with Poles that ‘Our island history with its tradition of viewing 
even people from another county as foreigners make it, perhaps, difficult for us to 
come to grips with this problem’.94) In 1949, the international sub-committee of the 
NFWI, which had a discussion on the position of Poles, considered drawing on the 
experience of Canada, a country that had rich experience of immigration.95)  
The British government of the time seemed to have a similar understanding. In 
91) Home and Country, March 1948, 42.
92) TNA, LAB26/235, From Mrs. Warmington to Miss. Boyes, 7 October 1949, E.V.W.s in Atherton.
93) WRVS Archives, 73/M464/40, From Mrs. Ruck to Ms. Henderson, 26 May 1947.
94) TNA, LAB 12/513, NFWI, 28th Annual Conference, Chairman’s Speech.
95) WL, 5/FWI/A/1/1/22, Box20, International Sub-Committee, 10th May 1949.
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the early 1950s, when the British government received an enquiry from the UNESCO 
about its policy towards the cultural integration for immigrants, the ministries 
concerned took the attitude that the UK had little to do with the problem of 
immigrants.96) The Home Office replied that ‘The Home Office’s interest in the 
subject of the questionnaire is limited…the United Kingdom is not a country of 
immigration in the sense that any substantial numbers of foreigners are admitted as 
immigrants’.97) 
In this situation, both Poles and EVWs were supposed to ‘fit into the life in the 
UK’ by learning English and the British way of life’. While there seemed to be a 
somewhat ‘fixed’ British way of life which foreigners were expected to learn in due 
course, what it meant was not clear at all. The only key was in the way local 
people were living, or in the ‘home’ of British people. Mingling with local people 
was taken to be the important step for foreigners towards ‘assimilation’, and inviting 
foreign workers to the British home was encouraged in order to help foreigners fit 
into life in the UK. While the government ministries depended on the voluntary 
work of women in fitting foreign workers into the local community, the WVS, or at 
least its executives, clearly felt that women could play a significant part in 
‘teaching’ foreign workers the British way of life, because they knew most what 
British lifestyle was as housewives. Thus, they insisted that British women should live 
in the camps and hostels for EVWs. While the government tended to overlook the 
family life of foreign workers for the sake of securing manpower and saving limited 
resources, the WVS valued family life and acted to maintain and reconstruct the 
family independently from government policy. 
Such a domestic form of identity within the UK could co-exist or even be mixed 
with the multi-ethnic ‘Britishness’ of the Empire/Commonwealth, as long as people 
in the host community could see immigrants as ‘others’ from outside who were 
required to ‘assimilate’ into the British society. The way Home & Country until early 
1960s had represented people from the colonies and Commonwealth was as ‘visitors’ 
or ‘students’ from outside.98) However, this domestic identity could be threatened 
and began to be incompatible with the imperial version of ‘Britishness’ from the 
1960s, when ‘immigrants’ who had British citizenship came to the UK and became 
local residents.
96) See files of NA, ED157/342.
97) TNA, ED157/342, From the Home Office to Dear Crwys Williams 31 July 1952.
98) See, Home & Country.
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Mapping for Modernity: 
An Arabist in Arabia, 1953-1955*
Shohei Sato**1)
Abstract
The mapping of the modern world during the age of European imperialism continues to 
cast a shadow across the social and political problems of today. Indeed, the creation of 
arbitrary borders has often been understood as the quintessential example of the adverse 
legacies of imperialism. But to what extent did the imperial powers have control over the 
whole process? The question of agency and intention is crucial to the normative question 
of responsibility, yet the former is more often assumed before it is examined in sufficient 
depth. This article addresses this problem by examining the process through which a 
modern map of an eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula was drawn and consequently 
became the basis of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, it highlights the 
experience of a young British diplomat who was heavily involved in the negotiations.
Julian Fortay Walker came to the region in the early 1950s, when the polities that 
would later form the UAE were still ‘Protected States’ and part of Britain’s informal 
empire. During a border dispute with Saudi Arabia, he was asked to produce a map 
clarifying the boundaries between the local polities, which had hitherto been only loosely 
defined. This article examines Walker’s experience of map making, in order to explore how 
modern spatiality was reshaped in relation to imperialism through the vignette his story 
offers.
After traveling through the region in his Land Rover, dotting the information gathered 
from people using the back of the nib of his fountain pen, Walker created a map so 
complicated that it later became nicknamed ‘Mr. Walker’s jigsaw puzzle’. It was intended 
to reflect the local realities as much as to support the British case in the border dispute 
with Saudi Arabia. The episode suggests that drawing boundaries according to social reality 
 * This research project has been enabled by the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (ref. 23720311) 
and the Asia and Africa Science Platform Program, both offered by the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science. Earlier versions of parts of this paper were presented on several occasions, 
including: the Fourth Korean-Japanese Conference of British History, Kumamoto, 2010; Southern 
Historical Association Annual Meeting, Baltimore, MA, 2011; and the Islam and Multiculturalism 
Seminar, Tokyo, 2011. I thank the participants for their insightful comments. I am also grateful to 
Chie Akashi for making the map contained in this article. All errors are mine.
** Waseda University
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can sometimes prove highly complicated, or even impracticable, depending on the extent to 
which the local traditions are congenial to the norms of sovereign territoriality.
In conclusion, this article suggests that one should make an analytical distinction between 
four interconnected issues surrounding what is often called the ‘legacy of imperialism’:
(a) A resumption, or a continuation, of the issues that had existed prior to the arrival of 
the imperial power;
(b) The issues that were brought in by, or created through contact with, the imperial 
power;
(c) The issues that were created or exacerbated by the modality of the way in which the 
imperial power departed; and
(d) The issues caused by modernity or modernization.
Partly due to the sense of guilt in the former metropole, or the insecurity of the 
postcolonial states, imperial powers are often condemned not only for their own conduct 
(b), or what has been created by the way in which they left (c), but also for problems 
that in fact existed at the time of their expansion into foreign territories (a) or for things 
that were, in fact, going to happen sooner or later regardless of the imperial presence, as 
long as the region concerned was going to experience modernization (d). 
In contrast to the linear borders in many parts of the world, the map drawn by Walker 
calls into question the assumption that had it not been for the imperial powers the borders 
between postcolonial states would have been much less problematic. Dividing land into 
exclusive territories, such as sovereign states, is only one of many ways to think about 
space, but its historical expansion in the world during modern times needs to be examined 
in further depth.
Keywords: Imperial legacy; territorial sovereignty; map making; Middle East; United Arab Emirates
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The mapping of the modern world during the age of imperialism continues to 
cast a shadow across the social and political problems of today. Mohammed Ayoob 
argues that ‘imperial powers bequeathed to their postcolonial successor regimes 
territorial entities that were composed of distinct ... ethnic groups’ or ‘divided 
previously homogenous ethnic communities’ into different states through a ‘cavalier 
construction of colonial borders’. Consequently, the continuing ethnic and religious 
rivalries both inside, and between postcolonial states appear to be a quintessential 
example of the adverse legacy of imperialism.1) 
But to what extent did the imperial powers have control over the whole process? 
The question of agency and intention is crucial to the normative question of 
responsibility, but the former is more often assumed before it is examined in 
sufficient depth. This article addresses this problem by examining the process 
through which a modern map of an eastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula was 
drawn and consequently became the basis of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 
particular, it highlights the experience of a young British diplomat who was heavily 
involved in the negotiations.
Julian Fortay Walker came to the region in the early 1950s, when the polities that 
would later form the UAE were still ‘Protected States’ and part of Britain’s informal 
empire. During a border dispute with Saudi Arabia, he was asked to produce a map 
clarifying the boundaries between the local polities, which had hitherto been only 
loosely defined. This article examines Walker’s experience of map making with the 
aid of declassified archival sources, private papers and his own memoirs. I have 
also conducted some telephone interviews with him. On top of its empirical 
contribution to the history of the British Empire in the Middle East, it also aims to 
explore the conceptual and normative issues set out above. It does not intend to 
overemphasize the role of an individual British diplomat, but to explore how 
modern spatiality was reshaped in relation to imperialism through the vignette his 
story offers.2) 
The body of this paper is divided into three sections. The first section will 
introduce the historical background and existing literature, thereby highlighting how 
the European idea of sovereignty had been negotiated in relation to the local 
1) Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 
International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 35.
2) I thank Ismail Fajrie Alatas for introducing me to this approach.
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political traditions since the early nineteenth century. The second section will 
examine how a border dispute that broke out in the mid-twentieth century 
prompted Walker to make the map of the region, particularly by looking into the 
relationship between oil and sovereign territoriality. The third section will examine 
how the complexity of the map was dealt with in the years leading up to the 
subsequent full independence the UAE. In the conclusion, I will summarize the 
empirical findings by exploring some of the conceptual issues set out above.
Imperialism and sovereignty
On 21 November 1903 Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, was visiting the Persian 
Gulf.3) Meeting the rulers of the southern coast, he stated:
We found strife and we have created order ... We have not seized or held your territory. We 
have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it ... The peace of these waters 
must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of 
the British Government must remain supreme.4)
This self-important remark, typical of British imperialists, depicts how they 
brought the institution of sovereignty to the Persian Gulf as an instrument through 
which to impose their version of international law on the region. For centuries, 
local rulers’ legitimacy in the southern Gulf, or the northern shore of the Arabian 
Peninsula, had largely depended on their ability to secure military protection from 
external powers. Britain provided precisely that and, by signing treaties with the 
rulers, it created polities whose legitimacy was from the outset dependent on an 
outside patron. This was designed to serve British interests, but it also had the 
effect of providing military protection to the client rulers and excluding their rivals 
from coming to power.
In the early nineteenth century, Britain oppressed the military forces of the 
northern shore of the Arabian Peninsula in order to secure a maritime route to 
India. With its military victory, Britain forced the local forces to enter into a series 
3) The name of the Gulf is subject to a political dispute between those who favour ‘Persian Gulf’ and 
those who like to use ‘Arabian Gulf’. I adopt the latter as the most commonly used term.
4) John Gordon Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 
1908-1915), I: 2638-39.
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of ‘truces’ with what they saw as ‘pirates’.5) However, to what extent the divisive 
discourse of ‘pirates’ conformed to the reality is highly debatable and controversial, 
not least because the primary sources available were written by Europeans. Of 
course, this also raises the question of the legitimacy of both the local society and 
the British presence.
At one end of the spectrum, Arnold T. Wilson agrees with the British official view 
of the time.6) At the other end of the spectrum, Sultan al-Qasimi criticizes Wilson 
and those like him as apologists for British imperialism.7) Between these two 
opinions, Rosemarie Said Zahlan points out that the term ‘piracy’ is relative and 
Charles E. Davies also hesitates to use the term pirates, even though he remarks 
that ‘some of what they did was piracy’.8) James Onley further advances the 
literature by pointing out that it was common practice at that time in the Gulf for 
powerful tribal leaders, or sheikhdom rulers as he calls them, to ask for tribute 
from the leaders of the weaker tribes. In many cases, this was a deal that benefited 
not just the protector but also the protected. The protector received tribute, but in 
return offered free passage and assumed the responsibility of protecting the weaker 
party in a crisis. However, the weaker party occasionally refused to pay the tribute 
if an attack from a third actor was thought to be unlikely. It was usually in these 
instances that the stronger tribes launched raids.9) However one concludes this hotly 
contested debate, it can be safely asserted on the basis of the consensus of the 
literature that Britain had indeed called the local people engaged in military 
activities ‘pirates’ and, throughout the nineteenth century, entered into a series of 
treaties with those ‘pirates’. 
5) For an introduction to the history of piracy in the Persian Gulf, see J.B. Kelly ‘Kursan’ (in the 
Persian Gulf), Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, 12 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986-2004), V: 
507-509. For a study of the history and traditions of maritime trade in the Persian Gulf, see George 
Fadlo Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Beirut: 
Khayats, 1963).
6) Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning 
of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 11.
7) Sultan ibn Muhammad Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1988), 28.
8) Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman (Revised and updated ed., Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 13; Charles E. 
Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820 (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1997), 276.
9) James Onley, "The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in 
the Nineteenth Century," New Arabian Studies 6 (2004): 30-92 at 36-37, 42-43.
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This in itself is highly significant for our discussion, because it highlights the 
function of the notion of law and state. By signing those treaties Britain had 
acknowledged some degree of sovereignty in the local rulers. No matter how 
unequal and unilateral the substance, the concept of a treaty assumes an agreement 
between parties with comparable legal personalities. The format of the treaty 
required Britain to grant, or indeed force, local societies to receive certain legal 
personas.10) Although these treaties fulfilled the purpose of subjugating the local 
territories under British control via the medium of cooperative local rulers, they also 
had the side-effect of imposing the facade of elusive sovereignty upon the region. 
Prior to the British entry in the Gulf, the nature of authority was more fluid than 
stable, and more multilayered than mutually exclusive. However, by signing the 
treaties Britain had effectively appointed some of rulers as the exclusive heads of 
imaginary sovereign states. As a result, the rulers were accorded ‘a status higher 
than the traditional way of life had allowed them’.11) 
This procedure promoted the ‘pirates’ to the status of ‘Protected States’ in British 
eyes.12) In strict constitutional terms Britain never established a formal colony but 
nonetheless exercised a significant degree of influence, which could be most suitably 
understood as an informal empire.13) Britain’s informal empire extended to the 
territories of today’s Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, ‘Ajman, Fujairah, Ra’s 
al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai.14) The latter seven 
10) Edward Keene, "Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Ninteenth Century: 
Expansion or Stratification?" (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, 2008), 18.
11) Peter Leindhardt, quoted in Onley, "The Politics of Protection in the Gulf," 66.
12) The British government officially acknowledged the usage of the term ‘Protected States’ only in 
1949. See especially Husain M. Albaharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of 
Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problems (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1968), 81-83. See also James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, 
and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25-29; Glen 
Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last 
Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 102.
13) To what extent the British imperial presence in the region was an ‘informal’ one opens up an 
important debate on the internal and external dynamics of the British Empire, which needs to be 
fully explored in a separate study. I thank John Darwin and Wm. Roger Louis for illuminating this 
point.
14) As a principle, this article follows the system of transliteration of the Arabic names of Frauke 
Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, New ed. (London: 
Longman, 1996). However, for the convenience of the readers, all diacritics have been omitted and 
special fonts have been replaced with the closest standard English alphabet.
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polities would later form the UAE, but at this point this result was far from clear.15)
This line of argument might be taken by some as an insult to the origins and 
legitimacy of the present states in the Arabian Peninsula. However, legal 
discontinuity is not necessarily mutually exclusive of social continuity. B.J. Slot states 
that, by the end of the eighteenth century, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and 
Oman more or less existed in their present form.16) In contrast, M.H. Mendelson 
remarks from a legal standpoint that ‘the idea of sovereignty and of the State itself 
was rather alien’ in the region until the twentieth century.17) From this point of 
view, it was British protection that ‘bestowed a legal status on the concept of 
“shaykhdom”’.18) 
The debate over the issue of ‘piracy’ and its aftermath during this period depicts 
the fundamental problem of the existing literature, which tends to be divided 
between overly Eurocentric historiography on the one hand, and self-serving 
nationalistic narratives on the other. The controversy arises partly from the fact that 
the primary sources available were written by the Europeans, but also because it 
calls into question of the legitimacy of both the local society and the British 
presence. Essentially, both sides tend to reduce the world into the West and the 
rest, reproducing a dichotomy that is shared by many studies written about most 
parts of the world in the modern era. This paper aims to overcome this problematic 
dichotomy by advancing the argument put forward by authors such as Onley.19) This 
15) From the local rulers’ point of view, their relationship with Britain was a double-edged sword, but it 
was nonetheless inescapable. On the one hand the imperial tie weakened their legitimacy within their 
own society but, on the other hand, Britain’s military protection was indispensable if they wanted to 
hold onto their position. Thus, the informal empire of Britain in the Persian Gulf was essentially an 
asymmetric interdependence enabled by a military presence and an elusive legal framework of 
sovereignty.
16) B. J. Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf, 1602-1784: An Alternative Approach to the Early History of the 
Arab Gulf States and the Arab Peoples of the Gulf, Mainly Based on Sources of the Dutch East 
India Company (Leidschendam: B. J. Slot, 1993), 399.
17) M. H. Mendelson, "The Application of International Legal Concepts of Sovereignty in the Arabian 
Context," Geopolitics 3, no. 2 (1998): 133-38 at 135.
18) J. E. Peterson, "Tribe and Politics in Eastern Arabia," Middle East Journal 31, no. 3 (1977), 
http://www.JEPeterson.net (accessed December 2011), 1-14 at 5.
19) In writing this paper, I have drawn heavily from three groups of studies. The first group is the 
literature of the history of the Persian Gulf. See especially Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United 
Arab Emirates. See also Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States; Muhammad Morsy 
Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Abdullah 
Omran Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85 (London: Croom Helm, 
1987); Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj. Recent studies in this strand also include 
Simon C. Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial 
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newer generation of literature benefits from the recent opening of British 
governmental sources as well as local primary sources and interviews.20)
Oil and Sovereign Territoriality
Britain’s informal empire on the northern coast of the Arabian Peninsula 
originated as an extension of its Indian Empire, but Indian independence did not 
prompt Britain to leave the region. This was partly due to the importance of the 
Persian Gulf as a route of transportation and communication, but also because of 
the strategic value of oil.21) Oil was discovered in Bahrain 1932, followed by 
discoveries in Qatar and Abu Dhabi in 1940 and 1958, respectively. The 
States, 1950-71 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British 
Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Jeffrey R. Macris, The 
Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region (London: 
Routledge, 2010). The second group is the literature on the history of the British Empire, particularly 
texts that illuminate the dynamics of the relationship between the imperial metropole and the 
dependant territories. The classic work is Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European 
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds. 
Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972). This heritage is built on John Darwin, 
The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). The third group of studies is the literature of International 
Relations on sovereignty. See especially Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, 
Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also 
Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 
1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull 
(Leicester University Press, 1977); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992); Hendrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in 
International-Relations: State Anarchy as Order," International Organization 48, no. 4 (1994): 527-57; 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
20) I engage with three different types of primary sources: (1) the declassified official documents of the 
British, American and Arab governments; (2) the published official documents of these governments; 
and (3) other contemporary documents, memoirs, as well as interviews.
21) In the maritime context, the Gulf had been incorporated into the lane of the British India Steam 
Navigation Company (BI Line, 1862-1972) after 1860. As for the air, the Imperial Airways (1924-39) 
opened airfields in Bahrain and Sharjah. The Imperial Airways later became the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (and eventually to British Airways in 1974), but a British diplomat recalls that 
the BOAC was locally known as ‘Better On A Camel’. Paul Tempest, "Qatar: A Strong New 
Bridge, 1967-2007," in Envoys to the Arab World: MECAS Memoirs, 1944-2009, vol. 2, ed. Paul 
Tempest (London: Stacey International, 2009), 130-37 at 133. Also see Onley, The Arabian Frontier 
of the British Raj, xxvi, 34-218.
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commencement of the commercial oil drilling not only helped the local economy, 
whose pearling industry was hit hard by its Japanese rivals, but also promoted the 
region to one of global significance.22) Thus, Britain continued to hold its informal 
empire in the region by transferring its jurisdiction from the Indian Government to 
the British Foreign Office.
In addition, the exploitation of oil brought a new idea of territoriality to the 
region. In the early twentieth century, boundaries between the polities of the region 
had been only vaguely defined. Oil concessions, and in some cases the hope 
thereof, prompted the rulers to become more clearly aware of the borders between 
their lands and water. As Peter Lienhardt aptly puts it, the mere ‘prospect of oil 
was modifying the groundwork of politics.’23)
In 1933, Saudi Arabia granted a concession to Standard Oil of California for the 
‘Eastern part ... within its frontiers’ yet those borders were not defined and Saudi 
Arabia refused to adhere to what Britain and Ottoman Turkey had agreed upon in 
1913.24) Meanwhile, by 1937, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had started to 
investigate whether there was oil in an area called Buraimi, located in the 
south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.25) Today, the Buraimi region straddles 
the boundary between Oman and the UAE; but in the mid-twentieth century the 
territories were not as clearly defined. Traditionally Buraimi had been known for 
having an oasis or as a key point for transportation, but by the mid-twentieth 
century it had become more important for oil ― that was hoped to be lying 
underneath the land. The tension resulted in a minor clash between Britain and 
Saudi Arabia in 1949.
Meanwhile, oil was coming to the centre of international relations in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In the north, Iran nationalized a British oil company 
but this was later reversed by a coup helped by British and American intelligence. 
And in 1952, Saudi Arabia seized Buraimi by force ― allegedly with tacit US 
22) Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj, 35, 217-18.
23) Peter Lienhardt, Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, ed. Ahmed Al-Shahi (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 
12.
24) Koroush Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf: Abu Musa and the Tunbs in 
Strategic Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge 2008), 65.
25) Extract from a report by T. F. Williamson and D. C. Rogers, "Geology of the Shaikhdom of 
BIRAIMI [sic], Arabia" (G.R. [Geological Report] 149), 1938/39, contained in "South-eastern Arabia: 
I.P.C. Reports," attached to a letter from London (Fields/ Geological Branch) to Abadan, memo no. 
10071, ‘Geology of Oman’, 15 November 1945, archival reference 44065, available at the BP 
Archive, University of Warwick, Coventry.
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support.26) Since Oman and Abu Dhabi were under British protection at that time, 
Britain represented them in a case brought before a special tribunal in Geneva (with 
the first session in Nice) against Saudi Arabia.
The tribunal opened in 1954. Whereas Britain represented Oman and Abu Dhabi, 
Saudi Arabia received support from Washington. Before the court came to any 
conclusion on this complex dispute, however, Britain withdrew its judges from the 
tribunal and the matter effectively ended when Britain seized the oasis by force in 
October 1955. The arbitration tribunal was a failure in this sense, but the whole 
dispute provided an important context to the evolution of spatiality in the region.27) 
Whilst Britain and Saudi Arabia were arguing over Buraimi, a young Arabist British 
diplomat was asked to tour and map the Protected States in order to clarify the 
boundaries among them. Assessing the British and Saudi Arabian claims and then 
comparing them with the local realities has its own merits, but for the purpose of 
the present argument, in the following paragraphs I will examine how things looked 
like through the eyes of this young Arabist.28)
Julian Fortay Walker was born in 1929 into a middle-class family in Marylebone, 
London.29) After serving in the Navy, he read history at Gonville and Caius College, 
26) Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf, 66.
27) It is outside the scope of this article to examine the Buraimi dispute per se in further detail, but the 
case is exceptionally rich in terms of materials for analysis. Both Britain and Saudi Arabia submitted 
ample evidence in form of memorials in order to justify their respective claims making. Hukumah 
al-Mamlakah al-‘Arabiyah al-Saudiyah, Al-Tahkim li Taswiyat al-Niza’ al-Iqlimi bayna Musqat wa 
Abu Zabi wa bayna al-Mamlakah al-‘Arabiyah al-Saudiyah: ‘Ard Hukumah al-Mamlakah al-‘Arabiyah 
al-Saudiyah, 3 vols, 1955; The Buraimi Memorials 1955: The Territorial Dispute concerning Buraimi, 
Liwa and Khor al-‘Udayd: The Memorials Submitted to Arbitration by the Governments of Saudi 
Arabia and the United Kingdom, 5 vols (Gerrards Cross: Archive Editions, 1987).
28) For a study of the Buraimi Dispute, see especially Tore Tingvold Petersen, "Anglo-American Rivalry 
in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957," The International History 
Review 14, no. 1 (1992): 71-91. See also B. J. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1964); Bernard Burrows, Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953-1958 (Salisbury: 
Michael Russell, 1990); Petersen, The Middle East between the Great Powers: Anglo-American 
Conflict and Cooperation, 1952-7 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Amer I. J. Al-Baho, "The Greatest 
Difference: Britain, the United States and the Buraimi Oasis Dispute, 1952-1957" (Ph.D. thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1997); Abdulrahman Rashid Al-Shamlan, "The 
Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula, 1934-1955" (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Michigan, 1987); Saeed Mohammad Al-Shamsi, "The Al-Buraimi Dispute: A Case 
Study in Inter-Arab Politics" (Ph.D. thesis, American University, 1986); Kelly, "The Buraimi Oasis 
Dispute," International Affairs 32, no. 3 (1956); Alexander Melamid, "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute," 
Middle Eastern Affairs 7, no. 2 (1956).
29) Born on 7 May 1929. The Diplomatic Service List, 1972 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1972), 463.
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Cambridge. His graduation from university coincided with the onset of the Cold 
War, and he entered the diplomatic service with the hope of becoming a Soviet or 
European expert. However, by a twist of fate, the Foreign Office decided to train 
him in Arabic. He studied Arabic first at the School of Oriental and African Studies 
in London, and then at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (MECAS) in 
Shemlan, Lebanon.30) Having been trained as an Arabist, at the age of 24 he started 
his career as Third Secretary in the Political Residency of Bahrain in 1953.31) In the 
years that followed, Walker was asked to travel through the region in order to 
clarify the boundaries between the territories that Britain believed to have under its 
control. 
According to his recollections, with the aid of a compass and the milo-meter of 
his Land Rover, he mapped the information gathered from the local people using 
the back of the nib of his fountain pen. Interviewing in the field was sometimes 
difficult since the locals tended to refer to the past as ams (an Arabic word that 
stands for both yesterday and the past in general), but he drew boundaries based 
upon the difference in the types of wells, the oral history of ‘tribal clashes and 
alliances, camel raids and other incidents in the desert’.32) Consequently he 
produced a map that was too close to reality for his superior’s liking. Walker recalls 
that it contained lines that the Foreign Office found inconvenient in light of 
Britain’s position in relation to the Buraimi Oasis dispute.
In any case, by 1963 the Foreign Office issued a map drawing on the evidence 
presented by Walker, which is reproduced here. The first point to be noted is that 
it does not contain Saudi Arabia, reiterating the British position that Buraimi is 
divided between Abu Dhabi and Oman. What is more surprising, however, is the 
fact that it contains a number of enclaves and areas of joint jurisdiction. Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Oman have multiple enclaves 
between each other. And within the sea of enclaves, Fujairah and Sharjah shares 
jurisdiction over one area, and ‘Ajman and Oman over another. The map was so 
perplexing that it later became named ‘Mr. Walker’s jigsaw puzzle’.33) There seemed 
30) For recollections of the Arabists trained at MECAS, see Envoys to the Arab World, ed. Tempest.
31) For a study of the role of British Arabists in the Middle East, see Kathryn Tidrick, Heart-beguiling 
Araby, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981.
32) Julian Walker, Tyro on the Trucial Coast (Durham: The Memoir Club, 1999), 109-21. Julian Walker, 
"Personal Recollections of the Rapid Growth of Archives in the Emirates," The Historical Documetns 
on Arab History in the Archives of the World (Abu Dhabi: Centre for Documentation and Research, 
2002), 40.
33) "Dubai and the Northern Trucial States Review of the Year 1969," Bullard to Crawford, 30 
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Map of the Trucial States based on Walker’s research, 1962-196334)
to be a fundamental tension between the idea of sovereign territoriality, character-
ized by exclusivity, and the way in which the local societies, where migration was 
an integral part of life, had been organized.
December 1970, FCO 8/1509, The National Archives (TNA).
34) The map is based on three maps that were issued in slightly different forms and timings: Boundaries 
of the Trucial States, prepared and drawn from sketch maps and information provided by Julian 
Walker, map no. 1 (north), Foreign Office Research Department, February 1962; Boundaries of the 
Trucial States, map no. 2 (south), Foreign Office Research Department, February 1963; Boundaries of 
the Trucial States, map no. 3 (covering the Southern Abu Dhabi-Oman boundary), unpublished, 
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Walker’s dilemma essentially arose from the fundamental difficulty of exporting 
the modern norm of international relations conducted by geographically demarcated 
sovereign states. Irresponsible drawing of state borders is often depicted as an 
example of the adverse legacy of imperialism. Indeed some boundaries in the world 
were drawn more arbitrarily than others, but Walker’s episode suggests that drawing 
the boundaries according to social reality can sometimes be extremely complicated, 
or even impracticable, depending on the extent to which the local traditions are 
congenial to the norms of sovereign territoriality.
A Solution to the ‘jig-saw puzzle’
After the late 1950s Britain experienced a major setback in the shape of the Suez 
Crisis and following the ‘wind of change’ speech it granted independence to many 
of its former colonies. However, the informal empire in the Persian Gulf largely 
remained intact. It was only in January 1968 that Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
announced that Britain would withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971. Even 
then, the decision did not come as a response to local calls for self-determination 
and, indeed, was actually taken in the face of the local rulers’ opposition. The 
rulers watched the turmoil in Aden with trepidation and were wary of losing 
Britain’s military support in countering domestic opposition. As a result, they 
secretly offered to pay for the maintenance of the British troops if they were to 
stay. However, the Wilson government was determined to continue with the retreat 
in order to politically justify social cuts, such as restoring prescription charges for 
the National Health Service, which had become inevitable due to Britain’s long-term 
economic retrenchment.
Wilson’s announcement meant that Britain would withdraw its informal empire in 
the Gulf within less than four years. Therefore, the nine Protected States of ‘Ajman, 
Fujairah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and 
Bahrain would need to become fully independent sovereign states, or be swallowed 
up by existing ones. The local rulers were quick to respond. In less than a week, 
Foreign Office Research Department, May 1963. The original copies of the former two are accessible 
as HAW/Map 2-3, Donald Hawley Papers, available at Palace Green Library, Durham University, 
Durham. All three are compiled in The UAE: Internal Boundaries and the Boundary with Oman, ed. 
Julian F. Walker, 8 vols. (Archive Editions, 1994), 8, maps 26-28. The map presented was 
reproduced by Chie Akashi based on the Archive Editions version.
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Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, the ruler of the most powerful 
Protected State, met his rival Shaikh Rashid bin Sa‘id Al Maktum. They set up a 
regional initiative to form a union of nine states aiming to achieve full 
independence collectively.35)
However, this plan turned out to be little more than lip service and the situation 
remained stalled for three years. In the meantime the Conservatives came to power 
in Britain and made an unnecessary and unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Labour 
decision, only to realize that the momentum towards the end of empire was 
irreversible. In this climate, Julian Walker, who had been deployed outside the 
region, came back to the Protected States in July 1971. He contacted the rulers, 
who he believed would otherwise ‘disappear on their summer holidays’ and 
prompted them to negotiate for independence.36) Encouraged by Walker and also 
their own advisors, Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid of Dubai agreed 
to come together to achieve collective independence, provided that the other states 
would accept their leadership. It took Walker another couple of days’ travelling 
between their palaces on the coast before he managed to convince the rulers of 
‘Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain to become part of the UAE under 
the leadership of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. In contrast, Bahrain and Qatar opted out 
and declared their independence separately, and their decision was accepted by 
Britain and the United States. Ra’s al-Khaimah also tried to go solo, but this move 
was rejected by the international community and it grudgingly joined the UAE in 
February 1972.37) There is no evidence that oil companies played any direct role in 
dictating the outcome of the independence of the three states. They were only 
observing warily from outside.38)
35) Watha ’iq  al-Khalij al-‘Arabi, 1968-1971: Tamuhat al-Wahdah wa Humum al-Istiqlal (Arabian Gulf 
Documents, 1968-1971: Attempts at Federation and Independence), ed. Riyad Nahib Al-Rayyis 
(London: Riyad El Rayyes, 1987), 25-29; Agreement between Zayid and Rashid, "Union of Arab 
Emirates. Resolutions, Decisions, Joint Communiqués & Documents," file 1 (January 1968-November 
1970), Sir Geoffrey Arthur Collection, Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony’s College, Oxford; 
From Dahran to Washington, 21 February 1968, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, 
Box 2418, POL 33, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) College Park, ML.
36) Walker to Wright, 6 June 1971, FCO 8/1761, TNA.
37) Watha ’iq  al-Khalij al-‘Arabi, 647-55; Telephone interviews with Julian Walker, 18, 19, 21 October 
2009; Walker to London, 13 July 1971; Walker to London 15 July 1971, FCO 8/1761, TNA.
38) From P. S. Hyem to K. McKern, "Expected Cost to BP of the R.A.F. Withdrawal from Bahrain and 
Sharjah," 16 August 1971, in "Eastern Agencies Cost and Profitability ― Airfield Cost Reports," 
archival reference 5726, papers of the British Petroleum Co Ltd and BP Trading Ltd, available at the 
BP Archive, University of Warwick, Coventry.
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Against all odds, the British retreat and the emergence of new states were 
conducted in a surprisingly peaceful manner. One of the very final orders delivered 
from the British foreign service at the end of 1971, so a British diplomat recalls, 
was ‘to ensure that all the official pianos in the Gulf were regularly tuned’.39) 
However, the process leading to this end was much more contingent, contested and 
fraught. If British imperialism had brought the shadow of a sovereign persona to the 
region in the nineteenth century, the illusion of oil precipitated the evolution of 
sovereign territoriality and, the final shape of the UAE as a fully sovereign state was 
only finalized by a series of haphazard negotiations between all the actors involved, 
including both Britain and the local rulers, which took place in the last moment of 
British withdrawal from the region.
Conclusion: Imperialism and territoriality
A map anticipated a spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, 
rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.40)
This is a quote from Thongchai Winichakul’s study of how the modern map of 
Thailand was created. He argues that the map, based on a delineation of boundaries 
in the modern sense, was not indigenous to the local traditions but rather 
discursively constructed in response to European influence. Such a notion presents a 
striking parallel with the way in which a modern idea of sovereign territoriality 
evolved on the northern coast of the Arabian Peninsula through its contact with 
Britain. 
The creation of arbitrary borders has often been understood as the quintessential 
example of the adverse consequences of European imperialism. However, in case of 
the boundary drawing of the present UAE, there is a certain absence of central will. 
Walker’s map was complicated because it was intended to reflect the local realities 
as much as to support the British case over the Buraimi dispute, and the whole 
process leading to the emergence of the UAE in 1971 was more characterized by 
39) Patrick Wright, "The Run-up to Independence, 1971," in Envoys to the Arab World: MECAS 
Memoirs, 1944-2009, vol. 2, ed. Paul Tempest (London: Stacey International, 2009), 121. I have not 
been able to identify the record of the order in the British National Archives.
40) Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1994), 130.
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disjointed instrumentalism than lead by a fully thought-out strategy.
The question of a central agent brings us back to our original point of departure. 
At this point, it may be helpful to make an analytical distinction between four 
interconnected issues surrounding what is often called the ‘legacy of imperialism’:
(a) A resumption, or a continuation, of the issues that had existed prior to the 
arrival of the imperial power;
(b) The issues that were brought in by, or created through contact with, the 
imperial power;
(c) The issues that were created or exacerbated by the modality of the way in 
which the imperial power departed; and
(d) The issues caused by modernity or modernization.
Partly due to the sense of guilt in the former metropole, or the insecurity of the 
postcolonial states, imperial powers are often condemned not only for their own 
conduct (b), or what has been created by the way in which they left (c), but also 
for problems that in fact existed at the time of their expansion into foreign 
territories (a) or for things that were, in fact, going to happen sooner or later 
regardless of the imperial presence, as long as the region concerned was going to 
experience modernization (d). 
In contrast to the linear borders in many parts of the world, the map drawn by 
Walker was far from simplistic. Its complexity amounting to a ‘jig-saw puzzle’ calls 
into question the assumption that had it not been for the imperial powers the 
borders between postcolonial states would have been much less problematic. The 
puzzle illuminates the contestation between different ideas of space. The conception 
of space is fundamental to our understanding of the world. Dividing land into 
exclusive territories, such as sovereign states, is only one of many ways to think 
about space, but its historical expansion in the world during modern times needs to 
be examined in further depth.
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[Perspective]
Rethinking the Industrial Revolution 
in the Perspective of World History
Young-Suk Lee*1)
Abstract
Traditional historians have regarded the Industrial Revolution as a watershed in British 
historical development. However, the current interpretations are dominated by the gradualist 
view that its process was unspectacular and modest. Gradualist historians also criticize the 
causes and factors of the Industrial Revolution which traditional historians have thought as 
important. The present confusion is derived from the existing academic tradition that while the 
revolutionists have sought the courses of the Industrial Revolution only in the perspective of 
the domestic history, the evolutionists have focused on the comparison between British 
industrialization and others.
Here, we need to reinterpret British industrialization in the perspective of modern world 
history. The Industrial Revolution originated from the using of the machinery in the field of 
cotton spinning, which was stimulated by the deep change from linen and wool to cotton in 
English peoples’ clothes in the eighteenth century. At the time India had a competitive 
advantage in the cotton manufacture, which stemmed from its agriculture. India’s agriculture 
was so productive that the cost of food products was lower than that of Britain. India’s 
competitive advantage in the cotton manufacture was also based on this condition. Inventing a 
series of machines for cotton spinning was an alternative that British manufacturers had to 
choose under this situation.
In short, what was more important is not the invention of machines, but the continuous use 
of them. Machines were also made in other regions. For example, Chinese intellectuals 
invented some elaborate machines for agriculture or water pumping. But they could not be 
used continuously in the country. It was possible only in Britain based upon the steam engines 
or coal. So, the steam engine and coal were more important than the invention of machines in 
the Industrial Revolution. While the labour-intensive economy of India or China was limited 
by the old biological regime in the age of new international trade, Britain succeeded in the 
use of machines driven by the steam engine for producing cotton yarn.
Keywords: biological old regime, coal, cotton manufacture, industrious revolution, machine, 
proto-industrialization, steam engine.
* Gwangju University
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I
The Industrial Revolution refers to the introduction of machinery and the factory 
system to the process of goods-production in Britain. But in a broader sense, it 
covers a series of social and economic changes caused by the expansion of the 
factory system. Of course, the Industrial Revolution did not cause a sudden change 
like a political upheaval. Nevertheless, traditional historians have stressed its 
discontinuities. They thought that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
represented a significant watershed in historical development. Until the early 1970s, 
most historians had accepted that the Industrial Revolution was a period of 
important mixture of technological innovation, industrial development, population 
growth, urbanization and proletarianization which involved marked changes in living 
standards and socio-political relations.
These revolutionist historians used to emphasize competitive markets, the factory 
system, technological innovations and steam power in the Industrial Revolution. 
According to the theory of modernization in the 1960s, it was the first case of 
modern economic growth. Harold Perkin says as follows:
The Industrial Revolution was a revolution in men’s access to the mean of life, in control of 
their ecological environment, in their capacity from the tyranny and niggardliness of nature ... 
It opened the road for men to complete mastery of their physical environment, without the 
inescapable need to exploit each other.1)
However, the current interpretations are dominated by the view that the Industrial 
Revolution was unspectacular, incomplete and modest. Nowadays, gradualist histo-
rians tend to reduce the ‘first industrial revolution’ to a ‘myth’ or a ‘misnomer’.2) 
According to the gradualist view, the ‘first industrial revolution’ no longer serves as 
the paradigm of modernization and the historical guide to economic development. 
The rise of the gradualist perspective is much concerned with the failure of British 
economic growth since the 1970s. The gradualist interpretations can be divided into 
1) H. Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969), 3-4.
2) See the following studies. M. Fores, "The Myth of a British Industrial Revolution," History 66 
(1981): 181-98; R. Cameron, "A New View of European Industrialization," Economic History Review, 
2nd ser., vol. 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-23; D. N. McCloskey, "The Industrial Revolution: A Survey," in 
The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, eds. R. Floud and D. N. McCloskey (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), vol. 1: 103. 
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two categories as follows.3)
First, there are some revisionist studies about the causes and factors of the 
Industrial Revolution. These studies reinterpret some factors that traditional 
historians have regarded as important driving forces of the Industrial Revolution. 
Revisionist historians underestimate technological innovation and the factory system 
during the Industrial Revolution. They also downplay the importance of social and 
economic factors in the late eighteenth century (for example, oversea trade, capital 
accumulation, population growth, enclosure and agricultural improvements, etc.).
Second, some clio-metric historians have produced new macroeconomic indicators 
on industrial output, national income, GNP growth and industrial productivity. These 
new estimates indicate a more modest picture of economic changes in the Industrial 
Revolution than has ever emerged before.4) Productivity and industrial output were 
slow to grow, and the proportion of the fixed capital also increased gradually. 
Therefore, the existence of the Industrial Revolution is placed in doubt. It is no 
exaggeration to say that this macroeconomic interpretation is now a new orthodoxy.
What shall we think about these new perspectives? These interpretations make 
the achievements of the Industrial Revolution to appear insignificant. Both the 
revisionist perspective on the causes of the Industrial Revolution and the econometric 
approach to British industrialization try to show not so much economic discontinuities 
as modest changes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Of course, 
it is true that the Industrial Revolution was not a radical process but a gradual one. 
It was not a sudden change especially in comparison with those of other countries 
in Europe and America. But though the rate of industrialization in Britain in the 
late eighteenth century was less impressive and was restricted to only a few sectors, 
notably cotton textiles and metallurgy, a sense of the economic change and progress 
was impressively obvious to many contemporary observers. The Industrial Revolution 
3) On the summery of gradualist studies and some debates over them, see the following studies. J. 
Hoppit, "Understanding the Industrial revolution," Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (1987): 211-24; 
Hoppit, "Counting the Industrial Revolution," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 43, no. 2 (1990): 
173-93; J. Kamlos, "Thinking about the Industrial Revolution," Journal of European Economic 
History 18 (1989): 191-206; M. Berg and P. Hudson, "Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution," 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 45, no. 1 (1992): 24-50. 
4) For example, according to N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, it is estimated that the rate of 
economic growth per year is 1.9 percent, and the annual increasing rate of national income is 0.5 
percent between 1801 and 1830. See N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, "Output Growth and the 
British Industrial Revolution: A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View," Economic History Review, 
2nd ser., 45, no. 4 (1992): 711-12. These indices are much lower than ones that P. Deane and W. 
A. Cole counted in the 1960s. 
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was not a myth, but actually a historical experience. 
The present confusion in the studies of the Industrial Revolution is derived from 
the tradition of the existing academic world that while the revolutionists have tried 
to seek its important causes and factors only in the perspective of the domestic 
history of Britain, the evolutionists have focused on the comparison between British 
industrialization and others. Therefore, it is necessary for us to reinterpret British 
industrialization in the perspective of modern world history. 
II
According to the traditional view on the Industrial Revolution, the British 
economy changed dramatically in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
It enabled Britain to initiate the economic progress of the world. Why did Britain 
experience the first industrialization? Historians in Britain have tried to find various 
factors which could be regarded as British peculiarities in modern economic history. 
For example, they emphasize several domestic factors such as the growth of the 
population, the rise of free markets, the growth of the middle class, foreign trade, 
the agricultural revolution, the financial revolution, the parliamentary enclosure, the 
development of road and canal networks, and natural resources etc. But it is very 
difficult for us to find British peculiarities in these factors.
Half a century ago, R. M. Hartwell suggested a table on the forces of the 
Industrial Revolution, in which he tried to classify a group of causes and factors 
into five categories such as “capital accumulation, innovations, fortunate factor 
endowments, and market expansion, and miscellany”.5) Perhaps his table could cover 
all the causes which historians had regarded as important. 
Although these causes were necessary for the growth of the British economy in 
the late eighteenth century, they could not be thought as sufficient conditions for 
the Industrial Revolution that were only peculiar to Britain and absent in other 
European countries. Since the 1970s, some historians began to rethink the Industrial 
Revolution not through British domestic history, but in the perspective of European 
history. There are two factors that economic historians have emphasized. One is 
proto-industrialization, that is, the development of rural industries under the 
5) R. M. Hartwell, "The Causes of the Industrial Revolution: An Essay in Methodology," in Causes of 
the Industrial Revolution, ed. R. M. Hartwell (London: Methuen, 1967), 58-59.
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putting-out system in the pre-industrial age. The other is related to a new type of 
family economic activities called the ‘industrious revolution’. 
In the first place, let's look at ‘proto-industrialization’. The term was derived 
from F. Mendels’ dissertation on eighteenth-century Flanders.6) After the publication 
of his dissertation, some economic historians have re-interpreted the development of 
the rural industry in early modern Europe through this idea. Here 
‘proto-industrialization’ means the “market-oriented transformation of raw materials 
into industrial commodities”, where the main labour consisted of rural producers. 
According to Mendels, the rural industry in eighteenth-century Flanders caused the 
marriage rate to go up especially during good economic trends, and this resulted in 
the ratchet-like rise of the population. In short, modern industry originated from 
“the gradual proto-industrialization of rural regions”. Here, “rural industry, outer 
market and symbiosis between agriculture and handicraft industry” were necessary 
conditions for the rise of proto-industrialization.7)
Mendels also read a paper on proto-industrialization at the 8th International 
Economic History Congress in Budapest in 1982. According to his paper, the central 
feature of proto-industrialization was the growth within that region of rural industry 
involving peasant participation in handicraft production for the market. The market 
for the goods produced by this activity was outside the region or even outside the 
national frontiers. And there was an essential linkage between proto-industrial 
activity and commercial agriculture.8) 
On the other hand, some German scholars at the Max Planck Institute of 
Göttingen have initiated a series of studies of proto-industrialization on the basis of 
Mendels’ research since the 1970s. In their views, “proto-industrialization is 
conceptualized as ‘industrialization before industrialization’ which can be defined as 
the development of rural regions in which a large part of the population rely entirely 
or to a considerable extent on industrial mass-production for inter-regional and 
international markets.” So, it is part of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
and belongs to “the second phase of the transition”.9) Proto-industrialization is 
6) F. Mendels, "Industrialization and Population Pressure in Eighteenth-Century Flanders" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969); Mendels, "Proto-Industrialization: the First Phase of the 
Industrial Revolution Process," Journal of Economic History 32, no. 2 (1972): 241-61.
7) Wolfgang Mager, "Proto-industrialization and Proto-industry: the Use and Drawbacks of Two 
Concepts," Continuity and Change 8, no. 2 (1993): 181. 
8) See D. C. Coleman, "Proto-industrialization: A Concept Too Many," Economic History review, 2nd 
ser., 36, no. 2 (1983): 436-37.
9) P. Kriedte, H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm, Industrialization before Industrialization (Cambridge: 
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related to some regional specialization between rural districts. It was concentrated in 
“barren mountain regions” or “harsh mountainous areas”.10) The economy was in 
favour of early marriage and stimulated the production using child labour. It 
resulted in a higher rate of demographic growth.11) Here, the Göttingen group 
seems to be influenced by the tradition of the German history school, of which one 
of the most well-known economic historians, Werner Sombart had emphasized the 
importance of the rural industry in the early modern age.  
Although many historians have tried to regard the proto-industry as important, we 
can not find the evidence of the transition from rural industry to industrialization. 
There is little evidence of population growth in some rural industrial regions in the 
eighteenth century. Some proto-industries were not directly related to the 
putting-out system. More significantly, many rural industrial regions had rather 
declined in the industrial age.12) For example, several English regions of rural 
industry went through “de-industrialization that experienced the impact of industrial 
revolution” during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Coleman’s 
study, only four among ten proto-industrial regions underwent industrialization 
during the Industrial Revolution.13) 
Next, let's examine what the industrious revolution means and how it is related 
to industrialization. Nowadays, some historians tend to regard the industrious 
revolution as one of the factors of the Industrial Revolution. And this trend seems 
to have been influenced by the recent studies emphasizing the factor of demand in 
the eighteenth century. The demand-centered approach is a challenge to the 
tradition of the existing economic history which has focused only on the domestic 
factors. In eighteenth-century Britain, the demand for goods continuously increased 
on the basis of British trade with North America, the Caribbean Sea, the Continent 
and India. Especially the demand for fustian, cotton and woolen goods which were 
produced under the putting-out system connected to the rural industry, was raised 
rapidly. In the eighteenth century, the imports of British industrial goods increased 
two times.
It is said that the industrious revolution preceded the Industrial Revolution, and 
was based upon increased family labour. Jan De Vries locates this revolution in 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 6-7.
10) Kriedte et al., Industrialization before Industrialization, 14, 24.
11) Kriedte et al., Industrialization before Industrialization, 21.
12) S. C. Ogilvie, "Proto-industrialization in Europe," Continuity and Change 8, no. 2 (1993): 161.
13) Coleman, "Proto-industrialization: A Concept Too Many," 443.
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seventeenth-century England, and argues that it was the consequence of the 
appearance of a new range of consumer goods. New consumption possibilities led 
families to work more and enjoy less leisure. This term which De Vries used first 
would certainly help us to reflect English economic development in the early 
modern age, and to understand some changes of labouring people’s life attitude in 
proto-industrial regions of eighteenth-century Britain. De Vries says as follow:
The Industrial Revolution as a historical concept has many shortcomings. A new concept of 
the industrious revolution is proposed to place the Industrial Revolution in a broader historical 
setting. The industrious revolution was a process of household-based resource reallocation that 
increased both the supply of marketed commodities and labour and the demand for 
market-supplied goods. The industrious revolution was a household-level change with important 
demand-side feature that preceded the Industrial Revolution, a supply-side phenomenon. It has 
implications for nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic history.14)
The labouring people began to escape from the pre-industrial life attitude where 
people used to choose leisure over labour after the arrival of the basic life-standard 
in eighteenth-century Britain. The workers in rural industrial regions sought the 
extra income for purchasing new goods and satisfying their new desire. According to 
De Vries, the evidence of the industrious revolution is found in the two changes. 
First, the workers of the proto-industry tried to reduce spending time for leisure 
coping with the increase of marginal utility. Second, they shortened the labour 
hours for self-consumption, and at the same time, prolonged the labour hours 
producing goods for a market. In this process the workers of the rural industries 
employed children and women in the works, and eventually intensified the strength 
of labour.15)  
Certainly the studies on proto-industrialization and the industrious revolution 
originated from emphasis on the demand causes. These studies would help us to 
understand the Industrial Revolution more deeply. But there are two points which 
we should attend to. First of all, these factors are necessary conditions to 
industrialization, but they did not necessarily lead to industrialization in European 
countries. Next, proto-industrialization and the industrious revolution appeared in 
various regions covering Asia in the perspective of world history. There were, for 
example, these phenomena in other European countries, China, Japan or India as 
14) Jan De Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," Journal of Economic 
History 54, no. 2 (1994): 249. 
15) De Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," 257.
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well as Britain in the eighteenth century.16) 
III
For a long time historians have regarded the use of machinery and the factory 
system as the essential features of the Industrial Revolution. Machines were very 
impressive to contemporary intellectuals such as Andrew Ure and Charles Babbage. 
They knew that a machine was a mechanism having its own tools in its body. For 
example, Ure classifies the machinery into three categories. They are “the machines 
concerned in the production of power”, “the machines concerned in the 
transmission and regulation of power” and “the machines concerned in the 
application of power, to modify the various forms of matter into objects of 
commerce.”17) He accurately explains the structure of the spinning machines such as 
jenny, water-frame and mule. Especially the self-acting mule improved in the 1820s 
was regarded as an embodiment of the machinery which initiated the economic 
development during the Industrial Revolution. According to Ure’s explanation, the 
invention of the self-acting mule was related to the factory owners’ effort coping 
with workers’ strikes and riots in the 1820s. It seemed that the machine had 
“finishing spinner’ thinking, feeling and skill”, so it was called ‘iron man’. This 
nickname let us know the fact that the machine stemmed from the necessity of 
labour-saving.18) 
On the other hand, the factory system meant a workshop in which various 
machines were installed. Here, machines should be concentrated on the basis of the 
principle of division of labour and hierarchy. As Marx sharply pointed out in the 
first volume of his Capital, Ure explains the factory system in two ways. First, 
“factory designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult 
and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines 
continuously impelled by a central power.” The second definition is that it involves 
16) In the 1960s and 1970s, some economic historians of China and Japan were interested in the 
problem of ‘capitalistic sprouts’, which was directly related to the rise of rural industries in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And De Vries’s recent book, The Industrious Revolution: 
Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy (2008) deals with the industrious revolution of 
Western Europe and North America. 
17) Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufacture (London: Charles Knight, 1835), 27.
18) Ure, The Philosophy of Manufacture, 36-37.
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“a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting 
in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being 
subordinated to a self-regulated moving force.”19)
Here, the spread of machines and factories in the Industrial Revolution should be 
also understood through its relation to the development of world history rather than 
on the basis of the British domestic situation. There are, at least, two considerations 
that originated from the foreign factors. One is the reason why the machinery was 
invented and used first only in the field of cotton spinning, and the other the 
problem related to the transition from the simple workshop to the factory system.   
Why were the machinery first introduced into the field of cotton spinning? We 
should examine the formation and change of the Euro-centric international trade 
network since the sixteenth century in order to answer that question. In the 
sixteenth century, the core of the New World economy was the establishment and 
growth of a plantation system using imported African slave labour, initially for the 
production of sugar, but eventually adapted to tobacco in the seventeenth century 
and cotton in the eighteenth century. Especially the British created the slave-based 
sugar plantation. It is well-known to historians that many African slaves were taken 
to work in New World plantations in this process.
In the new international trade, Europeans and North American colonists 
accumulated wealth. The trade contributed specially to the growth of the English 
economy in the modern age. The reason the English imported much cotton goods 
from India in the 18th century is because it was of high quality and lower price 
than domestic products (especially linen and wool). There were deep changes from 
linen and wool to cotton in English peoples’ clothes.20) Anyway, it felt good next to 
the skin, was lightweight for summer wear, and was less expensive than goods the 
English could manufacture themselves.
At that time, India’s competitive advantage stemmed from agriculture. India’s 
agriculture was so productive that the cost of food products was lower than that of 
Europe. In the early modern age, Asia’s competitive advantage was agriculture. High 
per acre yields led to low-priced food and low wages, and India’s competitive 
advantage in the cotton manufacture was also based on these conditions.
It seems that the Seven Years’ War was important to the development of the 
19) Ure, The Philosophy of Manufacture, 13-14.
20) E. Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain (London: H. Fisher, R. Fisher, and P. 
Jackson, 1835), 77. 
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British cotton industry. The British Government banned the importation of Indian 
textiles several times in the early eighteenth century. Those procedures stemmed 
from the purpose of developing her domestic cotton industry in Lancashire and 
Cheshire. If British manufacturers depended upon handicraft industry, they could not 
cope with India’s competitive advantage. Inventing a series of machines for cotton 
spinning was an alternative that they had to choose under the situation.    
In short, the triangular trade related to the slave and textiles fueled the growth of 
British shipping and established Manchester as a center of textile manufacture. Raw 
cotton was imported from the Ottoman Empire, and later from the British colonies 
in the Caribbean, and in the 1790s cheaper American raw cotton was imported to 
Lancashire. Eventually from the 1780s it began to be spun by the new spinning 
machines.
The history of innovations in the cotton industry is very well-known to historians. 
At first technological innovations occurred in the field of the cotton spinning 
industry. John Kay’s flying shuttle of 1733 increased the productivity of hand-loom 
weavers. So, the industry needed spinning innovations because of the shortage of 
cotton yarn. James Hargreaves’s spinning jenny (1764), Richard Arkwright’s spinning 
water-frame(1768), and Samuel Crompton’s mule (1779) revolutionized cotton 
spinning. Arkwright and his partners built a number of cotton mills in Lancashire 
and the Midlands with all the characteristic features of the factory system, including 
the precise division of labour and the co-operation of workers in different 
manufacturing processes. The cotton industry became the largest sector of 
manufacturing fields in Britain after the 1790s. 
Was the invention of the machinery unique to the British economy? Although 
many historians regard the machinery as the essence of the Industrial Revolution, it 
is true that it was made and used in other regions such as the Continent, China or 
Japan in the pre-industrial age. In the traditional society, Chinese intellectuals and 
craftsman invented some elaborate machines for agriculture or water pumping. But 
they were not broadly and continuously used among the working people. While 
spinning machines were broadly used with the help of their connection to steam 
engines, that mechanism did not spread in China and in other regions. It is an 
important difference between Britain and other countries especially in the late 
eighteenth century. So, some historians say that the key factor of the Industrial 
Revolution should be sought above all in the use of steam engines based upon coal. 
Here, we should admit the fact that the steam engine and coal were more 
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important than the machinery in the process of the Industrial Revolution. The view 
on the importance of a working machine stemmed from Adam Smith’s theory of 
division of labour. He used the case of the pin-makers to demonstrate the scale of 
the possible improvement on the basis of the division of labour. Though the 
possible advances in productivity by the division of labour and by the use of 
machines may be very substantial, they are also finite. These possible advances 
would be influenced by the scale of demand of the market, and by available energy 
necessary to those advances in productivity. Especially the latter was more important 
during the period of continuous growth of the population. Adam Smith did not 
consider the rapid increase of energy necessary to move and work the machines 
and tools for the production of pins.21)  
Of course, in the early stage of the Industrial Revolution, the connection between 
the spinning machine and the steam engine was not easy. Most spinners and 
manufacturers operated their spinning machines by hand or by water-wheel. At that 
time the somewhat low population density in Britain did not permit manufacturers 
to enable to input many labourers for coping with the increase of the demand for 
cotton yarn. Manufacturers could not help but depend on the steam engine. After 
James Watt’s improvement, it was possible. 
The steam engine was used in the early part of the eighteenth century.  The 
Newcomen engine was inefficient as a device for capturing the energy by the 
combustion of coal.22) But coal was not expensive, so it was used for the purpose 
of pumping water in the mining industry. Since James Watt made the separate 
condensing rotative engine, it became broadly used in the various fields of industry. 
Watt’s critical insight was to cause the steam to condense in a separate chamber 
apart from the piston, and to maintain the temperature of the cylinder at the same 
temperature as the injected steam. This meant that very little heat was absorbed 
into the cylinder itself in each cycle, and thus far more steam pressure was 
available to provide mechanical force. Watt had a working model by 1765.23) The 
field of application for the invention was greatly widened, and Watt made an effort 
21) See E. A. Wrigley, Continuity, Change and Chance: The Character of the Industrial Revolution in 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 73-74.
22) George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 149-50.
23) On Watt’s improvement, see the following studies. D. S. L. Cardwell, From Watt to Clausius: The 
Rise of Thermodynamics in the Early Industrial Age (London: Heinemann, 1971), 71-73; R. L. Hills, 
"The Development of the Steam Engine from Watt to Stephenson," History of Technology 25 (2004): 
181-97. 
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for converting the reciprocating motion of the piston to produce rotational power 
for grinding, weaving and milling. There were steam-powered cotton factories in 
Lancashire and Cheshire in the 1790s. And coal production increased rapidly, 
allowing a similar increase in the production of iron and lead. 
As E. A. Wrigley said, at first coal was only “a cheap substitute for wood as a 
source of heat energy,” and sometimes it was used for the smelting of iron ore in 
Britain.24) But in the eighteenth century it led to the invention of the steam engine, 
and as a result, it also became one of the most important factors in the process of 
British industrialization. So, eventually coal was very important for the development 
of British industrialization. There was no close connection between coal, the steam 
engine and machinery elsewhere in the world other than in Britain in the late 
eighteenth century. This was Britain’s unique characteristic in the world. 
IV
In order to understand the reason why the use of coal was the most important 
cause of the Industrial Revolution, we should examine the changing situations of 
world economic history especially in the early modern age. 
After the making of the New World economy, Western Europe initiated the 
international trade to be prosperous economically. But the trade also stimulated 
other regions. Especially China, India and Japan were also economically as 
prosperous as Western European countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Generally historians in Europe used to regard these Asian regions as a 
counterexample to West European development in the modern age. It was said that 
most of the population were inputted for the purpose of their subsistence, and that 
the situation rendered the investment necessary for an industrial revolution 
impossible. But it was not true. Especially agriculture in China was highly productive 
in comparison with that of Europe. Such efficient agriculture allowed its population 
24) Wrigley, Continuity, Change and Chance, 78. In the seventeenth century coal seems to be used 
broadly for heating. For example, in 1683-4, John Evelyn who visited the blanket fair on the frozen 
Thames, talked about London polluted by coal fuel for heating as follows. “London, by reason of 
the excessive coldness of the air hindering the ascent of the smoke, was so filled with the fuliginous 
steam of the coal, that hardly could one see across the streets, and this filling the lungs with its 
gross particles, exceedingly obstructed the breast, so as one could scarcely breathe.” John Evelyn, 
Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn, ed. William Bray (London: Henry Colburn, 1850 edn.), 
vol. 2: 193.
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to grow.    
In short, eighteenth-century China looked as developed as West European 
countries. Regional specialization gave rise to markets and a commercialized 
economy. The water-based transportation system allowed the efficient movement of 
products and people throughout the empire. But China's advanced market economy 
did not lead to an industrial innovation. China had a highly developed market 
economy within the constraints of the biological old regime. Although the dynamics 
of specialization increased market exchanges and improved transportation, China 
ended up with labour-intensive agriculture rather than industrialization. Here, we 
should consider that Western European countries were also confronted with the 
constraints of the biological old regime in the eighteenth century.
Recently K. Pomeranz examined these constraints more deeply. In his The Great 
Divergence (2000), Pomeranz argues for serious ecological obstacles to further 
growth in all of the most densely populated, market-driven, and commercially 
sophisticated areas of China, India and Western Europe.25) These obstacles were not 
so acute as to cause major food crises, but the regions suffered from shortages of 
fuel, building materials and fiber, and at the same time, from threats to the 
continued fertility of some areas’ soil. Pomeranz examines the attempts made by all 
these core areas to address these shortages through long-distance trade with less 
densely populated Old World areas. But such trade could not provide a fully 
adequate solution.26) Only Britain could escape from the constraints of the biological 
old regime on the basis of coal and the steam engine. Fortunately, in Britain coal 
was close enough to the surface of the ground. He emphasizes “the increasing use 
of coal” as follows.
Coal was central to earlier views of the Industrial Revolution. Only cotton, iron, steel, and 
railways got comparable attention, and except for cotton, these other main sectors depended on 
coal. But more recently coal has often been de-emphasized. People have noted, for instance, 
that more early factories were powered by water than by coal and that most of England's coal 
was used for the unglamourous and not particularly innovative tasks of home heating and 
cooking.27)
In fact, coal shows us irony in the studies of the Industrial Revolution. 
25) See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 5. 
26) Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 20.
27) Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 59.
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Contemporaries attached importance to coal as a factor of industrialization. For 
example, J. R. McColloch, a contemporary economist, focused on the role of coal 
for the development of industry in the 1830s. Coal was the most valuable factor that 
had contributed to the remarkable progress of English manufacture. According to his 
explanation, coal was “a sinew working steam engine.”28) But for a long time 
historians have not paid attention to coal as an important cause of the Industrial 
Revolution. Nowadays some historians such as Wrigley and Pomeranz began to 
emphasize the importance of coal again.
Up to now, the Industrial Revolution has been portrayed as the history of 
invention and use of labour-saving machines. It is said that British manufacturers 
found ways of lowering their costs of productions and hence they turned to 
mechanization. However, without coal and steam power, the cotton textile industry 
alone could not transform the British economy. In the Industrial Revolution, the use 
of coal and the steam engine was more important than the use of machinery. In all 
regions of the Old World from China to England, shortages of land to produce the 
necessities of life were putting limits on any further economic growth. This 
understanding of the ecological limits of the biological old regime opens a new 
window onto the explanation of why the Industrial Revolution occurred first in 
England. 
According to Pomeranz’s explanation, Britain’s advantages in escaping from the 
constraints were largely ecological. Some were related to the fortunate location of 
coal deposits. Others were based on the bounty of the New World. These 
advantages brought about other innovations, and they transformed its economy.29)
V
Let’s summarize the process of the Industrial Revolution again. In the eighteenth 
century the labour-intensive economy of China and India was limited by the 
biological old regime. After the rise of new international trade, this pattern of 
production was strengthened in order to cope with increasing the goods-demand 
from domestic or foreign regions. Although the labour-intensive system was based 
on the higher productivity of agriculture, it could not be continued under the old 
28) J. R. McCulloch, "On Baines and Ure," Edinburgh Review 61 (July 1835): 456.
29) Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 211.
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biological regime.  
But Britain succeeded in the use of machines driven by the steam engine for 
producing cotton yarn. Most important in that innovation was coal. After that, the 
method of getting energy from fossil fuels became a standard for economic activities 
in the world. Modern industrial civilization has developed on the basis of this path. 
Its result is well-known to us: exhaustion of natural resources, environmental 
pollution, global warming, and destruction of the ecosystem. It is no exaggeration to 
say that these negative results cancel out the material wealth gained from modern 
industrial civilization.
144    East Asian Journal of British History, vol. 2 (2012)
Reference
Baines, E. History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain. London: Fisher & Jackson, 1835.
Bassalla, George. The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Berg, M. and P. Hudson. "Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution." Economic History Review, 2nd 
ser., 45, no. 1 (1992): 24-50.
Cameron. "A New View of European Industrialization." Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 38, no. 1 
(1985): 1-23.
Cardwell, D. S. L. From Watt to Clausius: The Rise of Thermodynamics in the Early Industrial Age. 
London: Heinemann, 1971.
Coleman, D. C. "Proto-industrialization: A Concept Too Many." Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 
36, no. 2 (1983): 435-48.
Craft, N. F. R. and C. K. Harley. "Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A 
Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View." Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 45, no. 4 
(1992): 703-30.
De Vries, Jan. "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution." Journal of Economic 
History 54, no. 2 (1994): 249-70.
Evelyn, John. Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn. Edited by William Bray. Vol. 2. London: 
Henry Colburn, 1859.
Fores, M. "The Myth of a British Industrial Revolution." History 66 (1981): 181-98.
Hartwell, R. M., ed. Causes of the Industrial Revolution. London: Methuen, 1967.
Hills, R. L. "The Development of the Steam Engine from Watt to Stephenson." History of Technology 
25 (2004): 181-97.
Hoppit, J. "Understanding the Industrial Revolution." Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (1987): 211-24.
Kriedte, P., H. Medick, and J. Schlumbohm. Industrialization before Industrialization. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Mager, Wolfgang. "Proto-industrialization and Proto-industry: the Use and Drawbacks of Two 
Concepts." Continuity and Change 8, part 2 (1993): 181-215.
McColskey, D. N. "The Industrial Revolution: A Survey." In The Economic History of Britain Since 
1700. Edited by R. Floud and D. N. McCloskey. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981.
McCulloch, J. R. "On Baines and Ure." Edinburgh Review 61 (July 1835): 449-61.
Mendels, F. "Proto-Industrialization: the First Phase of the Industrial Revolution." Journal of 
Economic History 32, no. 2 (1972): 241-61.
Ogilvie, S. C. "Proto-industrialization in Europe." Continuity and Change 8, part 2 (1993): 159-79.
Perkin, Herold. The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1969.
Rethinking the Industrial Revolution in the Perspective of World History    145
Pomeranz, Kenneth. The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 2000.
Ure, Andrew. The Philosophy of Manufacture. London: Charles Knight, 1835.
Wrigley, E. A. Continuity, Change and Chance: the Character of the Industrial Revolution in 
England. Cambridge: Cmabridge University Press, 1990.
[Book Review]
Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British 
Abolitionism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), Pp. 480.
Young Hwi Yoon*1)
Christopher Leslie Brown’s book, Moral Capital: Foundations of British 
Abolitionism offers a promising framework for understanding the seemingly sudden 
rise of the British abolitionist movement in the late eighteenth century. Most of all, 
Moral Capital explains the context in which antislavery sentiment could be 
transformed into a moral and active antislavery ideology, or abolitionism. Brown 
argues that the key can be found in historical events in the revolutionary era; the 
American Revolution raised doubts about the moral authority of the British Empire 
among the British and Americans, and people who already had ill feeling towards 
the slave trade strengthened their political and moral position in the antislavery 
cause during the years of crisis. Many British as well as American colonials found it 
necessary to emphasise the immorality of their counterparts while insisting on their 
own moral superiority; colonial assemblies blamed the British government for the 
transatlantic slave trade, while proponents of the British constitution denounced 
slaveholding in North America. In this way, antislavery sentiment permeated the 
transatlantic channel of communication as the Atlantic world moved towards 
abolitionism, in the atmosphere of tension and disruption caused by the Revolution. 
This explains why many antislavery people started expressing their antipathy towards 
slavery more actively in this particular period.
Furthermore, Brown’s thesis breaks fresh ground in the debate of abolitionists’ 
motivation. Moral Capital does not consider this issue a dichotomous question 
between humanitarianism and material interests, claiming that conflict caused by the 
Revolution formed the atmosphere in which opponents of slavery, the most 
noticeable ‘vice’, could gain moral prestige; thus, the “antislavery argument became 
more useful during the era of the American Revolution and thereafter.”(458) Here, 
* University of Warwick
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Brown analyses abolitionists’ motivation using political scientist John Kane’s concept, 
‘moral capital’. Kane defines it as “moral prestige ― whether of an individual, 
organisation or cause ― in useful service.”1) It means that a moral distinction can 
become a source of power in the world in the way that it facilitates and legitimises 
action. In this view, political cause can be a means to fulfil the moral cause and 
vice‐versa. For example, the Quakers, pioneers of the early antislavery movement, 
expelled slaveholding members from their community according to their religious 
conviction and were able to enhance their social prestige. Thomas Clarkson, a 
representative abolitionist, devoted his life to an altruistic mission and was able to 
get worldly fame, presenting himself as “the redeemer of African liberty.”(439‐42) 
The Brown thesis provides the prolonged debate about whether the abolitionists 
were moralists or hypocrites with a new paradigm. 
Brown’s view of Anglo‐American attitudes towards slavery is a sophisticated one 
but does not convey the whole story. As Moral Capital posits, three questions should 
be answered for a comprehensive understanding of the history of the British 
antislavery movement: how values, perceptions and beliefs hostile to the slave trade 
and slavery developed and spread in the British Atlantic world; how these ideas 
transformed into a political ideology and practical actions for social reforms; and 
how abolitionists eventually achieved the abolition of the slave trade and the 
emancipation of slaves.(17) Moral Capital rightly answers the second and third 
questions but does not give full attention to the rise and spread of antipathy 
towards the slave trade, a premise of the rise of abolitionism. The formation of 
antislavery sentiment needs to be explained more thoroughly and distinguished from 
the growth of a moral ideology or abolitionism. Antislavery sentiment itself 
represents natural ill‐feeling towards something perceived as inhumane. However, 
this antipathy was shared among many people in diverse areas in the Atlantic world, 
advanced by human efforts. Like studies by other scholars over the past decades, 
Brown’s research leaves unexplained questions about the spread of antipathy to the 
slave trade.
The Brown thesis that in a succession of national crises, the antislavery cause 
became a useful one for diverse political ends needs to be interpreted more broadly. 
There was a sense of crisis caused by the Revolution rather than merely a series of 
critical moments. Anglican abolitionists who played a central role in the 
parliamentary campaign, equated wars, riots and the unrest caused by the 
1) John Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7.
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Declaration of Independence with divine judgement. They thought that a national 
crisis resulted from their continued disregard of the inconsistency between slavery 
and religious principles. The Revolution enhanced the aspect of impending 
retribution attached to the crisis and a number of people, particularly evangelical 
Anglicans started taking practical action to prevent the occurrence of further 
national ‘punishment’. The Brown thesis persuasively emphasises the importance of 
the political context of the abolitionist movement, but it is also important to focus 
on the consequence of these political events which made antislavery evangelicals 
begin to take action. Moral Capital overlooks that a sense of crisis was caused by 
these political events and held a strong position in the popular imagination in the 
late eighteenth century. 
Despite these points, the strength of Moral Capital is still substantial. Brown does 
not deal with all the issues of the antislavery movement but does ask the right 
questions and provide proper answers. This is a provocative rereading of the origins 
of late eighteenth century British antislavery and a markedly important attempt to 
transcend a dividing line between ideals and interests in the analysis of abolitionists’ 
motivation. Moral Capital is an outstanding contribution to the historiography of the 
eighteenth‐century antislavery movement, stimulating further studies. 
[Book Review]
How not to write Global History: A Note on Robert Allen’s The British 
Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective
Jacob Frank*1)
Why should one write a review about a book, which is said to be a “highly 
original and superbly researched book”, “a brilliant book on two of the main 
questions of economics”, and whose author “has set new standards for the study of 
one of the most critical episodes of human history”.1) Of course this book, which is 
part of the New Approaches to Economic and Social History serial, is a very useful 
textbook for senior high school students and undergraduate historians and 
economists, but it is unfortunately not academically rigorous and groundbreaking. 
Robert Allen wants to respond to the question, why the Industrial Revolution took 
place in eighteenth‐century Britain and not elsewhere in Europe or Asia. In order to 
do so he narrows down the description of the pre‐industrial economy of Britain and 
its subsequent development. Without the knowledge of technical improvements in 
the eighteenth century it seems impossible to explain the Industrial Revolution. 
The British expansion between 1500 and 1750 established a high wage economy 
in the big cities like London and the remarkable inventions, like the steam engine, 
the water frame, Spinning Jenny and the coke blast furnace, which revolutionized 
the British economy in a decisive way. Coal and financial capital replaced 
manpower and therefore as a consequence the Industrial Revolution originated in 
Britain. For Allen the “Industrial Revolution can be seen as the sequel to that first 
phase of globalization”,2) because the later adoption of technologies by other 
countries on the European continent and the United States made the Industrial 
Revolution a global phenomenon. Since the new inventions were at first not rentable 
* Würzburg Universoty, Germany
1) The quotations belong to Joel Mokyr and Jan Luiten van Zanden (in the blurb). As a remark I would 
like to point to the fact, that the author rather quotes Wikipedia than using the original source, cf. p. 
142.
2) Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 2010), 2. Further 
quotations and references of Allan’s book will just be denoted in the text by using the pagenumbers 
in brackets.
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in other countries, they played a decisive role for the advancement of the British 
industry. But why were these new innovations able to be invented in Britain? Allen 
refers  to the unusual wage and price structure, because anywhere else the grade of 
R&D (research and development) would not have been profitable.(cf. p.7) In general 
the author’s assumption is not revolutionary, because Habakkuk3) went through the 
same case for the American Industrial Revolution in nineteenth-century America. 
The takeover of power in the Dutch colonies in Asia as well as the setup of the 
Indian Empire were fundamental features of the British Industrial Revolution(19-21). 
Unfortunately Allen skips this point, to concentrate his analysis on several economic 
aspects.
The high wages, an agricultural revolution and the cheap energy economy made 
the British pre‐industrial economy capable of being ahead compared against the 
continental economies. Compared to those of other European and Asian countries, 
the British industry had the best premise to be successful. Especially the fact that in 
1800 all English thermal energy derived from coal shows that this raw material was 
a significant factor, which supported the advancement of the Industrial Revolution. 
Nowhere else coal could be provided for a cost less than one gram of silver per 
BTU (British thermal unit)(96-98). Consequently the fuel trajectories alongside with 
the mentioned high wages and agricultural revolution, which brings forth a 
population growth, were responsible for the British success. The moment coal 
became valuable for other sectors of industry, the economical development 
increased accessorily. If the international trade, the agricultural revolution, and the 
cheap energy had not existed, the British cities would not have grown that fast. In 
consequence there would not have been an Industrial Revolution in Britain. 
Regrettably, Allen does not mention the political factors, which distinguished the 
other European countries from the British issue as well.(124f.) For sure, “without 
seventeenth‐century success, wages, agricultural productivity and city size would all 
have been lower in 1800” but the author does not mention with a single word the 
fact, that continental Europe has been shaken to the core by the Thirty Years’ 
War(127).
The Industrial Revolution was one of the great and most significant events in 
history, but Allen wants to mark out why it was a British one. He questions why the 
steam engine, the mechanical spinning, and coke smelting were invented in Britain 
and not somewhere else in Europe or Asia. 
3) John Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1962).
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For this purpose he starts to explain the history of these elementary inventions in 
the following three chapters in two phases: macro inventions and micro inventions. 
In this process it was the high wages, which stimulated the inventive process, 
because “the decision to incur costs to operationalize a technical idea was an 
economic one”(141). The new machines were invented to economize labor, but the 
first macro inventions were not profitable, until the further steps of micro 
inventions, namely the machines developed by R&D, changed this situation. In 
contrast to China, where labor was cheap, Allen points out that the high amount of 
coal made it easy to reduce manpower and due to the micro inventions one could 
save coal as well. Compared to the macro inventions the process of micro‐inventing 
was a more collective one. The following three inventions should illustrate these two 
phases of invention. 
The steam engine is one of the most important inventions during the Industrial 
Revolution. In the phase of macro invention it was Thomas Newcomen (1664-1729), 
who designed and built the first model, which had been the result of a process of 
twelve years of R&D. a century and a half of micro inventions and local learning 
followed on this. John Smeaton (1724-1792) and James Watt (1736-1819) provided 
the basis for the use of steam in many different technologies. The railway and the 
successful British merchant marine depended on these early inventions. But the 
micro inventions were not only beneficial for Britain, because the phase of local 
learning eliminated the advantage and “the improvements in engine efficiency that 
led the steam engine to be the dominant motive power in British mining and 
manufacturing in the middle of the nineteenth century also led to the widespread 
adoption of steam in Western Europe and North America.”(179)
In addition to steam “cotton was the wonder industry of the Industrial 
Revolution”(182) and the mechanization of the yarn-spinning represents the 
technological history of the cotton industry. James Hargreaves (1720-1778) invented 
the Spinning Jenny in the middle of the 1760s, which economized labor and wages. 
In contrast to other inventions it was local learning that led to the invention of 
Spinning Jenny. Richard Arkwright’s (1732-1793) roller spinning, the carding 
machine, and the mule provided the British spinning industry with the possibility to 
compete with the Indian production and enabled it to gain more and more by 
saving expensive labor/manpower. 
The last of the three big inventions was coke smelting, which had been invented 
by Abraham Darby I (1678-1717) in 1709. This procedure was a key invention, 
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because it provided the opportunity to produce cheap iron. Darby's heirs developed 
the process further.  The French, Germans, and Americans could profit from these 
micro inventions when they, at the break of the economic trend, moved directly to 
the advanced technology. In the eighteenth century, like in the other cases of 
inventions as well, the technology was only profitable in Great Britain, but in the 
nineteenth century the process of micro inventions had made it affordable 
everywhere. 
The question of why these inventions were all invented by British inventors and 
not somewhere else has not yet been answered. As “the rate of inventions is 
determined by the supply of inventors as well as by the demand for new products 
and processes”(238) the high wages in Britain made the steam engine, the spinning 
jenny, and coke smelting necessary. Even if Allen states, that “the lack of a coal 
industry was an important difference, another was a more limited supply of 
potential inventors”(238), I absolutely disagree on this point. There were a lot of 
capable inventors all around the world but not in the same fields like in Britain. It 
was mainly the coal industry and its needs, definitely not a surplus of intelligence in 
Britain, that led to the final macro and micro inventions. The British inventions 
were in most instances made possible by knowledge of continental, rather than 
British, origin such as the scientific works of Evangelista Torricelli (1608-1647) and 
Otto von Guericke (1602-1686). After all it was the demand for technologies and not 
the alleged higher level of education that made the Industrial Revolution happen in 
its final steps.(268)
In the end the author provides a rather short conclusion, by stating that the 
“famous inventions of the British Industrial Revolution were responses to Britain’s 
unique economic environment”(272) and that “the British were not more rational or 
prescient than the French in developing coal‐based technologies: The British were 
simply luckier in their geology.”(275) As a consequence it was only just the British 
way that lead into the 20th century. The fact that Allen in the end is just speaking 
of France and Britain and that he considered just the British alternative valuable 
enough to lead to the modern times makes it hard to remember his original aim, 
which was to define the British Industrial Revolution in global perspective. All in all, 
his book provides a good access to the topic of the British Industrial Revolution, 
but there is neither a good comparative method, nor a global perspective. His 
comparisons always include switching partners of comparison. While he compares 
the energy prices of European, Asian, and American cities like London, Amsterdam, 
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Antwerp, Paris, Beijing, Canton, Puna, and Philadelphia (99-102), he mostly 
compares the parameters of research with France while using sources “of varying 
degrees of reliability”(185).4) The more global aspects are not dealt with at all. 
Questions concerning  the consequences of the British Industrial Revolution for the 
largest cotton producers, India and China, who had dominated the cotton market 
for centuries due to the correlation of political and economic factors, are not 
answered. How did the Industrial Revolution influence the military power of Britain, 
which made it able to become the first global Empire in the modern times? These 
questions must regrettably be put aside for now.
4) One extremely demonstrative point is Allen’s rather bad comparative analysis on p.163. To the 
question “Why the steam engine was invented in Britain rather than France or China” follows a 
comparison between France and Britain, but China will never appear again in this context.
[Book Review]
Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of 
Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), xv + 480Pp.
Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the 
Great War, 1914-1919 (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), xviii + 363Pp.
Jong Nam Na*1)
Increasing interest on 100th Anniversary of the First World War are flooding all 
around the Western academia. The rapid increase of book publications on the Great 
War is a part of the heated phenomenon on its first centenary. Various perspectives 
on the Great War even including fashion and religion are guiding readers to enlarge 
the scope and deepen the depth of this event. That is the major source that makes 
sincere readers happy everyday. 
It seems, however, that the booming interests on the Great War are not an Asian 
but a Western trend. Asians have been quite away from the war, although they were 
in the very middle of it. Japan was the only active and volunteer participant of the 
Great War in Asia. Therefore looking into Japanese perspectives on the Great War 
might be the first step to enlarge and deepen overall understanding on this global 
event. Among various topics, how Japan accepted the idea of empire and practiced 
it vis-à-vis her neighbors in particular has attracted historians’ interest so far. 
Among several masterpieces, works by Peter Duus and Frederick R. Dickinson 
provide readers with some well-connected ideas on the Japanese road to the First 
World War that focus on why and how.
Peter Duss analyzes both origin of the Meiji imperialism and changing patterns of 
Japanese Korean policy during 1870-1910, focusing on political and economic 
perspectives. While arguing the external origin of Japanese imperialism, he mostly 
touches on why and how Japan learned imperialism from the West and how she 
applied it to Korea and changed it by necessity. This volume raises questions on 
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two main issues: the political perspectives of Japanese imperialism from 1870 to 
1910, from “Subdue Korea” debates to official annexation of Korean Peninsula, and 
the economic perspectives of the Meiji Japan’s Korean policy by viewing trade, 
migration, settler community, and land acquisition during this period. From these 
ideas, readers can catch the detailed process of Japanese imperial policy over 
Korea. Interestingly at the last two chapters, the author also suggests how Japanese 
imperialism was transformed in cultural, racial, and historical contexts, quite 
differently from Western imperialism over Asia and other regions.
Basic assumption of the author’s main argument is the Meiji leaders’ 
understanding of the genuine reality of the Western imperialism that is defined as “a 
collective enterprise, a bandwagon ridden by a diverse band of passengers who 
climb abroad at different times with different destination but who are heading in 
the same direction.” Under this concept, as the author argues, Japanese leaders 
emphasized both political and economical aspects of the imperialism, which were 
“separate but interlinked, and reinforcing each other.” 
Interestingly enough, although Japan learned imperialism from the West as a 
latecomer, what made Japanese imperialism successful even more than the Western 
imperialism were the Japan’s self-consciousness or self-definition in her relation 
with neighboring countries and with the West. According to the author, it was Meiji 
leaders’ concept of “national prestige” and “national unity” which stimulated them to 
learn from Western countries. In other words, not to be isolated from or to follow 
up the mainstream of the world, Japanese leaders found that modernity was the 
most urgent mission. Probably it was the very starting point of Japanese imperialism. 
So, before Japan started overseas expansion, Japanese leaders made best efforts to 
modernize their society for almost two decades. After then, Japan just followed 
Western examples. 
About the origin of imperialism in the Meiji Japan, differently from Stewart Lone’s 
“origin from crisis against Western threats” concept, Duus argues that what invited 
Japanese leaders to the race of the nineteenth century style imperialism was their 
voluntary effort to follow the West. In other words, it was quite a pervasive notion 
among Japanese society that not to fall behind the race, Japanese should make their 
best efforts to learn from the West, and found some place to apply it exactly as 
they learned. So Duus emphasizes the active and voluntary aspects of the Japanese 
imperialism. However, again the author argues that Japan’s imperialism was just a 
mimicry supported by the request of national modernization. 
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While covering every detailed developments of Japan’s Korean policy, the author 
argues that because Japanese leaders had failed to find proper Korean collaborators 
until 1907 at the earliest, the reformation of Korean government was delayed and 
other related policies were also deadlocked. In fact, as Duus says, although Japan 
assisted several political factions in Korean government to start modernization 
program with Japan’s support, no group made successful reform until 1910 due to 
intervention of foreign powers, Korean government’s objections, and, most decisively, 
the lack of their will to modernize themselves. Therefore, due to the delayed reform 
of Korean government, Japanese imperialist suffered from various kinds of furious 
protests from all over the Korean society.
One of the most controversial arguments comes at the last chapter in which the 
author suggests different aspects of Japanese imperialism from Western imperialism. 
First of all, Duus argues that Japan’s Korean policy was different from Great 
Britain’s Indian policy in cultural, racial, historical aspects. He also continues that 
Japanese leaders had clear ideas of so-called “Yellow men’s burden” even from 
when they started to think of the Korean problem. Based on some special emphasis 
on homogeneous cultural, racial, and historical background with Korea, Japanese 
leaders rather focused on the reform and modernization of Korea than imperial 
plunders. They, Duus continues, also tried to help Korea and stimulated Korean 
people to start the modernization as Japan did two decades ago. In that sense, 
“Yellow men’s burden” was different from “White men’s burden”, although these 
concepts became basic foundations of 1930s’ more pervasive and aggressive 
imperialistic ideas, so-called “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.”
While organizing quite detailed description on Japan’s experience of the Great 
War between 1914 and 1919, Frederick R. Dickinson argues that it was the First 
World War which resulted in the shaping of essential Japanese national identity and 
“renovation.” Dickinson assumes that Japan learned different or even bad lessons 
from the war when compared to European countries, because she participated in 
only small battles against Germany in China and suffered relatively small numbers of 
casualties and economic losses. Unfortunately, as the author continues, this 
experience blocked Japan herself from joining the newly emerged Wilsonian system, 
new mainstream of the world after the war. He also argues that Japan’s national 
identity which was shaped during the Great War period became the basis of another 
aggressive military imperialism of 1930s and, finally, resulted in the tragic outcomes 
of the Second World War. So, Japan could not join the world’s mainstream until 
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1945 when she lost the wrongly shaped national identity during the Great War 
period.
Another important point of this book is the author’s challenge to the old 
scholarly argument that “Japanese imperial policy was the product of unitary voices 
of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.” By focusing on Kato Takaaki’s role in foreign 
policy making process during the Great War period, Dickinson  argues that Japan’s 
“imperialistic” foreign policy was the product of two politically opposing voices, not 
of the unitary military-bureaucratic oligarchic decision.
Basically Dickinson traces how Japan experienced the Europe’s war on the 
opposite side of the globe, how Japan tried to maximize this “Divine Aid” 
opportunity in China and the Continent, how Japanese leaders accepted every 
changing situation, and how Japan’s domestic power structure changed to follow up 
this international situations. To approach this series of processes, the author mostly 
starts from both Japanese political leaders’ world-views and their recognition of 
Japan as a modern country.
First of all, the author invites his readers to the Japanese leader’s understanding 
of the European War in 1914. According to the author, most Japanese leaders 
considered the war on the other side of the world as the “Divine Aid for the 
Destiny of Japan,” which was already an imperialist country. So, they were very 
pleased by the situation, with which they could maximize Japan’s national interest 
at the Continent and China in particular. Probably this is one of Dickinson’s basic 
assumptions of why this war was important in making Japan’s essential national 
identity.
About the character of Japanese imperialism, the author assumes that Japanese 
goal of foreign policy was more than a strategic response to external event. Rather, 
he defines Japanese foreign policy as a component of the much greater enterprise, 
“the quest for national renovation.” In this context, Dickinson criticizes the “crisis 
based imperial reaction” interpretation, as Peter Duus does. He also agrees that 
Meiji Japan started her overseas expansions not because of the reaction to Western 
threats but because of Japan’s voluntary will of strengthening national unity and to 
follow the advanced Western countries. 
What makes this book distinctive is the author’s detailed coverage of the 
domestic power relation of Taisho Japan, which finally produced the Japanese 
national identity during this period. According to the author, in the Okuma, 
Terauch, and Hara cabinets which rose and down during the Great War period, 
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Japan’s foreign policy was handled by two political groups, which had totally 
confronting ideas and priorities of interests. First, Dickinson introduces Kato Takaai 
and the Doshikai, which pursued British models of constitutional governmental 
system. While arguing for the autonomy of foreign policy from interventions of the 
Genro and other military-bureaucratic oligarchic interest, Kato tried to attain 
Japan’s national interests not through war or military operation but through 
diplomatic negotiation. 
On the contrary, Yamagata faction and like-minded political factors such as the 
Seiyukai principally emphasized the roles of military in the foreign policy. To this 
faction, threats from the Untied States in near future became the starting point of 
their idea of foreign policy. Thus, they focused on the military expansion in China 
to defend Japan’s monopoly in particular and moved to contract with Russia in 1916 
to respond against United States’ possible attack to Japanese exclusive interest in 
China. To show two different concepts around Japanese foreign policy from 
contrasting polities, the author picks three important agenda: the Nishihara Loan, 
the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement, the Siberian Intervention. 
About Kato’s Twenty One Demands, Dickinson also criticizes the old scholarly 
belief, which has regarded it as the representative example of Japanese harsh 
imperial policy. But he interprets this document as quite normal, not harsh, and 
standard levels of imperial policy, differently from existing argument which also has 
considered this as a foreboding of 1930s aggressive imperialism. Another interesting 
interpretation of this book comes from the author’s emphasis on Japanese active 
reaction against the Russian Revolution in 1917. Especially about the Siberian 
intervention, Dickinson argues that Japanese leaders actively reacted not just to 
block the expansion of Bolshevik but also to strengthen Japan’s position on the 
Continent. 
About Japanese leaders’ reaction against Wilsonian ideas, Dickinson argues that 
this new world order brought about enormous shocks to Japanese society that could 
be compared to the aftermath of Perry’s “black ship.” However, unlike in the 1860s, 
Japanese leaders responded conservatively. They suppressed March First Movement at 
Korea by using military troops and prohibited several democratic social movements 
even in Japan. Moreover, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy went further. They 
started another mobilization in order to stimulate new “nationalism” spirits in 
Japanese society. Unfortunately, these were the very reactions which resulted in later 
aggressive militarism in 1930s.
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